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This dissertation explores the reasons that court-involved youth in New 
York City are sent to institutional placement (incarcerated), and assesses the 
impact of placement on future recidivism. Unlike adult dispositions, family court 
dispositions for juveniles are driven by two distinct goals: protecting public safety 
and acting in the best interests of the youth. These interests may act in concert, or 
they may be at odds with one another. That is, the disposition that is best suited to 
protecting public safety may not be the one that is best for the youth. Given this 
dilemma, what are the real reasons behind decisions to incarcerate New York City 
juvenile delinquents? 
I find that the main forces behind the placement decisions have less to do 
with criminogenic risk factors and assessed needs, and more to do with factors that 
characterize youths’ relationships with the court itself. These factors often 
represent the degree to which youth have “learned their lesson” and demonstrate 
that they can comply with court orders. However, despite the profound impact that 
they have on the risk of incarceration, these characteristics and dynamics are not 
very predictive of the risk of recidivism. 
Placement itself, at least in the short term, does not appear to affect the risk 
of recidivism. It neither decreases recidivism, as deterrence theory would predict, 
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find some evidence that school engagement may condition this relationship. 
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Introduction and Research Agenda 

1.1 Primary Research Goal: The Impact of Juvenile Incarceration on 
Recidivism 
There has been longstanding interest about the effect of incarceration on 
the risk of future recidivism. Common wisdom proposes that imprisonment deters 
offenders from committing subsequent crime through incapacitation, and by 
making the consequences of illegal activities tangible. However, others argue that 
offending is more a product of social background and life circumstances than 
rational calculation and therefore, that incarceration holds little promise to prevent 
future crime. In some cases, imprisoning offenders may actually increase their 
likelihood of re-offending, as criminal records reduce access to legitimate life 
pathways and attach harmful stigmas to the incarcerated. Furthermore, prison has 
been characterized as a sort of “school for criminals,” where inmates become more 
deeply entrenched in criminal lifestyles, develop delinquent identities, acquire 
negative peers, and learn more sophisticated criminal techniques (see Branham 
1992). 
While discussions abound about the utility of incarceration for adult 
offenders, the effect of juvenile incarceration on subsequent criminal trajectories is 
less well-explored. Few studies address the relationship between sentencing and 
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distinguish the impact of incarceration on youth with diverse social and legal 
backgrounds. In this dissertation, I explore the effects of juvenile incarceration on 
future recidivism using social and legal history data about adjudicated juvenile 
delinquents in New York City. Principally, I compare the recidivism patterns of 
youths who receive different types of dispositions (i.e., institutional placement 
versus probation and other community-based sentences) while controlling for 
social background and legal history variables – thus answering the most 
fundamental question about how juvenile incarceration affects subsequent re-
offending. 
More relevantly, I assess the utility of incarceration for youth with different 
personal, social and legal profiles. The effects of incarceration are likely to vary by 
offender characteristics (DeJong 1997; Orsagh and Chen 1988; Sherman 1993). 
Because my dissertation data contain information about a variety of background 
factors (e.g. demographics, family history, substance abuse patterns, educational 
history, peer groups), I can evaluate the deterrent effect of incarceration (or lack 
thereof) on youth with diverse social and legal histories. I explore the impact of a 
range of disposition-types on recidivism for youth with different backgrounds and 
profiles. Which types of youth, for example, benefit
i most from community-based 
sentences like probation? Which benefit most from institutional placement?
ii 
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potentially harmful. In New York, incarcerating a young person for a year costs 
about $70,000.
iii New York City pays about half of that amount for each local 
youth sent to state placement. Concern about the effectiveness of incarceration is 
therefore both financial and ethical, and these dimensions are intertwined. 
Policymakers must ask themselves: What return are we getting on this expense? 
And more broadly: What is the primary purpose of incarceration, and are we 
achieving this goal? Incarceration certainly incapacitates for a discrete period of 
time, but if its intent is to deter or rehabilitate, then we must assess its ability to do 
so. If juvenile incarceration has a criminogenic effect, then government needs to 
think very hard about the youth that are sent away, and their condition upon return. 
1.2 Secondary Research Goal: Exploring Family Court Decision-Making 
While my primary research interest in this dissertation has to do with the 
impact of incarceration on juvenile recidivism, my data also allow me to closely 
investigate the nature of family court processing. In doing so, I can paint a detailed 
portrait of pathways through the juvenile justice system. I attempt to identify 
factors associated with discretionary court actions such as dispositional 
recommendations made by juvenile probation officers, and judges’ ultimate 
dispositional decisions. Thus, I aim to determine not only the ways in which 
delinquent youth respond to placement, but also the reasons that youth end up in 
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useful policy implications. In mapping youths’ pathways through the system, and 
describing the impacts of official decisions on subsequent patterns of offending, I 
hope to identify discretionary decisions that may negatively affect the lives of 
youth, and to propose ways that these decisions might be improved. If, 
hypothetically, placement has a negative impact on a group of “marginal” youth – 
kids whose criminal and personal profiles place them on the border of a placement 
and a probation disposition – then maybe these youth should be proactively 
funneled into community-based alternatives to placement. If placement has the 
most adverse affect on a “high-risk” group of youth who are extremely likely to be 
placed by the court, perhaps the state needs to focus attention on the services that 
these youth receive while incarcerated, and the nature of post-release supervision 
and services. More specifically, I attempt to discern differential effects by degree 
of social bonding and neighborhood characteristics. 
1.3 Structural Logic of the Dissertation 
This dissertation’s structural logic follows a series of research questions – 
each reflecting a critical juncture in the arrangement of contacts between youth 
and the justice system. I explore these questions separately, but also consider their 
implications on one another. The questions are: 
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If a youth has been found “involved”
iv in an offense, the disposition 
process is set in motion. This process will culminate in a sentence handed down by 
a family court judge. However, much of the substantive investigative work that 
feeds into this sentence is done by juvenile probation officers (JPOs), who write 
pre-sentence reports called “investigation and recommendation” (“I&R”) reports 
for family court judges. These reports describe youths’ offenses, legal histories, 
school information, family backgrounds, community involvement, peer influences, 
mental health, and substance use patterns. I&Rs culminate in a recommendation to 
the juvenile bench – typically either for probation or placement. In most cases, 
JPO recommendations and judges’ dispositions agree. In my data, when JPOs 
recommended probation, judges gave probation sentences 94% of the time; when 
JPOs recommended placement, judges gave placement sentences 74% of the time. 
I will discuss this in more detail in chapter four. There is some scholarly debate 
about whether JPO recommendations drive judicial decisions or vice versa, but the 
important point here is that JPOs play an integral role in filtering information 
about court-involved youth to judges, and are one of the principal driving forces 
behind the disposition. In New York City in 2000, there was no standardized risk-
assessment instrument in place in the probation department, so JPOs were given 
wide discretion in rationalizing their recommendations.
v As such, their personal 
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themselves at the end of their family court experience.  
2. What characteristics of youth are predictive of placement dispositions? 
While JPO recommendations are important, judges’ disposition decisions 
serve as the final word regarding whether youth are placed or allowed to remain at 
home under some form of supervision. Therefore, I will predict placement 
dispositions for my study sample, identifying the factors that judges consider most 
important in making the decision to incarcerate youth. This analysis will likely 
yield a laundry list of factors, such as offense severity, legal history, school 
engagement and family functioning, which are significantly predictive of 
placement. I will also estimate a multivariate regression model that predicts 
instances when judges override the dispositional recommendations of JPOs, in 
order to explore this critical area of agreement and disagreement.  
Overall, it will be interesting to identify the characteristics of youth that are 
most likely to lead them to placement. In subsequent analyses, I will compare 
these characteristics to those that predict recidivism, in order to determine how 
closely court rationales align with real risk of offending.  
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As a first step in the recidivism analysis, I will estimate multivariate models, 
without including the placement variable, so as to initially identify those 
characteristics most closely associated with re-offending. This analysis will also 
allow me to compare factors that predict re-offending with factors that predict 
placement. The prediction of recidivism will serve as a starting point for answering 
my central research question: 
a. Does placement have an impact on recidivism?   
Subsequent models will include the placement variable, allowing an 
analysis of the effect of placement on recidivism. Thus, I will determine 
whether placement has, in the aggregate, a deterrent effect, a criminogenic 
effect, or no discernable effect. 
b. Does this placement impact vary by youth characteristics? 
Using criminological theories as guiding frameworks, I will study the 
interaction between placement and youth characteristics in predicting 
recidivism. I will attempt to identify sub-groups of youth for whom 
placement has a deterrent or rehabilitative effect (i.e., placement reduces 
subsequent recidivism), and sub-groups for whom placement has a 
criminogenic impact (i.e., it increases recidivism). Specifically, I will 
attempt to determine whether the impact of placement on recidivism varies 
by degree of conventional social bonding, or by neighborhood 
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about the intricate relationship between youth characteristics, the court 
process, and patterns of criminality. 
1.4 Chapter Structure 
Chapter Two will begin with a review of relevant literature. This review 
will cover scholarship about juvenile court processing and decision-making, as 
well as research on the incarceration of youth and its consequences. I will also 
outline research on the effects of incarceration on adult offender populations. 
Chapter Two will also present the theoretical foundations of the analysis. 
Organizational perspectives will frame the analysis of court decision-making. 
Criminological theories drive the analysis of incarceration effects. The central 
research question – regarding the impact of placement on recidivism – emerges 
from deterrence, labeling, and differential association theories. To explore the 
interaction between placement effects and youth characteristics, I derive 
hypotheses from control theory and social disorganization theory. Again, I think 
that placement effects may vary by degree of conventional social bonding, and by 
neighborhood conditions. 
Chapter Three describes my data and methodological approach. Issues of 
data collection, quality checking, reliability, and validity are covered, and I present 
descriptive statistics about study subjects. I also discuss limitations of the data set 
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answer research questions, and describe their strengths and weaknesses.  
Chapter Four presents the results of my family court processing analysis. I 
statistically model both JPO dispositional recommendations and judges’ 
dispositional decisions, and explore their relationship to one another. Principally, I 
try to determine why youth end up in placement, and highlight individual- and 
case-level characteristics that are significantly associated with family court 
decisions. I also try to figure out why judges override JPO recommendations.  
Chapter Five presents analyses that answer my central research questions. I 
use logistic regression and survival analysis to assess the overall impact of 
placement on recidivism. I construct a series of models with theoretically derived 
interaction terms to illustrate the ways that placement effects are conditioned by 
youths’ characteristics. To gain a holistic understanding of patterns of recidivism, I 
estimate a series of models with different dependent measures, including time to 
re-arrest, time to re-arrest for a felony offense, time to re-arrest for a violent crime, 
and time to re-arrest for a violent felony. 
The final chapter provides a review of findings and a discussion of 
scholarly and policy implications. This dissertation will contribute to literature on 
delinquency risk, deterrence, labeling, social bonding, and other theoretical 
correlates of recidivism. I use the main research questions to test the applicability 
of several theories of delinquency and crime. This research also engages 
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been underexamined in this regard. Practically, this can inform juvenile justice 
decision-making by effectively specifying profiles of youth for whom 
incarceration holds the most rehabilitative promise, and those who are best served 
by community-based sentencing. 
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Overview of Family Court Processing and Review of Relevant Literature 
This chapter begins with a detailed overview of juvenile justice processing 
in New York City. Specifically, I identify critical decision points and key actors in 
this process, and highlight the points where young offenders can be diverted from 
further involvement, or be pushed deeper into the system (i.e., towards placement). 
This overview should clarify the pathways to placement, as well as the means by 
which youth may avoid being placed.  
New York City is, of course, a unique place with distinctive demographics 
and social conditions. In this dissertation, it is therefore important to frame the 
analysis in the context of similar research done in other jurisdictions, in order to be 
able to situate my findings in a broader body of work. In this chapter then, I also 
review relevant literature on family court decision-making, juvenile incarceration, 
and the relationship between incarceration and recidivism. Finally, I outline the 
criminological theory scholarship from which I draw hypotheses about 
incarceration effects and the interactions between incarceration and individual 
characteristics. 
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Figure 2.1, below, provides a visual outline of family court processing in 
New York City. This is a relatively simplified representation, but all of the critical 
decision points in the process are depicted. There are a number of decisions that 
can divert youth from further involvement with the system, or postpone further 
involvement by giving youth the chance to stay out of trouble for a set period of 
time. 
Figure 2.1: Juvenile Justice Processing in New York City 
Arrest 
Intake 
Petition 
Fact Finding 
Disposition 
Adjustment 
Decline to petition 
Not involved 
Placement  Probation  Other 
Youth Card 
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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.The process starts with an arrest. While most youth who are arrested will 
go through the intake, adjudication and disposition process in family court, some 
receive a “Youth Card” at arrest. The Youth Card is an extremely mild sanction, 
and is generally given to youth who have committed non-serious, non-violent 
offenses such as turnstile-jumping, possession of graffiti instruments, or very 
minor theft. Those who receive these Youth Cards do not have to come to family 
court, and their cases essentially end at arrest. If they are re-arrested later however, 
police and the courts may take prior Youth Cards into account in making 
subsequent decisions. 
Most youth between the ages of seven and fifteen (at the time of offense) 
who are charged with committing an act that would constitute a crime if 
committed by an adult are labeled “juvenile delinquents;” their cases are processed 
in family court. After a youth is arrested, he or she is brought to the family court 
for intake.
vi,vii At intake, the youth is interviewed by a juvenile probation officer, 
who asks questions about the current offense, family situation, peer group, school 
performance, drug use, and other pertinent social and behavioral characteristics. 
The JPO also fills in information about legal history, including status offenses. At 
this point, the JPO can “adjust” the case. Adjustment
viii means that the case will 
not go forward at that point, and the youth is released. If the youth stays out of 
trouble for a set period of time – typically six months – the case is stricken from 
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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.the record; if the youth is re-arrested, or is truant from school, or violates some 
other condition of the adjustment, the original case can be reopened for 
adjudication and disposition. About fifteen percent of cases that reach intake each 
year are adjusted.
ix 
If the case is not adjusted, results of the JPO’s preliminary investigation are 
shared with the presiding judge, and the JPO makes a recommendation to the 
bench regarding the youth’s detention status until the next court date. The judge 
ultimately decides whether the youth will be detained or not, and if so, what the 
level of restriction for detention will be.
x 
Next, the case is brought to the city’s Corporation Counsel – the family 
court prosecutor. Corporation Counsel examines the details of the case, and 
decides whether to continue with the petition. If there is weak evidence, 
Corporation Counsel can decline to prosecute, effectively ending the case. If, on 
the other hand, the prosecutor decides to go forward, final charges are determined 
and a next court date is arranged. The final petition is given to the judge. This 
document lists the exact charges, describes the alleged offense, and includes 
victims’ statements and police reports. 
If Corporation Counsel chooses to petition, a series of hearings are held in 
family court regarding the case. These hearings are called fact-finding, and are 
meant to determine the youth’s guilt or innocence. During these hearings, the 
judge will hear from the youth, the youth’s family, victims, police officers, and 
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words “guilty” and “innocent” are not used. Instead the youth is found to be 
“involved” or “not involved.” Being found “not involved” is equivalent to 
acquittal, and ends the case. Conversely, a youth who is found to be involved in 
the alleged offense is scheduled for a dispositional hearing, which will decide the 
sentence. 
If fact-finding establishes involvement in the crime, a juvenile probation 
officer is assigned to the case, and writes an investigation and recommendation 
report (I&R).
xi The I&R is analogous to the pre-sentencing investigation in adult 
criminal processing, although with much greater emphasis on so-called 
“extralegal” factors such as family functioning and school involvement. To 
complete the I&R, the JPO will interview the youth and the youth’s family, check 
to see if the family has any official complaints of neglect or abuse,
xii look up the 
youth’s legal history, and obtain attendance and grade reports from school. The 
I&R narrative broadly covers the following topics: 
•  Current offense; 
•  Legal history; 
•  History of status offenses (PINS complaints); 
•  Family structure; 
•  Family conflict; 
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enrollment, mental health issues, substance use, and criminal records; 
•	 Grades, attendance, school conduct, special education status; 
•	 Peer influences, including reported gang membership or affiliation; 
•	 Community or organizational involvement, such as church attendance, 
membership in clubs, and participation in sports; 
•	 Use of free time; 
•	 Drug and alcohol use; 
•  Mental health. 
At the end of the I&R report, the JPO makes a dispositional recommendation to 
the judge. Typically, this recommendation is for placement or for probation. The 
judge then makes a dispositional (sentencing) decision based on information in the 
I&R, and his or her understanding of the case. In the vast majority of cases, 
judges’ dispositional decisions agree with JPO recommendations. Below, I outline 
the sanctions that judges may issue.
xiii 
The most severe sanction that youth can receive from the family court is 
institutional placement, which removes the youth from the community for a period 
of six to twenty-four months. The restrictiveness of placement can vary between 
non-secure, limited secure, and secure, with different state facilities offering 
different levels of restriction. Schooling is provided in placement, though it is 
generally understood that the quality of education is poor. There are several 
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and at different times of the year, so designing curriculum that meets the needs of 
all placed youth is quite difficult. Second, educational staff and materials are not 
likely to be very good in placement facilities. And finally, for a variety of reasons, 
placed youth are probably not very well-engaged in school. 
Some youth, usually those with specific needs and who are less “risky,” are 
sent to state-contracted voluntary agencies, which run facilities providing 
specialized treatment approaches for issues like drug dependence and sexual 
abuse. Placement-bound youth are screened by these agencies prior to disposition; 
the agencies make admission decisions based on program suitability and available 
bed space. 
Youth who are sent to placement (including voluntary agencies) do not 
spend their entire sentence incarcerated. Typically, they stay in placement for 60­
80% of their sentenced time, and then are released to aftercare, a form of juvenile 
parole. While on aftercare, they check in regularly with aftercare workers (akin to 
adult parole officers), who monitor their behavior, and can violate youth for 
truancy or delinquency, sending them back to placement. 
Other placement-bound youth are sent to community-based alternative-to­
placement programs. These youth, in general, are slightly less “risky” than those 
who do go to placement. In 2000, there were essentially two such programs – both 
of which still exist.
xiv One is Juvenile Intensive Supervised Probation (JISP), 
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with higher frequency of contact, longer sentence length (usually eighteen to 
twenty-four months), and stricter compliance requirements. The other program is 
called the Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services (CASES) – 
a non-profit agency which specializes in providing educational and employment 
programming. Like JISP, CASES requirements are generally quite strict, and 
typically include remaining arrest-free, obeying a curfew, going to school, 
attending mandated services, and refraining from drug use. Youth who fail to meet 
the conditions of their JISP or CASES supervision are terminated from the 
program and re-adjudicated in family court. 
Less risky youth are given normal probation (six to twenty-four months; 
typically twelve or eighteen), which involves regular meetings with a probation 
officer, as well as some combination of other requirements such as staying in 
school and not getting arrested. When appropriate, youth will be mandated to 
attend drug treatment, counseling, psychiatric services, or an educational program 
alongside the other requirements of their probation supervision. The Department of 
Probation has a number of formal and informal arrangements with local service 
agencies, and attempts to refer young probationers to appropriate services in their 
neighborhoods. Youth who do not meet their probation conditions are issued 
violations by their probation officer (in professional parlance, they are violated), 
re-adjudicated in family court, and given a new disposition. The new disposition is 
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get longer probation, more intensive probation, or be sent to state placement. This 
is sometimes called “stepping up” sanctions. 
The least risky youth are given a conditional discharge (CD), which is a 
short (six to twelve month) community-based sentence with few, if any, 
requirements. No regular meetings with probation officers or other court officials 
are required. This disposition is common for first-time offenders who commit 
minor, non-violent crimes (e.g., turnstile jumping, graffiti, low-level theft). 
Generally, a youth will only have to remain arrest-free to successfully complete 
this sentence. Upon completion of CD, the case is retroactively dismissed and the 
youth’s record is sealed. 
2.2 Predictors of Juvenile Dispositions: Why Do Youth Get Placed? 
As an initial analytical step in this dissertation, I aim to identify the types 
of youth who are likely to end up in placement. In this section, I cover prior 
research on the prediction of juvenile dispositions. Since its inception at the turn of 
the century, the American juvenile justice system has been governed by a dualistic 
philosophy that distinguishes it from the adult justice system. Adult sentencing is a 
fairly routine process that relies heavily on legal factors such as the current offense 
and the offender’s history of legal involvement, while decisions in the juvenile 
justice system are rooted in a much more expansive doctrine that entails more 
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Chein 1981). The rationale behind adult sentences is driven by concerns about 
public safety, and while this issue is certainly considered in juvenile dispositions, 
concerns about the welfare of the offender him- or herself play a much more 
important role in dispositional decisions about young offenders. Consider the New 
York State Family Court Act, which states: 
“In determining an appropriate order the court shall consider the needs and 
best interests of the respondent as well as the need for protection of the 
community. [The court] shall order the least restrictive available 
alternative…” (§352.2) 
The goal of “child saving,” more formally known as parens patriae,
xv allows an 
array of extra-legal factors to be considered by the court in making dispositional 
decisions. The state is to act as surrogate parent, and not in an adversarial manner 
towards the child (Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 542 (1966)). This is not to say 
that extra-legal factors do not play a role in adult court decisions – only that these 
factors have a more explicit place in family court. The dualistic philosophy of 
juvenile justice often results in confusion over the purposes of sanctioning, and 
creates tension between the competing goals of preserving public safety and 
serving the best interests of the child. 
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suggested that the lack of specified guidelines in decision-making processes results 
in sentencing outcomes which are profoundly affected by the individual judgments 
of court actors (see Curtis and Reese 1994). One source of sentencing 
inconsistency in juvenile justice can be found in the aforementioned philosophy of 
individualized justice, which seeks to examine each individual on a case-by-case 
basis and provide the best treatment available (Bernard 1992; Bortner 1986; 
Cavender and Knepper 1992; Cullen et al. 1983; Sanborn 1994). However, 
juvenile justice decision-makers are also forced to consider the safety of the 
community in deciding how to sentence delinquent youth. This presents a dilemma 
for decision-makers. The disposition that may be best suited to serving the needs 
of the child may be, either partially or fully, at odds with the disposition that is 
perceived to minimize community risk. The means by which court actors reconcile 
these oft-competing objectives demands attention. 
There is a core set of factors that research has shown to predict juvenile 
dispositions. Previous research has found legal factors such as the nature of the 
referral offense and legal history to be strongly related to juvenile dispositional 
decisions (Arnold 1971; Cohen and Kluegel 1978, 1979; Kowalski and Rickicki 
1982; Minor et al. 1997; Sanborn 1996; Tittle and Curran 1988). More serious 
offenses certainly lead to more restrictive sanctions (e.g., Fader et al. 2001; Minor, 
Hartmann & Terry 1997; Sanborn 1996), though the degree of this influence has 
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seriousness of prior system contact is also associated with more severe sanctions 
(Cohen & Kluegel 1979; Kowalski & Rickicki 1982; Minor, Hartmann & Terry 
1997; Phillips & Dinitz 1982; Reese, Curtis & Richard 1989; Thornberry 1973; 
Tittle & Curran 1988). Youth who have been “given a chance” by the court and 
then get into more trouble, such as probation violators, are likely to be stepped up 
to harsher sanctions as a result of subsequent court contact (Asquith 1983; 
Cicourel 1968; Gross 1967; Reese, Curtis & Richard 1989; Sanborn 1996). 
A host of extralegal factors have also been examined in terms of their 
influence on juvenile dispositions. Under the principle of parens patriae, court 
actors may include anything relevant to public safety or the welfare of the youth in 
making decisions. Age, for example, is often considered with regard to system 
penetration or potential removal from the home (Kowalski & Rickicki 1982; 
Minor et al. 1997; Sanborn 1996). Another relevant factor may be family 
functioning. Fader et al. (2001) find that maternal substance abuse or family 
history of neglect predict out-of-home placement for youths in the Philadelphia 
juvenile justice system, providing some support for the notion of “state as 
caretaker” (see also, Sanborn 1996).
xvi Other extralegal variables that may be 
considered include school engagement, mental health, and attitude towards the 
offense (Fader et al. 2001; Rogers & Williams 1994; Sanborn 1996). 
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functioning fall well within the mandate of the juvenile justice system, but other 
research has suggested that decisions driven by the dual consideration of risk and 
need also open the door to potential racial or gender discrimination. Findings are 
mixed, with some studies concluding that race and gender have profound influence 
on decisions to place youth (Frazier, Bishop & Henretta 1992; Horowitz & 
Pottieger 1991; McCarthy & Smith 1986; Thomas & Cage 1977; Thornberry 
1973; Tittle & Curran 1988), and others finding no evidence of such bias (Carter 
1979; Dannefer & Schutt 1982; Horwitz & Wasserman 1980; Kowalski & 
Rickicki 1982; Phillips & Dinitz 1982; Teilman & Landry 1981). I attempt to 
identify such bias in my own analyses. 
2.3 The Juvenile Probation Officer (JPO) as a Case Study of Individualized 
Justice 
In the New York City juvenile justice system, as in others, JPOs play a key 
role in determining the dispositional outcomes of adjudicated youth. They serve as 
the main informational resource for family court judges who must make a decision 
about whether to let a youth remain in the community under some form of 
supervision, or to place that youth in a state-run facility. As such, I wish to devote 
some space to fully explicating their function. 
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judges, which provide details of a youths’ cases, including: legal history, family 
background, school performance, peer group, use of drugs and alcohol, and mental 
health, as well as a description of the current offense. At the conclusion of an I&R 
report, the JPO makes a recommendation to the family court about what the 
disposition should be; typically, this is either a recommendation for state 
placement or for probation. This narrative summary is a key source of information 
for judges, and in the vast majority of cases, both in New York City and 
elsewhere, judges’ decisions align with JPO recommendations (Carter and Wilkins 
1967; Rush 1992; Susman 1973). Since JPOs appear to have a significant 
influence on the destinations of adjudicated youth, it is important to ask: 
•	 To what factors do JPOs in New York City give the most weight in making 
dispositional recommendations to family court judges? 
It has been argued that probation departments and probation officers “are 
the most conspicuous manifestation of the philosophy of individualized justice” 
(Walsh 1985, 290). JPOs, in making dispositional recommendations, must balance 
the potentially conflicting goals of public protection and child welfare. Prior 
research has suggested that juvenile justice actors generally, and juvenile probation 
officers specifically, attempt to resolve this conflict through narrative justifications 
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Richard 1989). However, the rationale which underlies a particular dispositional 
recommendation may be similar, even identical, to the rationale that supports a 
very different disposition. To wit, juvenile probation officers can cite the need for 
“treatment” or “therapy” to defend recommendations of institutional placement, as 
well as community-based supervision (Crittendon 1983; Curtis & Reese 1994; 
Reese, Curtis & Richard 1989). Thus, these justifications may serve to obscure the 
real forces behind JPO dispositional recommendations.  
In addition to public safety and child welfare, some research has cited a 
third potential basis for JPO dispositional recommendations: entrenched 
organizational practices. That is, JPOs make their recommendations based on an 
institutionally evolved logical sequence (Asquith 1983; Cicourel 1968; Reese, 
Curtis & Richard 1989). Thus, youth who exhibit behaviors that indicate non­
compliance with institutional expectations, such as probation violators and youth 
who show little remorse for their actions, are expected to be stepped up to harsher 
sanctions, regardless of the actual risk they present to community safety, or the 
appropriateness of the delivered sanction to meet their needs. Established 
institutional decision processes take precedence over other case-specific factors 
that may speak more directly (and more empirically) to needs and risks. Narrative 
accounts of needs and risks, therefore, can merely serve to justify the inevitability 
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particular sanctions. 
Previous research has found a high rate of agreement between the 
dispositional recommendations of POs and subsequent court sentencing decisions. 
In the adult criminal justice system, one study found that courts followed the 
recommendation of POs 95% of the time (Neubauer 1974). In a more recent study 
of adult criminal processing, Latessa (1993) found that judges followed PO 
recommendations for probation 85% of the time and recommendations for prison 
66% of the time. Decisions in the juvenile justice system also appear to follow this 
pattern; Susman’s (1973) analysis on the Washington DC juvenile court system 
revealed that judges followed the JPO’s dispositional recommendation in 76% of 
all cases. 
There has been considerable confusion and little consensus on the causal 
direction between recommendations and sentencing decisions. In studies of the 
adult justice system, some point to this high rate of agreement as evidence that 
POs merely shape their recommendations to reflect judges’ sentencing tendencies 
(Carter & Willkins 1967; Hood 1966; Neubauer 1974, Rosecrance 1985). On the 
other hand, judges may rely quite heavily on POs’ recommendations to ensure 
efficient court processing and quick delivery of appropriate services. Walsh (1985) 
claims: “probation officers are the source of disparate sentences rather than the 
judicial disparity being the source of disparate recommendations” (291, see also 
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necessary to determine the causal relationship between judicial decisions and PO 
recommendations. However, regardless of the direction of the relationship, given 
the high rate of agreement and the pivotal role POs play in filtering information to 
judges, it is very important to understand the factors POs consider when making 
recommendations.
xvii 
There is limited knowledge about the particular relationship between 
juvenile characteristics and their influence on JPO recommendations. Studies that 
have examined the role of the JPO have found that the demeanor of the court-
involved youth plays a critical role in the types of treatment POs will recommend 
(Albonetti 1991; Barton 1976; Cohn 1963; Emerson 1969; Grisso, Tomkins & 
Casey 1988; Smith, Black & Weir 1980; Tomkins 1990).
xviii In a questionnaire 
administered on JPOs in Minnesota, Gross (1967) analyzed perceptions of the 
most important factors considered in the juvenile predisposition report. He found 
that JPOs ranked attitude towards the offense, family situation, and previous 
delinquency problems as the three most important factors for disposition 
recommendations. Sanborn (1996) broadened this study, surveying criteria that 
POs, as well as other court personnel, considered in the decision-making process. 
He found that court officials cited the following factors and characteristics as 
predictors of a harsh delinquency disposition: delinquent record, offense type and 
severity, school record, history of failed treatment, youths’ character, and family 
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traditional dependence on administrative data, and provided a nuanced 
examination of how court officials actually viewed potentially relevant 
characteristics of youth. For instance, Sanborn’s conceptualization of family 
characteristics did not simply examine single parent status, but also looked for 
indicators of family dysfunctionality (i.e. the family’s willingness to assist in the 
rehabilitative effort, the family’s ability to control and supervise the child).  
While this litany of factors that JPOs seem to consider in their 
recommendations may simply be evidence of rampant individual-level discretion 
in the juvenile justice system, they may also be a manifestation of efforts to frame 
and justify recommendations that are in actuality, institutional imperatives. Again, 
this may stem from the dual function of the juvenile justice system: protecting the 
public and saving the child. The use of similar reasoning to justify dissimilar 
recommendations (treatment or therapy) is cited as evidence of this framing 
process (Crittendon 1983; Curtis and Reese 1994; Reese, Curtis and Richard 
1989). The reality may be that that structural constraints and institutional 
expectations drive recommendation patterns, not individual judgments of risk or 
need. Asquith (1983) suggests one way that JPOs may reconcile the conflict 
between risk and need. He argues that actors in the juvenile justice system, in 
making decisions, adopt a “frame of relevance” created by an accepted stock of 
professional knowledge and shaped by “available ideologies” that court actors 
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behavior, and acts to subsume concepts of risk and need into a consistent set of 
practices. Symptoms of risk and symptoms of need coagulate into a single frame 
of relevance with standard risk/need markers, and these markers often represent 
the degree to which youth have “learned their lesson” and can demonstrate the 
ability to comply with system rules and mandates. However, the accuracy with 
which these symptoms track real risk or real need remains up for debate. The 
implication here is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to simultaneously serve the 
needs of youth and the community, and that the court instinctively finds a way to 
settle this dilemma. 
2.4 The Effect of Incarceration on Offending 
In this chapter, I have detailed juvenile justice processing in New York 
City, and outlined relevant literature regarding decision-making, with special 
emphasis on predictors of placement. Now, I turn to the central research aim in 
this dissertation: exploring the impact of placement on the recidivism of youth. In 
the sections that follow, I review extant research on incarceration effects for both 
adult and juvenile offender populations. 
The relationship between incarceration and recidivism in adult populations 
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subsequent recidivism in adult criminal justice populations find little support for a 
deterrent effect. Some find that incarceration, in fact, increases the risk of 
recidivism. However, existing literature also suggests that the relationship between 
incarceration and recidivism is complex, and that examinations of this relationship 
must take into account a variety of factors – such as background characteristics, 
criminal history, and offense type – that may affect the impact of incarceration on 
recidivistic outcomes (Song & Lieb 1993; Walker 1987). Clearly, incarceration 
can have a more powerful deterrent effect for some offenders than for others (e.g., 
younger versus older; property versus drug offenders). Further, any conclusions 
drawn from this body of literature must be tempered by the fact that studies vary 
widely in terms of their sampled populations, measures of recidivism, controlled 
factors, and research designs (Smith, Goggin & Gendreau 2002). 
If imprisonment fails to deter future crime on the part of those imprisoned, 
then one of its most commonly cited functions lacks an empirical foundation. 
Studies which find incarceration to have little deterrent impact thus call underlying 
principles of American criminal justice into question. Smith and Akers (1993) 
compared the recidivism rates of Florida prisoners against rates for a matched 
sample of offenders in a prison diversion program for a five year follow-up period. 
They found that recidivism rates between the two groups were essentially the 
same, regardless of what type of recidivism measure was used (re-arrest, re­
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the relative cost-effectiveness of community and prison sentences also touches on 
this dissertation’s central research questions. Comparing the recidivism rates of 
offenders who successfully completed community-based corrections programs to 
those released from prison, Marion found no difference in re-imprisonment rates 
for a two year follow-up period. She concluded that compared to incarceration, 
community-based sentences can provide equal public protection at reduced cost. In 
a foreign example, Cohen, Eden, and Lazar (1991) followed 202 Israeli felony 
offenders for five years after sentence completion. Roughly half of the subjects 
were given probation, and half were given prison sentences. Controlling for the 
effects of age, education, and legal history, these researchers found that initial 
sentence-type was not related to recidivism. That is, those who received probation 
and those who received prison recidivated at statistically identical rates. However, 
because of the high recidivism rates in both groups, the authors concluded that 
neither probation nor prison were particularly effective sentences. 
While the studies described above found incarceration to have no deterrent 
effect on subsequent offending, some have reached the far more troubling 
conclusion that incarcerating offenders may actually increase the likelihood of 
later criminal behavior. For example, Bartell and Winfree, Jr. (1977) examined the 
reconviction of one hundred offenders sentenced for burglary in 1971 in New 
Mexico. Controlling for age, criminal history, and offense severity, these authors 
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who had received probation. Petersilia, Turner and Peterson (1986) matched a 
group of offenders released from California prisons to a group of probationers on 
background characteristics and criminal history. These researchers found that more 
prisoners (72%) than probationers (63%) were re-arrested within two years, and 
that more prisoners (47%) than probationers (31%) were re-incarcerated over the 
same period.
xix Wheeler and Hissong (1987) performed a three-year recidivism 
analysis on misdemeanor offenders in Houston who received fines, probation, and 
jail sentences. Controlling for criminal history and demographic characteristics, 
these authors found that probation reduced recidivism more effectively than fines 
or jail. Spohn and Holleran’s (2002) recidivism analysis focused on 1,077 felony 
offenders in Kansas City, comparing the recidivism outcomes of those who 
received jail time to those who received probation. These researchers also refute 
the idea that incarceration has a specific deterrent effect: incarcerated offenders re-
offended at higher rates and more quickly than those with community sentences. 
These relationships were particularly pronounced for felony drug offenders. 
Perhaps most comprehensively, Smith, Goggin and Gendreau’s (2002) meta­
analysis of literature on the effects of criminal justice sanctioning on recidivism 
outcomes examined this relationship in 111 research studies. While limited by 
methodological and design differences across included studies, these researchers 
found harsher sanctions to have no deterrent effect on recidivism. In fact, harsher 
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across all subgroups of offenders – adults and youths, men and women, whites and 
minorities.  
The relationship between time served and recidivism in adult populations 
Studies which compare the recidivistic outcomes of incarcerated and non-
incarcerated subjects, while informative, are limited by an inability to distinguish 
the effects of sentence length on re-offending. Clearly, longer periods of 
incarceration incapacitate offenders for longer periods of time. But what effect do 
longer prison sentences have on recidivism after release? Those who advocate 
longer sentences argue that in addition to incapacitation, longer sentences will 
discourage released offenders from committing crime through specific deterrence, 
and moreover, will discourage potential offenders from crime through general 
deterrence (Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin 1978; Song & Lieb 1993; US Department 
of Justice 1992). Those who argue for shorter sentences believe that the certainty 
of punishment is more critical than the severity of punishment (i.e., sentence 
length) in deterring re-offending (Smith, Goggin, & Gendreau 2002). Furthermore, 
crimes that stem from limited life chances, broader social problems and physical 
addictions are unlikely to be deterred – in fact they may be exacerbated – by long 
periods of imprisonment (Orsagh & Chen 1988). Finally, long prison stays may 
increase re-offending by indoctrinating prisoners into criminal lifestyles and 
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Goggin & Gendreau 2002). 
Studies which find little or no connection between sentence length and 
subsequent offending challenge the utility of harsh punishments in the form of 
long sentences. If longer sentences have no deterrent effect, then public resources 
are wasted on housing prisoners who may be better served by community-based 
supervision and treatment. Beck and Hoffman (1976) examined the recidivism of 
1,546 federal prisoners for two years after release. Controlling for criminal history, 
age, education, employment history and marital status, these authors found no 
relationship between time served and recidivism rates. The Hawaii Department of 
the Attorney General’s (1984) report on the recidivism of 115 parolees in Hawaii 
examined factors related to the re-arrest of this population. This study also found 
total time served to be unrelated to the probability of re-arrest during a six-year 
follow-up period. In the longest study of this kind, Denise Gottfredson (1999) 
compared the recidivism rates of those who were incarcerated against those who 
received suspended sentences or probation for a 20-year follow-up period in New 
Jersey. She found that neither sentence type nor length of confinement affected the 
likelihood of recidivism. 
Two earlier studies actually find length of sentence to be positively related 
to recidivism risk for certain offender groups. Gottfredson, Gottfredson, and 
Garafalo (1977) followed 5,349 male prisoners paroled in Ohio between 1965 and 
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type, criminal history, alcohol and drug use, and parole performance, these 
researchers found that in general, increased length of time served did not reduce 
recidivism. Recidivism, across risk categories, either increased or remained 
constant with increased time served. Gottfredson, Neithercutt, Nuffield and 
O’Leary (1973) conducted a recidivism study of 104,182 American male prisoners 
paroled between 1965 and 1970. Recidivism was operationalized as re-
incarceration. Controlling for age, offense type, and prior offenses, these authors 
found that while on parole, offenders who had served longer sentences had higher 
re-incarceration rates than offenders with shorter sentences. However, this 
relationship varied by offense type. Property offenders were less likely to be 
deterred by longer sentences, while for armed robbers and drug offenders, longer 
sentences produced a slight deterrent effect. 
Unpacking the relationship between incarceration and recidivism 
Gottfredson et al.’s findings indicate an important limitation in the way that 
the relationship between incarceration and recidivism is framed. Rather than 
simply assessing the deterrent impact of prison as a dichotomous conclusion 
(deterrent/not deterrent), researchers should move toward studies which attempt to 
identify groups of offenders who are most effectively deterred by the prospect of 
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1993). 
Walker, Farrington and Tucker (1981) explored this relationship for 2,069 
male offenders in England. These researchers found that the impact of sentence-
type was mitigated by number of previous convictions. Imprisonment was more 
effective than probation in reducing re-conviction for first-time offenders. 
However, for offenders with one to four previous convictions, probation was more 
effective. For those with five or more previous convictions, there was no 
significant difference; re-conviction rates were high for all sentence types. 
Similarly, DeJong (1997) found that first-time offenders in New York City were 
more likely to recidivate than “experienced” offenders following incarceration. 
Orsagh and Chen (1988) examined the relationship between time served 
and recidivism for different types of offenders, and also tested the presumption 
that the effect of sentence length was not monotonic; these authors proposed that 
this relationship follows a U-shaped curve. That is, there may be an optimum 
sentence length that maximizes the suppression of potential recidivism. Following 
1,425 North Carolina prison releasees for two years, Orsagh and Chen found 
significant differences across offense types, as well as variability by sentence 
duration. For robbery offenders, time served was positively related to the 
probability of re-offense. For burglars, time served had a deterrent effect up to an 
optimum sentence length of 1.3 years for younger offenders and 1.8 years for older 
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whole, the sample’s optimum time served was 1.2 years. Prior to 1.2 years served, 
length of time served effected a reduction in recidivism; after 1.2 years, time 
served increased the risk of recidivism. Orsagh and Chen conclude that the 
relationship between sentence length and recidivism risk is complex and specific 
to offender characteristics. 
DeJong (1997) approached this issue in a slightly different way; she 
proposed that offenders’ ties to conventional society would mitigate the deterrent 
effect of incarceration. Comparing this effect for roughly 5,000 New York City 
arrestees, DeJong found those with fewer ties to conventional society (e.g., 
marriage, employment, high school education) were more difficult to deter through 
incarceration; these offenders were more likely than their socially-bonded 
counterparts to re-offend after being incarcerated. However, as testament to the 
complexity of this relationship, she also found that for offenders with few social 
ties, longer prison stays predicted longer periods to re-arrest. She speculates that 
“short confinements may not provide a strong enough dosage to get unbonded 
people to reevaluate their perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment” 
(572). While DeJong’s analyses are limited by her unfortunate exclusion of 
supreme court cases (thereby “softening” the sample) and the lack of precision 
with which she was able to calculate time incarcerated, her findings nevertheless 
indicate that the ways in which offenders experience and perceive punishment may 
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lifestyles. 
The relationship between incarceration and recidivism in juvenile populations 
Research on the relationship between incarceration and recidivism in adult 
criminal populations reveals empirical problems in “get tough” crime control 
approaches, and underscores the need to better understand the consequences of 
particular criminal sanctions for different subparts of heterogeneous offender 
populations. Like research on adult criminal populations, research exploring the 
incarceration-recidivism link for young offenders has produced mixed support for 
a deterrent effect. Moreover, research on this issue for juvenile populations has not 
yet distinguished incarceration effects by offender characteristics. This is 
unfortunate for a number of reasons. First, recent trends in the criminal justice 
treatment of juveniles have exhibited a general shift away from rehabilitative 
ideals and toward harsher punishments (Bazemore & Umbreit 1995; Champion 
1989; Feld 1987, 1990, 1993, 1998, 1999; Forst et al. 1989; Krisberg et al. 1986; 
Rudman et al. 1986), and the effects of this trend are in need of more thorough 
empirical examination.
xx Second, the juvenile justice population reflects a group 
of offenders who are in (or nearing) their peak years of criminal activity, and 
devising effective strategies for controlling present and future offending can have 
important consequences for individual and social welfare. Lastly, research in this 
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inform approaches to deal with social and personal circumstances which underlie 
youth criminality. 
Some studies have shown incarceration to have a deterrent effect for youth. 
Murray and Cox (1979) examined re-offending among chronic delinquents in 
Chicago who were either incarcerated in reformatories or diverted to community 
programs. They compared pre- and post-program arrest rates, and found that 
incarcerated youth exhibited larger reductions in post-program offending. 
Furthermore, among those sentenced to community programs, youths who were in 
more restrictive programs showed the greatest reduction in arrests. Gottfredson 
and Barton (1993) compared the recidivistic outcomes of 673 youths who had 
been incarcerated in Maryland’s Montrose Training School to 254 matched 
individuals in community-based programs. Over a 2½-year follow-up period, 
incarcerated subjects were re-arrested significantly fewer times than those in the 
community group. This difference, however, was diminished when only serious 
offenses were compared. Moreover, when self-reported delinquency rates were 
compared, differences between the two groups were smaller than when comparing 
official re-arrest rates. Nevertheless, Gottfredson and Barton’s findings provide 
some support for the deterrence hypothesis. 
Other research has found incarceration to have no deterrent effect, or a 
positive relationship with recidivism. Lipsey’s (1999) meta-analysis of the impact 
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variety of programs for juvenile offenders in 196 research studies. Controlling for 
methodological variations, Lipsey found that incarcerating youth, even with 
service enhancements, was not significantly related to recidivism reduction. 
Wooldredge (1988) compared twelve different dispositions on their ability to 
reduce recidivism for 2,038 young offenders in Illinois. Recidivism was measured 
by juvenile and adult arrests for a three to seven year follow-up period. Controlling 
for a variety of individual and environmental factors, Wooldredge found that the 
best disposition in terms of reducing recidivism was a combination of probation 
and community treatment. More importantly for this dissertation, he also found 
that longer terms of incarceration were associated with increased recidivism. 
Schneider and Ervin (1990) used both quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
examine the effects of different dispositional options on 876 delinquents in six 
cities for a two to three year follow-up period. These researchers found that 
incarceration and probation were both less effective than restitution in reducing 
subsequent delinquency. Further, time incarcerated was positively related to 
committing more subsequent crimes. Jacobs (1990) conducted a survival analysis 
of 629 delinquents who were either formally processed in court, or diverted from 
formal court referral. Those who were formally processed displayed less 
recidivism than those who were diverted. However, among those who were 
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recidivism than those who remained at home. 
While this research is informative, and speaks to debates about the need 
and function of juvenile criminal confinement, it generally treats samples as 
homogenous groups. However, juvenile offender populations are not homogenous. 
Youths can differ on any number of characteristics: demographics, attachment to 
parents, peer relations, school performance, mental and psychological functioning, 
substance abuse, and neighborhood of residence. These factors may have profound 
interactive effects with the way that youth experience criminal sentences. Clearly, 
youth with more social bonds may feel the deterrent effects of harsh sanctions 
more keenly than youth with fewer (or weaker) bonds. Furthermore, young 
offenders who come from (and are released to) neighborhoods with higher crime 
rates may internalize criminal norms and prove less susceptible to deterrent 
effects. Or, as Orsagh and Chen (1998) propose, the effects of deterrence may not 
be monotonic. Institutional confinement may initially dissuade youth from 
criminal activity, but prolonged institutional confinement may indoctrinate youth 
into criminal lifestyles and identities that promote subsequent delinquency. These 
examples underscore the need for more nuanced analysis of the incarceration-
recidivism relationship in young populations. 
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Primary theories: Deterrence, labeling, and differential association 
In addition to exploring practical issues related to juvenile punishment, this 
research provides a good opportunity to test criminological theories against, and in 
conjunction with, one another. Moreover, situating these analyses within existing 
theoretical frameworks generates a number of testable hypotheses. Most 
fundamentally, I will engage criminological literature on deterrence, with specific 
reference to juvenile offender populations. Testing the validity of deterrence 
theory is important because the notion of deterrence supports much of modern 
American criminal justice policy and practice. Deterrence theory is rooted in the 
classical work of Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1823), who presumed criminal 
behavior to be the product of rational calculations of interests (i.e., costs and 
benefits). Accordingly, the social response to crime must make clear the 
consequences of criminal action in order to prevent future offending. Punishments, 
in order to deter crime effectively, must be swift (the principle of celerity), certain 
(certainty), and appropriate to the offense (severity). A system of effective 
criminal sanctions will deter crime in two ways. At the social level, these sanctions 
will have a general deterrent effect. That is, potential offenders will refrain from 
crime because the consequences of criminal actions are widely known. 
Unfortunately, this dissertation is not suited to testing the idea of general 
deterrence.
xxi At the individual level, criminal sanctions produce a specific 
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crimes are dissuaded from crime by the experience of these sanctions. Criminals 
who have been caught and punished should be more specifically deterred from 
future crime. Further, the severity of experienced sanctions should be positively 
related to their deterrent effect. 
If juvenile criminal sanctions do have a deterrent effect, incarcerating 
juveniles for their criminal behavior should cause these young offenders to 
associate crime with their experienced punishment, and therefore reduce their 
future offending. The perceived threat of punishment is theoretically increased 
following incarceration, and thus, those who have been incarcerated will commit 
less future crime than those who have not experienced this harsh sanction. 
Hypothesis 1a: Controlling for other relevant factors, juvenile delinquents who 
are incarcerated will recidivate later, and less frequently, than those who are not 
incarcerated. 
Hypothesis 1a proposes that swift and certain punishment will deter subsequent 
criminal behavior. However, in accordance with the doctrines of deterrence, the 
severity of punishment may also impact future offending. Longer incarceral stays 
will serve to reinforce the psychological association between criminal behavior 
and its legal consequences. 
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juvenile delinquents are incarcerated for will be negatively associated with 
subsequent recidivism. 
The deterrent effects of criminal sanctions may be counterbalanced, or 
negated, by other individual factors and circumstances. Or, more simply, the 
principles of deterrence theory could just be wrong. Skolnick (1997) characterizes 
the idea of deterrence as “superficially persuasive” (411), and others have 
contended that the deterrence doctrine rests on the fiction that changing criminal 
penalties will alter criminal behavior (Irwin & Austin 1997; Paternoster 1987, 
1991; Tonry 1995). Existing scholarly research, while far from conclusive, 
generally shows that increasing criminal penalties has little or no effect on 
aggregate crime rates (see Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin 1978; Paternoster 1987, 
1991; Tonry 1995; Reiss & Roth 1993). 
Labeling theory counters deterrence theory in contending that criminal 
punishments can actually increase future offending among the punished (Becker 
1963; Chambliss 1973; Lemert 1951, 1972). According to labeling theorists, 
criminal behavior may increase after sanctioning because formal sanctions 
attenuate legitimate life pathways, or because sanctioned criminals engage in a 
process of value identification with their label, and thus adopt norms and behavior 
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Paternoster & Iovanni 1989; Thomas & Bishop 1984; more generally, Goffman 
1963). Imprisonment may serve as a powerful conduit to the adoption of criminal 
identity, as it is the most severe sanction that one can receive from the state 
(except for death) and in fact, bestows a more stigmatized label than lesser 
sanctions (e.g. probation). In this way then, being imprisoned may serve to 
increase future offending.
xxii 
In New York, as in other states, juvenile arrest and court records are sealed 
(hidden from public view) in order to limit stigmatizing effects. However, youth 
who have been arrested and incarcerated, even if their records are sealed, can 
never be fully shielded from stigma, as family members and peers are likely to 
become aware of this legal history. In school, youth who have been incarcerated 
will need to explain their long absence to classmates and teachers. Furthermore, 
incarcerated youth are likely to have fallen behind in their studies while in 
placement, potentially augmenting the stigma they feel (life cycle damage). 
Relatedly, other facets of incarcerated youths’ lives may be interrupted by 
placement. Membership on sports teams or in other organized activities may be 
lost, or youth may be reluctant to return to these activities after placement. Part-
time employment may also be lost. Along with the psychological effects of 
stigmatization then, placement may directly or indirectly contribute to tangible 
changes that can have negative impacts. Diminished academic engagement may 
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the day for delinquent activity; the loss of a job may push youth towards illegal 
money-making activities like selling drugs. The relationships between placement, 
stigma, life cycle damage and the erosion of human capital are likely to be 
complex, but whatever these interrelationships are, they lead to the prediction that 
placement will have negative effects on the lives of previously incarcerated youth, 
and criminal activity is likely to increase because of these effects. 
Beyond the adoption of criminal identities and “life cycle damage,” 
incarceration may have other deleterious effects that can increase future re-
offending. Theories that focus on the process of learning may help to understand 
these effects. Sutherland’s (1937, 1947) differential association theory posits that 
criminal behavior is learned through interaction with others, and that this process 
includes acquisition of both criminal techniques and criminal motivations (see 
also, Matsueda 1988; Sutherland & Cressey 1960). According to differential 
association theorists, the motives and impulses of a potential delinquent are 
conditioned through this learning process, in which the delinquent internalizes 
definitions of legal codes as either “favorable” or “unfavorable.” A person will 
become delinquent because of an excess of definitions that encourage violation of 
the law, over definitions that do not encourage such transgressions.
xxiii It follows 
that juveniles who are incarcerated, and thus surrounded by other juveniles who 
have committed crimes (including the most serious offenders), will be more likely 
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commit crime after release will increase. Moreover, stigmatization, in combination 
with the acquisition of new peer groups in placement, may propel incarcerated 
juveniles towards negative peers (other stigmatized youth) after release, further 
amplifying bad effects.  
Hypotheses 2a and 2b emerge from the postulates of labeling and 
differential association theory, and contradict the predictions made by deterrence 
theory. Some criminological theorists have in fact argued that labeling theory, 
rooted in the sociological tradition of symbolic interactionism, fits well with ideas 
of differential association, as learned definitions of criminality are inherently 
linked to adopted social roles (Matsueda 1988; Orcutt 1987). 
Hypothesis 2a: Controlling for other relevant factors, juvenile delinquents who 
are incarcerated will recidivate sooner, and more frequently, than those who are 
not incarcerated. 
It follows that those who are incarcerated for longer periods would identify more 
readily with their criminal label than those who are incarcerated for less time. 
Moreover, longer periods of incarceration will increase the duration and frequency 
of delinquent associations. Therefore, recidivism should increase in association 
with time served. 
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juvenile delinquents are incarcerated for will be positively associated with 
subsequent recidivism. 
Mediating theories: Control, social disorganization, and criminal opportunity 
The criminological theories discussed in the previous section provide 
useful frameworks to study the aggregate impact of incarceration on re-offending 
among juveniles. As stated earlier however, I am also interested in a more nuanced 
examination of the deterrent impact of incarceration at the individual level. Harsh 
sanctions are not likely to deter all youth from future crime, as distinct sub-
segments of the juvenile offender population may experience incarceration in 
different ways. I aim to examine the particular characteristics of youth who are 
deterred by such sanctions, youth who are not deterred, and youth for whom such 
sanctions are counterproductive (i.e., they are associated with increased 
recidivism). Criminological theories that explore the impact of social bonding and 
community characteristics on delinquency will guide this effort.  
Social control theory proposes that criminal and delinquent behavior can be 
explained through an examination of the bonds between potential delinquents and 
conventional activities, beliefs, and institutions. Put simply, at the individual level, 
degree of attachment to conventional society should be inversely related to 
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1990). Hirschi’s (1969) original formulation of control theory described four 
elements of the social bond: attachment (identification with convention), 
involvement (participation in pro-social activities), commitment (aspirations and 
expectations), and belief (respect for and acceptance of convention). Social bonds 
have traditionally been operationalized in the areas of education, employment, 
family and peers, and conventional activities (see, for example, Agnew 1985; 
Akers & Cochran 1985; Wiatrowski, Griswold & Roberts 1981). And indeed, in 
literature pertaining to delinquency risk, factors in these areas have been shown to 
predict delinquency among young people. For example, high levels of conflict 
with parents, poor parental supervision, and low levels of positive parental 
involvement have been identified as risk factors for delinquency and antisocial 
behavior (Hawkins et al. 1998; Wasserman et al. 1996, 2003). Likewise, peer 
rejection has recently been shown to relate to delinquency (Bagwell et al. 2000; 
Coie et al. 1995). Failure to engage school during childhood and adolescence has 
also been associated with delinquency risk (Hawkins et al. 1998; Le Blanc, Cote, 
& Loeber 1991; Maguin & Loeber 1996). 
If level of social bonding is indeed negatively related to delinquency, and 
incarceration, in general, has a deterrent effect, placement will be more likely to 
deter youth with higher levels of bonding from future criminal behavior. After 
release, poorly-bonded youth will remain at high risk for criminal activity, and 
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Conversely, well-bonded youth may feel that they have more at stake and more to 
lose through continued criminality, and thus feel the deterrent effects of 
incarceration more acutely. DeJong’s (1997) study of adult arrestees in New York 
City proposed this exact hypothesis, and found some evidence to support it.  
Hypothesis 3a: Among delinquent youth, the deterrent effect of incarceration will 
vary by level of social bonding. Those with higher levels of social bonding will 
recidivate later, and less frequently, than those with lower bonding levels. 
Critically, the interaction between placement and social control may 
depend on the broader effect of incarceration. That is, a contradictory hypothesis 
could also emerge from control theory. While social bonds may strengthen the 
deterrent impact of incarceration, the opposite could be true: incarceration, or its 
attached stigma, may actually serve to weaken or sever existing social bonds 
(Brodsky 1975; Edin, Nelson & Paranal 2004; Moore 1996). This incarceration-
initiated loss of social bonds might lead to continued, or increased, criminal 
behavior after release because of diminished social controls. Edin, Nelson and 
Paranal (2004) identify this effect among adult fathers who are incarcerated, and 
posit that it is the very loss of attachment caused by incarceration that increases 
further criminality. Because well-bonded youth will experience this loss and 
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well-bonded youth to experience relatively higher rates, and greater severity, of 
recidivism than poorly-bonded youth after incarceration. The absence of social 
controls may leave previously-bonded youth free to engage in elevated levels of 
post-incarceration delinquency. Furthermore, the stigma attached to placement 
may be felt most acutely by those youth that initially have the most to lose. I 
would expect that if in general, placement deters youth from further offending, 
Hypothesis 3a would be supported. However, if placement has a criminogenic 
effect, Hypothesis 3b would be supported. 
Hypothesis 3b: Among delinquent youth, the criminogenic effect of placement will 
associate positively with level of social bonding. Those with higher levels of social 
bonding will recidivate sooner, more frequently, and more severely, than those 
with lower bonding levels. 
Neighborhood-level factors may also potentially explain some variation in 
the deterrent effect of incarceration on recidivism. Social disorganization theory, 
first imagined by Shaw and McKay (1942), posits that there are direct and indirect 
relationships between community characteristics and crime rates. Socially 
disorganized urban areas – marked by conflicting cultural values, low social 
cohesion, and poor physical conditions – lack social controls which guard against 
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disorganization theory argue that macro-conditions such as poverty, urbanization, 
industrialization, population turnover, and racial heterogeneity affect crime 
through their impacts on informal social controls, neighborhood cohesion, and the 
ability of residents to maintain public order (Bursik & Grasmick 1993; Kornhauser 
1978; Sampson et al. 1997; Skogan 1990; Warner & Rountree 1997). Specifically, 
as Sampson and Groves (1989) argue, social disorganization affects crime through 
the inability of communities to supervise and control teenage peer groups, weak 
informal local friendship networks, and low rates of participation in formal and 
voluntary neighborhood organizations. I would expect the direction of a 
neighborhood effect to be consistent regardless of whether placement had a 
positive or negative association with recidivism. That is, if placement reduced 
subsequent offending, this reduction will be smaller for youth who live in 
disorganized neighborhoods. Conversely, if placement increases recidivism, the 
increase will be greater for those in disorganized neighborhoods. 
Hypothesis 4: Youth released into more socially disorganized neighborhoods will 
recidivate faster, and more frequently, than youth released into less socially 
disorganized neighborhoods. 
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community-level predictors of aggregate crime rates, which stands in contrast to 
theories such as control, which focus on variations in individual characteristics in 
explaining criminal propensities. Some recent efforts in criminological 
scholarship, however, have sought to integrate individual- and community-level 
explanations. One example of theoretical synthesis is Wilcox, Land and Hunt’s 
(2003) “dynamic, multicontextual criminal opportunity theory” (I will refer to it as 
“criminal opportunity theory”). Borrowing largely from routine activities theory 
(Cohen & Felson 1979; Felson & Cohen 1980), Wilcox et al. focus their efforts on 
the circumstances surrounding criminal acts. Criminal opportunity, according to 
these theorists, results from the intersection of three factors: motivated offenders, 
suitable targets, and capable guardianship. As these three factors vary across time 
and space, criminal opportunity (and criminal activity) will likewise vary. 
Motivated offenders and suitable targets are presumed to have a positive 
relationship with criminal opportunity, while capable guardianship should be 
negatively related. 
Criminal opportunity theory reconciles the apparent conflict between 
classical theoretical traditions (such as deterrence and social disorganization), 
which assume criminal motivation as a given and attempt to specify the 
circumstances under which people act upon that motivation, and positivist theories 
which purport criminal acts to be products of variations in individual motivation. 
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motivation as fixed in the general population; the number of motivated offenders 
per unit of space should vary according to population density. However, the 
criminal activity of these potential offenders will be determined by the spatial and 
temporal characteristics of their environments. Put simply, aggregate-level 
exposure of unguarded targets to motivated offenders will explain crime rates. 
Applying this theory to the present study, I would expect incarcerated youth 
(ostensibly a population of motivated offenders) who are released to 
neighborhoods with more suitable targets and less capable guardianship to be more 
likely to recidivate than youth who are released to neighborhoods with fewer 
suitable targets and more capable guardianship. 
Hypothesis 5a: Youth released into neighborhoods with more suitable targets will 
recidivate faster, and more frequently, than youth released into neighborhoods 
with fewer suitable targets. 
Hypothesis 5b: Youth released into neighborhoods with less capable guardianship 
will recidivate faster, and more frequently, than youth released into 
neighborhoods with more capable guardianship. 
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Broadly, my dissertation addresses two research concerns: 
1.  The reasons behind decisions to place youth. 
2.  The effect of placement on youths’ offending patterns. 
These concerns are obviously intertwined, and analyses of these phenomena 
should have important policy implications. Questions of the function and utility of 
placement are important to policymakers. What types of youth are being sent to 
placement, and why? What effect does placement have on the criminality of the 
placed? What implications do New York City’s juvenile incarceration practices 
have for public safety? More broadly, what is the function of placement? Is it to 
deter? To incapacitate? To punish? To rehabilitate? Are these goals being 
achieved? If not, is there a better way to achieve them? 
Placement is expensive and harsh. In times of fiscal crisis, policymakers 
may be searching for ways to reduce the expense of criminal sanctioning without 
risking increases in local crime and potential public furor over perceived leniency. 
With these constraints in mind, how can placement decisions be intelligently 
informed by research? In the next chapter, I will detail the data to be used in my 
analyses, as well as the analytical approach I will take to answering my research 
questions. 
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Data and Methodology 

This chapter will describe the data to be used in my analyses, as well as the 
methodological approach I have chosen to use. Specifically, I cover issues of data 
collection, sample description, and statistical methods. I also outline some 
limitations in the data and methodology. 
3.1 Data Collection 
To answer my research questions, I conduct analyses on a sample of 736 
juvenile delinquents who received dispositions in the New York City Family Court 
system during the spring of 2000. I collected these data between April and June of 
2003 as part of a team of researchers at the Vera Institute of Justice, and I have 
been granted permission to use the data for my dissertation.  
In New York, a juvenile delinquent is a person between the ages of seven 
and fifteen (at the time of the offense) who is charged with committing an act that 
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.
xxiv All juvenile delinquents in 
New York City are adjudicated and sentenced in Family Court. Study subjects 
were chosen by examining Family Court calendars in all five New York City 
boroughs for each day in April, May, and June of 2000 – which identified every 
youth who received a disposition during this period. Thus, this dataset should be 
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York City Family Court. Other Vera Institute researchers and I located case files 
for each subject in probation department file rooms in the five family courts using 
personal and numeric identifiers taken from court calendars. Case files contain a 
variety of documents pertaining to each youth, and his or her journey through the 
New York juvenile justice system. Not surprisingly, we were unable to locate files 
for every identified study subject. Some files were probably misplaced or filed 
incorrectly; others may have been in use by court personnel. Table 3.1 summarizes 
the percentages of files located in each borough. 
Table 3.1: Percent of Sample Located, by Borough 
Borough 
Files 
Located 
Number of 
Possible Files 
% of Sample 
Located 
Brooklyn 211  226  93.4 
Manhattan 199  215  92.6 
Queens 116  137  84.7 
Staten Island  43  49  87.8 
Bronx 167  210  79.5 
TOTAL 736  837  87.9 
We were able to locate the majority of files, with an overall location rate of 88%. 
File location rates were highest in Manhattan and Brooklyn, and lowest in the 
Bronx. 
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time of his or her disposition. Variables reflect the following characteristics of 
sampled youth: 
•	 Demographic profile (date of birth, sex, race, zip code); 
•	 Case processing variables (e.g. name of judge, court dates, detention/parole 
status during trial, arrest and petition charges, type of disposition, length of 
disposition); 
•	 Legal history (e.g. prior arrests and institutional placements); 
•	 Characteristics of present and past family environments (e.g. guardians, 
abuse/neglect history, nature of relationships between family members); 
•	 School performance indicators (e.g. attendance, grades, conduct at school); 
•	 Community and peer relationships (e.g. negative peers, gang involvement, 
use of free time, participation in organized activities); 
•	 History of alcohol and drug use; 
•	 Mental health history; 
•	 History of victimization (e.g. bullying, sexual abuse, property offenses 
against respondent). 
Coded information was derived by examining documents in each subject’s 
probation case file. We developed a standardized data collection instrument, which 
included a series of items covering the areas of information described above, and 
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educated; all had at least a bachelor’s degree and most had obtained or were in the 
process of obtaining graduate degrees in public policy or the social sciences. Most 
had some experience working with the criminal justice system, and/or had studied 
criminal justice in college or graduate school. Data coders were given extensive 
training by senior research staff at the Vera Institute in order to promote coding 
consistency. Principally, this training consisted of a series of meetings in which 
senior research staff tutored data coders on the intricacies of family court 
processing, and helped to resolve potentially confusing issues related to 
interpreting court documents. These meetings also served to familiarize data 
collectors with the form and function of the data collection instrument.  
During the course of data collection, we implemented a number of 
additional measures to ensure coding accuracy and consistency. At least one senior 
staff member was present at all times.
xxv Coded data for each and every study 
subject was double-checked by senior staff. Immediately after a file was coded, the 
senior staff member would review responses with the data coder to identify 
potentially conflicting or ambiguous information, and appropriately adjust 
responses. Moreover, we held regular meetings with data coders during the data 
collection process to establish consistent coding guidelines and resolve issues 
related to data collection. Data coders were also rotated periodically throughout 
the five New York City borough family courts as a further guard against coding 
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other state and local administrative databases (i.e., detention and placement data). 
The main sources of information in the paper case files were: 
•	 Probation Investigation and Recommendation (I & R) Reports: Pre-
sentencing reports written by probation officers and submitted to family 
court judges that recommend the most appropriate disposition in each case. 
They contain fairly comprehensive legal, social, and psychological 
information for delinquent youth. 
•	 Probation Intake Reports: Brief reports, written by probation officers at the 
time of a youth’s first court appearance, which summarize the offense and 
provide overviews of family life, peers, school performance, and other 
potentially relevant characteristics of youth. Intake reports are often used 
by judges to make detention recommendations during the trial process. 
•	 Mental Health Reports (MHRs): Psychological evaluations of delinquent 
youth, written by licensed clinicians prior to disposition. MHRs contain 
legal and social information, but primarily focus on mental health issues.   
•	 “JISP” assessments: Reports, written prior to disposition, which evaluate 
the suitability of placement-bound youth for the Juvenile Intensive 
Supervision Program, which is a more restrictive form of probation. These 
reports describe various legal and behavioral issues related to subjects. 
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school interventions. 
•	 Court petitions: These are filed by Corporation Counsel (the juvenile 
prosecutor), and describe the final charges made against a particular youth. 
They also include a description of the offense written by the arresting 
officer, as well as any relevant victims’ statements.  
•	 NYPD arrest reports: These describe the offense for which a youth is 
arrested, the offense and arrest dates, and the initial charges filed by the 
police. They also contain some demographic information. 
Coded data from probation case files offer a rich baseline portrait of this 
sample of delinquent youth, and are highly suitable for conducting recidivism 
analyses. Variables capture a number of characteristics that potentially amplify or 
protect against the risk of future offending. In this dissertation, these baseline 
measures are used to predict recidivism patterns over a three-year post-disposition 
follow-up period. In order to measure recidivism, I have linked baseline records, 
using personal and numeric identifiers, to arrest and incarceration information 
provided by other city and state agencies. I have signed agreements with all 
relevant agencies, which grant me permission to use their data for the purposes of 
this dissertation. Below, I describe the origin and purpose of the various data 
sources: 
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provided data on subsequent arrests (juvenile and adult) in New York 
State. Records included arrest dates and charges. Some demographic 
information was also included. These arrest records have been used to 
derive all recidivism outcome measures. 
•	 Juvenile placement: The New York State Office of Children and Family 
Services (OCFS), which oversees all state juvenile placement facilities, 
provided data on juvenile re-incarceration. These data included information 
on length of stay in these facilities, types of facilities, and transfers 
between facilities. OCFS data allowed me to calculate the exact time that 
each study subject spent in state incarceration. For those study subjects 
who were sent to state placement, I was able to use OCFS data to 
determine their exact date of release. This release date marked the temporal 
point when the recidivism “clock” started for each placed subject in my 
analyses. 
•	 Juvenile detention: The New York City Department of Juvenile Justice 
provided data on pre-trial detention in juvenile incarceral facilities. The 
data included admission and release dates, admission and release reasons, 
and some legal and demographic information. Mainly, I used these data to 
calculate time in the community for the recidivism analyses. 
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provided data on adult incarcerations, for those study subjects who “aged 
out” of the juvenile justice system during the follow-up period. Linking 
OCFS, DJJ and DOC data allowed me to calculate, for every day after 
disposition, whether a particular subject was incarcerated or in the 
community. Consequently, my recidivism outcome measures are extremely 
accurate. 
Thirty-eight cases in my dataset did not have a matching OCFS incarceration 
record. As a result, I am unable to determine accurately time spent incarcerated 
and in the community for these subjects, and choose to exclude them from 
multivariate analyses. The final dataset thus contains 698 total cases.  
3.2 Description of the Sample 
Demographically, this sample of delinquent youth is typical of the criminal 
justice-involved population in New York City. Four out of five subjects are male, 
and over 90% are persons of color – mostly black and Hispanic. The mean age at 
disposition was 14.5. Table 3.2 summarizes the main demographic characteristics 
of the study’s subjects. 
63 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Table 3.2: Demographic Characteristics of Youth Receiving 
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Sex  Number Percent 
Male  553  79.2 
        Female  145  20.8 
Race 
        White  43  6.2 
Black  428  61.3 
Hispanic  196  28.1 
Asian  9  1.3 
Other  12  1.7 
Don’t know  10  1.4 
Age at disposition 
9  2  0.3 
10  5  0.7 
11  8  1.1 
12  30  4.3 
13  84  12.0 
14  173  24.8 
15  277  39.7 
16  112  16.0 
17  7  1.0 
Table 3.3 below outlines the legal characteristics of the sample. The 
plurality of youth adjudicated in the New York City family courts are there as a 
result of a violent offense. About half of the study’s subjects are adjudicated on 
violent, against person, or weapons charges, while roughly one-third are convicted 
of property crimes. Only 13% are adjudicated on drug-related charges. However, 
while the types of offenses youth are convicted of seem serious, in that they tend to 
be violent, the severities of those offenses are not so serious. More than half 
(56.4%) are convicted of misdemeanors. Only 3.2% are convicted on felony A or 
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felonies (felony C, D or E). 
Almost 60% of subjects had been detained at some point during the court 
process. However, it is important to remember that youth can be detained for many 
reasons, and not all of these reasons are necessarily related to the youth’s threat to 
public safety, or the likelihood that the youth will eventually be placed. I will 
discuss this further in the multivariate results sections chapter four. Most youth do 
not readily admit their guilt regarding the current offense. Only 31.9% take some 
responsibility for what happened. This is not surprising, as the issues of remorse 
and admitted involvement are drawn from the I&R report. Under the duress of 
interrogation by a JPO, with the issue of disposition hanging in the balance, youth 
may be inclined to minimize or justify their actions as a means to a more lenient 
sentence. Anecdotally, from reading the I&R reports in the case files, I find that 
subjects, under questioning from the investigating JPO, commonly attempt to 
downplay their involvement, redirect responsibility for the incident to the victim or 
to other perpetrators, or simply deny involvement altogether.
xxvi Such efforts may 
be counterproductive, however, as prior research has shown that taking 
responsibility can lead to a lesser sanction (e.g., Emerson 1969; Gross 1967; 
Sanborn 1996). 
A substantial proportion of subjects have prior justice system-involvement. 
Over 40% had previously been arrested, and over one in five had been arrested for 
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or conditional discharge, meaning that they had been “given a chance” by the court 
and failed to comply with mandated requirements. Very few subjects (4%) had 
experienced state placement. This is not surprising, as older youth tend to be 
placed; by the time they are released, they have often aged out of the juvenile 
system and are subsequently processed as adults. Finally, almost a quarter of the 
sample (23.6%) had prior status offenses (PINS complaints) on record, suggesting 
that these youth are perceived as troublesome and in need of formal supervision. 
PINS (“persons in need of supervision”) complaints are non-criminal family court 
cases that are typically filed by a child’s family as a request for formal assistance 
in controlling the youth’s behavior. JPOs and judges handle PINS cases by 
referring youth to appropriate services, and imposing sanctions when absolutely 
necessary. In extreme cases, PINS complaints can lead to placement in foster care 
or other restrictive settings. 
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Top adjudicated charge type  Number Percent 
     Violence/against person/weapons  344  49.3 
Property  218  31.2 
Drugs  91  13.0 
Other/don’t know  45  6.4 
Top adjudicated charge severity 
Felony A or B  22  3.2 
Felony C, D or E  251  36.0 
     Misdemeanor  394  56.4 
Other/don’t know  31  4.4 
Detained before disposition  415 59.5 
Takes some responsibility for the offense  223 31.9 
Probation/CD violator  106 15.2 
Prior arrests on record  284 40.7 
Prior arrests for violent offense on record  145 20.8 
Previously placed in OCFS  28 4.0 
Prior PINS complaints on record  165 23.6 
Table 3.4 below describes the home and family-related details of subjects’ 
lives. The study sample appears to be a fairly troubled one, with a high incidence 
of family and home problems. About 7% live in institutions or are homeless. 
Almost two-thirds have only one parental figure at home.
xxvii Four out of ten had 
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the course of their lives.
xxviii 
A fair number of subjects have problems in the home, though these 
assessments are colored by the occupational and ideological perspectives of court 
actors, and thus must be treated with caution. Regardless, according to JPOs, 
parental figures provide clear supervision in only one quarter of all cases. Only 
about half of the subjects are usually obedient to their parents. And, about a 
quarter of the subjects have significant conflict with their parents. In fifteen 
percent of cases, youths’ parents actually requested that they be placed at 
disposition. Anecdotally, from reading the case files, I found that in the vast 
majority of these cases, the parent(s) described the youth in question as “out of 
control/uncontrollable,” or “a threat to the safety of other family members.” 
Sometimes, parents request placement because youth are engaging in criminal 
activity (e.g., selling drugs) in the home. 
Aside from problems between the youth and family members, the families 
involved in this study displayed an array of other problems. In 10.9% of the 
families under study, there had been some official finding of abuse and neglect, 
though these findings did not necessarily involve the study subject specifically. 
Ten percent of families have a member in residence with a criminal record; six 
percent have a member with an alcohol or drug problem; and six percent have a 
member with a mental health problem. Note that these numbers are probably much 
68 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.lower than the actual incidence of these problems, as family members, under 
questioning by court officials, are likely to be reluctant to admit such problems. 
Only findings of abuse and neglect are checked against official records, and can 
thus be considered totally accurate. Family criminal history, alcohol and drug use, 
and mental health issues are gleaned only from interviews between JPOs and 
family members. 
Legal employment is not that common among subjects’ family members. 
Only 53.3% of subjects have any family member that is employed, and 44% have 
at least one family member receiving public assistance.  
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Parental figures in household  Number Percent 
2 parents/guardians  191  27.4 
1 parent/guardian  455  65.2 
     Institution/homeless/don’t know  52  7.4 
Youth has history of moving b/w family units  279 40.0 
Parent(s) set clear supervision boundaries  178 25.5 
Youth is usually obedient to parent(s)  345 49.4 
Significant conflict with parent(s)  175 25.1 
Parent has asked for placement  105 15.0 
Court finding of abuse/neglect in family  76 10.9 
Family member has criminal record  65 9.3 
Family member has drug/alcohol problem  44 6.3 
Family member has mental health problem  43 6.2 
Family member is employed  372 53.3 
Family member receives public assistance  307 44.0 
Table 3.5 below outlines the school-related characteristics of the study 
subjects. 
xxix Overall, they do not do very well in school. Fully 15% do not attend 
at all, or attend less than 10% of the time. Only 12.6% attend more than 90% of 
the time. School performance is similarly lackluster; only 17.9% are passing more 
than half of their classes. Almost 30% are enrolled in special education. About 
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(detention/suspension/expulsion) for behavioral problems.  
Table 3.5: School-Related Characteristics of Youth Receiving 
Dispositions in NYC, Spring 2000 (N=698) 
School attendance  Number Percent 
     Good attendance (90% or more)  88  12.6 
Average attendance (10-90%)  505  72.3 
Poor attendance/not attending (0-10%)  105  15.0 
Passing more than half of his/her classes  125 17.9 
Youth is in special education  209 29.9 
School intervention for behavioral problems  226 32.4 
Table 3.6 details some other social and personal details about subjects’ 
social lives that may be pertinent to their risk of being placed, or the risk of future 
criminal activity. Many youth are believed to have negatively-influencing peer 
groups. This information is typically obtained through interviews between the 
investigating JPO and parents. Almost 80% of youth are believed to have some 
negative peers. Almost 25% are believed to belong to a gang, associate with gang 
members, or have family members who belong to a gang. A substantial percentage 
(72.9%) are known to have acted violently against another person, though this 
figure includes the current offense, so it does not accurately capture violent 
behavior that is exclusively unrelated to the current adjudication. 
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always marijuana. The actual number is likely to be higher, as many youth will 
deny such behavior in the presence of court officials. A common response to the 
question of drug use is something like, “I tried it once, but did not like it.” During 
data collection, we found that a youth will often give this response to the probation 
officer, but then admit to current, often frequent, usage to a mental health clinician. 
As a result, I have chosen to combine acknowledgement of past and present drug 
use into a single measure. Still, it is important to note the potential inaccuracy of 
this measure, and others that are derived from JPO-respondent pre-dispositional 
interviews. 
Behavioral and mental health problems are common. Almost two-thirds 
have been previously diagnosed, or diagnosed by a court clinician to have such 
problems. Although very few subjects are known to have serious problems such as 
bipolar disorder or schizophrenia, a very large number are assessed as having 
lesser problems such as conduct disorder and antisocial personality disorder. This 
may be evidence of psychiatric net-widening, but the percentage of subjects who 
have attended counseling (44.1%) either by will or by mandate suggests that these 
are people with real problems that require some form of treatment. 
Finally, a fair number of subjects (44.3%) participate in some form of 
organized social activity such as church, organized sports, or after-school clubs. 
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Number Percent 
Youth has negatively-influencing peers  557 79.8 
Youth associates with gang members  164 23.5 
Youth has history of violence/assault  509 72.9 
Past or present drug use acknowledged  328 47.0 
Evidence of behavioral/mental health problems  454 65.0 
Youth has attended counseling  308 44.1 
Youth participates regularly in organized 
activities 
309 44.3 
Overall then, my study population appears fairly troubled, with high 
incidences of a range of problem issues. Legal contact is common. Problems in the 
home are varied and serious. School performance is generally quite poor. Peer 
groups, patterns of substance use, and behavioral issues likewise indicate a group 
of youth who do not show great promise to achieve success through legitimate 
means. 
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Court processing analyses 
The first part of my analysis focuses on identifying predictors of court 
actions – specifically, the JPO dispositional recommendation and the ultimate 
disposition. I model each of these outcomes separately using logistic regression 
techniques. Independent predictors have been selected based on prior research and 
theory. They fall into three broad categories: demographics, legal variables, and 
social variables. Demographic variables include gender, age and race. Legal 
variables include current offense and prior legal involvement. Social variables 
cover a broad range of areas, reflecting the dualistic nature of family court 
decision-making. These areas include drug use, peers, school performance, family 
functioning and mental health. 
Dependent variables are coded dichotomously. The dependent variable in 
the JPO dispositional recommendation model is coded one for a placement 
recommendation and zero for a probation recommendation. The dependent 
variable in the final disposition model is coded one for a placement disposition and 
zero for a non-placement disposition. In both models, I conduct diagnostics to test 
for multicollinearity, and adjust the models accordingly. 
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The principal goal of the data analysis is to investigate the specific 
deterrent effect of incarceration on this population of adjudicated youth. To do 
this, I conduct a number of statistical analyses on these data. The selection of 
relevant predictors of recidivism for multivariate models is driven primarily by 
theoretical concerns, as well as findings from prior research. Multivariate analyses, 
in the form of logistic regression and survival (or “event history”) analysis, test the 
independent effect of incarceration on the recidivism of delinquent youth, 
controlling for other potential recidivism predictors. Multivariate models are 
constructed which include incarceration as a dichotomous independent variable 
(“ever incarcerated”), and as a continuous variable (“length of incarceration”).  
Logistic regression is used to identify predictors of recidivism, and to test 
the independent effect of placement on recidivism during the follow-up period. 
Survival analysis predicts time to failure (re-arrest) for study subjects. Modeling 
the amount of time to recidivistic outcomes allows examinations of both 
desistance/reintroduction of criminality, and differences between delayed and 
immediate return to criminal behavior. Survival results will enhance regression 
results by illustrating the impact of incarceration on the length of time to 
recidivism for young offenders. Though it may be unnecessary to conduct both 
regression and survival analysis, I do so as a form of validity checking – to see 
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up periods. 
Survival analysis explores the effect of independent covariates on the 
distribution of “failure” times in a group. This technique is commonly used in 
biomedical research, where failure refers to death or illness, and researchers wish 
to test the impact of a treatment on these outcomes while controlling for other 
relevant factors. It is, however, gaining more widespread usage in the social 
sciences, and recidivism analyses are a common application, as re-arrest or re­
conviction can be easily understood within this notion of “failure.” Multivariate 
survival analysis allows an estimation of the relative impacts of covariates on the 
time it takes to fail (get re-arrested) by assessing the effect of each covariate on the 
shape of the survival curve (i.e., distribution of failure times), as well as 
determining the levels of statistical significance of associated coefficients. 
In the survival analyses, I first attempt to estimate Cox Proportional 
Hazards models, as the Cox model (also, “Cox regression”) is a versatile survival 
model that assumes no shape in the underlying distribution of the data. The 
model’s hazard function is given as: 
h{(t|x(t)} = h0(t) exp{x(t)’β}, 
where x(t) is a vector of covariates, and h0(t) is the hazard function at x(t)=0. 
The Cox model is semi-parametric; it has non-parametric and parametric 
elements. While the model is non-parametric in that no shape is assumed for the 
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the effect of a given covariate does not change over time, or more specifically, that 
the hazards of different values of covariates remain proportional to one another 
(this is the parametric part). Thus, if Person One’s risk of recidivism is twice as 
great as Person Two’s at a certain point in time, Person One’s risk is twice as great 
at all times. This is known as the proportional hazards assumption. This 
proportionality means that regression coefficients are understood as time-invariant, 
and interpreted as the effect of given covariates on the risk of failure, relative to 
the baseline risk. There are a number of ways to test the proportional hazards 
assumption. I apply STATA’s
xxx survival diagnostic function (STPHTEST 
command) to test the applicability of the Cox model for each dependent variable. 
Dependent variables in the Cox models are: 
•  Number of days to first arrest; 
•  Number of days to first arrest for a felony; 
•  Number of days to first arrest for a violent offense; 
•  Number of days to first arrest for a violent felony; 
Total follow-up time
xxxi (time in the community) in this study is three years 
– the length of time from the latest possible disposition received (June 30, 2000) 
and the temporal endpoint of data indicating re-arrest (June 30, 2003). It is 
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three years, as those who were incarcerated were not considered to be at-risk for 
re-arrest until their release from state facilities. The maximum typical sentence 
length for juveniles in state-run facilities is eighteen months, but I am able to 
calculate exact entry and release dates based on state placement data (source: 
OCFS). It is useful to envision each subject’s follow-up period as a “clock” that 
“ticks” when the youth is in the community and stops when the youth is 
incarcerated. Upon release from OCFS placement facilities, a subject’s recidivism 
clock begins ticking, and I count the number of days to re-arrest from this temporal 
starting point. 
This process is straightforward when counting the number of days to any 
re-arrest, but is complicated by the estimation of more specific recidivism 
measures such as time to re-arrest for a violent offense. After disposition or release 
from placement, a particular youth may be re-arrested for a non-violent offense 
and incarcerated for this offense for a time, but in terms of the analysis of violent 
recidivism, this subject has yet to recidivate. Therefore, I am forced to subtract the 
number of days the youth spent incarcerated on the non-violent offense from the 
follow-up period. And again, because I have data on all forms of juvenile and adult 
incarceration, I am able to calculate these incarcerated spells with precision. 
Below, for further clarity, I present a few visual examples of typical post-
disposition trajectories. 
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Scenario 1: Time to any re-arrest for subject sentenced to probation 
X 
Disposition  Re-arrest 
In Scenario 1, the youth is sentenced to probation and released immediately into 
the community. This subject’s recidivism clock begins ticking at the moment of 
disposition, and does not stop until the subject is re-arrested, or eighteen months 
pass. Clearly, if X days pass between disposition and re-arrest, the subject’s time to 
re-arrest is calculated as X. Note here that X real days have passed since 
disposition. 
Scenario 2: Time to any re-arrest for subject sentenced to placement 
X  Y 
Disposition  Release from placement  Re-arrest 
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then released. This subject’s recidivism clock does not begin ticking until release 
from placement. The clock stops when the subject is re-arrested after Y days, or 
when eighteen months elapse after release from placement. In this example, the 
subject’s time to re-arrest is calculated as Y, even though the real number of days 
that have passed between disposition and re-arrest is X+Y. If Y is greater than 
eighteen months, then the subject has not recidivated in my analyses. 
Scenario 3: Time to violent re-arrest for subject sentenced to probation 
X  Y  Z 
Disposition  Non-violent re-arrest   Violent re-arrest 
Scenario 3 is different because here, I am interested in predicting a specific type of 
re-arrest: re-arrest for a violent offense. Thus, if the subject is given probation at 
disposition, then re-arrested and incarcerated for a non-violent offense after X 
days, the recidivism clock stops ticking after X days. After release from 
incarceration, the recidivism clock begins to tick again, and Z days pass until the 
subject is re-arrested for a violent offense. Here, time to violent recidivism is 
calculated as X+Z, even though X+Y+Z real days have passed since disposition. If 
X+Z exceeds eighteen months, the subject has not recidivated in my analyses. 
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complexity of the family court process lends itself to myriad trajectories of system 
contact. For example, a subject sentenced to probation may be technically violated 
by his JPO because he or she did not go to school, and may be detained pending 
the outcome of this violation filing. This subject has not been re-arrested, but has 
been re-incarcerated. In this scenario, I subtract out the incarcerated time from the 
follow-up period. The point here is that the level of detail in my data allows me to 
conduct recidivism analyses with an exact knowledge of time spent incarcerated, 
and I can calculate time incarcerated and time not incarcerated precisely, 
regardless of how unusual a youth’s path through the system may be. 
All multivariate models include a series of independent variables derived 
from prior research and relevant theory. To test the differential impacts of 
incarceration on theoretically specified subparts of this sample, I add or derive a 
number of variables to be included in multivariate analyses that reflect 
theoretically meaningful predictive factors. I create interaction terms between 
these variables and the placement variable to investigate the differential effect of 
placement on relevant sub-samples. The variables associated with specific 
hypotheses are listed below. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b (“Control” hypotheses): To test these hypotheses, measures 
of social control are included in regression and survival analyses. These measures 
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involvement, and peer relationships. Specifically, I draw on variables that reflect:  
•  Degree of conflict between subject and parents/guardians; 
•  School attendance; 
•  Grades in school; 
•  Nature of peer influences. 
Hypothesis 4 (“Social Disorganization” hypothesis): I derive measures of 
ethnic/racial heterogeneity, poverty and residential mobility for each subject’s 
neighborhood by linking the “zip code” field to neighborhood characteristics using 
online data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
xxxii These measures include: 
•  Ethnic and racial composition;
xxxiii 
•  Percent of households with public assistance income in 1999; 
•  Percent of residents below poverty level in 1999; 
•  Household tenure (owner or renter occupied); 
•  Residence in 1995 (same/different house, same/different town or city). 
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target suitability and capable guardianship in neighborhoods using online U.S. 
Census data. These include: 
•  Housing units per square mile; 
•  Occupancy status (i.e. percent of vacant housing units); 
•  Population density; 
•  Percent of population that works outside county of residence; 
•  Average travel time to work; 
•  Vehicles per square mile; 
•  Median rent asked. 
3.4 Limitations of the Data 
There are a number of limitations to these data. First, because the sample is 
taken entirely from the New York juvenile justice system, the relevance of 
findings to other jurisdictions and institutions must be stated with care. New York 
is a unique place with a distinctively complex system of juvenile justice. Second, 
since these data are primarily coded from probation department case files, they are 
constrained by the information contained in these files. Probation I&Rs, for 
example, are written by probation officers, and largely based on their interviews 
with delinquent youth. As I have already mentioned, it is likely that recently 
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drug use and criminal activity in these settings. Where possible, data coders have 
corroborated coded data across multiple sources, and made educated judgments 
about the most reliable information available. Relatedly, accounts of delinquent 
youth written by police officers, probation officers, clinicians, and other criminal 
justice officials will be inherently affected by the authors’ occupational, social, and 
ideological dispositions. A final limitation is that recidivism measures record 
arrests in New York State only. Thus, if a subject is arrested in another state during 
the follow-up period, it cannot be taken into account in these analyses. The 
offending patterns of youth who move out of the area are unobserved and thus, 
these cases are a source of bias in the analysis. 
3.5 Methodological Limitations 
Studies of recidivism must find a balance between allowing sufficient 
follow-up time and selecting a representative sample. Coding baseline measures at 
a point in the distant past allows for long follow-up periods, but at the expense of 
sample representativeness; the further back in time one goes for baseline 
evaluation, the less that the study’s subjects look like their modern-day 
counterparts. Conversely, a shorter follow-up period promotes greater similarity 
between sampled subjects and their contemporaries, but these short follow-up 
periods prevent analyses that explain any long-term impacts on recidivism. The 
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for a fairly short follow-up period (3 years total), but there should be a great deal 
of similarity between study subjects and youth that are currently adjudicated in 
New York Family Court.  
In essence, this research project is “experimental,” in that I seek to test the 
effects of a type of “treatment” (i.e., placement) on a particular population by 
comparing treatment group outcomes against the outcomes of a control group (i.e., 
those who receive community-based sentences). This design raises some 
methodological issues that can be understood through an examination of the 
counterfactual account of causality (see Winship & Morgan 1999 for a review). 
The counterfactual framework indicates two potential sources of bias when using 
observational data to estimate causal effects. First, outcomes for treatment and 
control groups may differ, even in the absence of treatment, because the two 
groups are not alike. Second, the potential effects of treatment may differ for 
treatment and control groups.
xxxiv These biases will be unobservable, as treatment 
group subjects cannot possibly have observable outcomes as control subjects, and 
control group subjects cannot have observable outcomes as treatment subjects.  
Applying the counterfactual framework to the current project, one can 
imagine two potential areas where bias may manifest itself. First, recidivism will 
likely be correlated with selection into treatment and control groups. That is, youth 
who are sentenced to placement will have distinct profiles from those who receive 
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placed youth may recidivate at higher rates, regardless of their sentence. Similarly, 
youth on probation may have been more effectively deterred through placement 
than youth who were actually placed. Second, time actually served in placement is 
not equal to sentence received, and time served may vary by a number of factors. 
When a youth receives a sentence of eighteen months in OCFS placement, it 
simply means that the youth will be under OCFS supervision for eighteen months, 
not necessarily that the youth will be incarcerated for eighteen months. Depending 
on his/her behavior in placement and other life circumstances (e.g., family 
situation), a youth can be released early to OCFS aftercare – again, this is 
essentially a form of parole. Conversely, a placed youth may be incarcerated for a 
period longer than his/her sentence, should OCFS apply for a placement extension 
due to behavioral issues or their assessment of a youth’s suitability for return to the 
community. In short, actual time served may also be correlated with pertinent non­
legal factors. 
The key to addressing these methodological limitations is identifying 
factors which contribute to selection bias – either by disposition or by time served 
– and determining whether these factors are measurable or not. For example, if 
selection into treatment and control groups can be accurately predicted through an 
analysis of observable factors (legal history, charge severity, family 
circumstances), I am able to model the selection into treatment and control groups 
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eliminate the correlation between assignment and outcome (recidivism). Likewise, 
if I can model determinants of actual time served, I can control for variations in 
“assignment” to longer/shorter sentences, and eliminate correlation between this 
type of assignment and outcome. 
These limitations are more difficult to address if I find that 
observable/measurable factors cannot explain selection into treatment/control 
groups, or variations in time served. Should this be the case, I must devise 
alternative strategies to compensate. A solution that I have adopted is to use 
propensity scoring methods to control for inter-group differences. That is, I model 
the propensity of each subject to be assigned (sentenced) to the placement or 
probation group, and include this propensity in multivariate models. I would hope 
that this calculated propensity can “soak up” unobserved differences between the 
samples. 
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Family Court Processing Analysis 

This chapter covers findings related to family court processing in New 
York City. I focus on two critical and related decision points in the court process: 
the JPO dispositional recommendation and the judge’s ultimate dispositional 
decision. These decisions are the most important in terms of youths’ likelihood of 
placement. Broadly, I aim to determine why court-involved youth in New York 
City end up in placement. That is, what legal and social characteristics of youth are 
associated with an increased chance of incarceration at disposition? Specifically, 
under what circumstances do JPOs typically recommend placement? Under what 
circumstances do judges sentence youth to placement? Finally, what is the nature 
of the relationship between the recommendation and the disposition? 
Recall that in the juvenile justice system, sentencing is based on two 
potentially countervailing forces: community safety and child welfare. In this 
chapter, I hope to explain how judges and probation officers consider and 
reconcile these forces in their decisions. In later chapters, I will compare the 
results of my recidivism analyses with the results of these court processing 
analyses, in order to assess how well the decisions of court actors actually coincide 
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purported function of juvenile justice in New York and its actual function. 
4.1 JPO Dispositional Recommendations: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 below displays the proportion of subjects who received 
recommendations for placement and for probation. Eight-seven cases had no 
recommendation on file, either because the I&R report was missing, the 
recommendation had been deferred, or no recommendation had been made. 
Table 4.1: JPO Dispositional Recommendations in NYC, Spring 2000 
(N=698) 
Number Percent 
Placement 394  56.4 
Probation 217  31.1 
Don’t know  11  1.6 
Recommendation deferred  14  2.0 
No I&R on file  62  8.9 
Most subjects were recommended for placement (56.4%). About one-third 
received a probation recommendation. Eighty-seven subjects had no 
recommendation available, for the reasons cited above. These eighty-seven are 
excluded from the multivariate analysis predicting I&R recommendation. 
Table 4.2 below breaks down the demographic, legal and social 
characteristics of youth receiving placement and probation recommendations. The 
table serves two purposes. First, it allows me to identify the critical observed 
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suggest the factors that may be most significantly associated with the 
recommendation. Multivariate analyses will further explore the role of these 
factors. 
Table 4.2: Characteristics of Youth Recommended for Placement and 
Probation in NYC, Spring 2000 (N=611) 
I&R Recommendation 
Placement Probation 
Female (%)  18.5*  26.7 
Age (mean)  14.53  14.35 
Black (%)  63.7*  59.4 
Hispanic (%)  29.9*  24.0 
Bronx (%)  27.4*  14.3 
Brooklyn (%)  27.4*  30.4 
Manhattan (%)  26.6*  32.3 
Queens (%)  14.0*  17.1 
Staten Island (%)  4.6*  6.0 
Adjudicated on violent charge (%)  44.2*  58.5 
Adjudicated on property charge (%)  31.5*  32.3 
Adjudicated on drug charge (%)  16.8*  5.1 
Adjudicated on felony charge (%)  42.9*  34.1 
Probation violators (%)  19.8*  2.8 
Has previous arrests (%)  51.3*  18.4 
Has previous violent arrests (%)  25.9*  8.8 
Has previous OCFS placements (%)  4.3*  0.5 
Has previous PINS complaints (%)  32.0*  6.5 
Detained before disposition (%)  84.8*  18.9 
Takes some responsibility for offense (%)  27.4*  46.5 
In 2 parent household (%)  27.2  28.6 
History of moving between family units (%)  45.2*  30.0 
Parents set clear boundaries (%)  19.3*  38.2 
Usually obedient to parents (%)  33.2*  71.9 
90 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Significant conflict with parents (%)  36.3*  8.8 
Parent wants youth placed (%)  25.1*  1.8 
Court finding of abuse/neglect in house (%)  13.7*  7.4 
Family member with criminal record (%)  9.9  8.8 
Family member with drug/alcohol problem (%)  10.2*  0.9 
Family member with mental health problem (%)  8.1  4.1 
Family member is employed (%)  52.3  58.5 
Family member receives public assistance (%)  43.4  45.2 
Attends school more than 90% of the time (%)  6.1*  24.4 
Passing more than ½ of classes (%)  11.7*  32.3 
In special education (%)  34.0*  24.9 
School intervention for behavioral problem (%)  44.9*  27.6 
Has negative peers (%)  84.5*  66.4 
Associates with gang members (%)  31.2*  12.0 
History of assaultive behavior (%)  78.2*  65.9 
Current or past drug use (%)  63.5*  20.3 
Has attended counseling (%)  52.3*  32.7 
Participates in regular organized activities (%)  39.1  45.6 
*Differences significant at p≤0.05 
While the age of the two sub-samples is virtually identical, there are other 
important demographic differences. Youth who are recommended for probation 
are more likely to be female (26.7% vs. 18.5%) and less likely to be black or 
Hispanic (83.4% vs. 92.6%). 
There are differences across boroughs as well. The Bronx, in particular, 
appears to recommend a disproportionate number of youth for placement. It is the 
only borough in which fewer youth are recommended for probation than 
placement, and this difference is large. Over a quarter of the youth recommended 
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recommended for probation come from this borough.  
Interestingly, being adjudicated on a drug charges appears to be associated 
with placement recommendations, while those adjudicated for violent offenses are 
more likely to be recommended for probation. The two sub-samples have roughly 
equal proportions of property offenders. Anecdotally, from reading the I&R 
narratives, it seems that JPOs may view many violent acts as singular emotional 
outbursts of the “schoolyard fight” variety, while drug offenses, particularly drug 
selling, are seen as evidence of formal entry into illegal activities and networks. 
Offense severity, however, appears to be connected to the recommendation in the 
expected manner. Youth recommended for placement are more likely to be 
adjudicated on felonies than those receiving probation recommendations (42.9% 
vs. 34.1%). 
Youth recommended for placement have more extensive legal histories 
than those recommended for probation. They are significantly more likely to be in 
court for the violation of probation or some other community-based sentence 
(19.8% vs. 2.8%). They are more likely to have been previously arrested (51.3% 
vs. 18.4%), to have been previously arrested for a violent crime (25.9% vs. 8.8%), 
and to have previously experienced state placement (4.3% vs. 0.5%). A much 
larger proportion of youth receiving placement recommendations are detained 
during trial (84.8% vs. 18.9%), suggesting that judges may already, during the trial 
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informal conversations,
xxxv have suggested that it is common for judges to give 
“softer” youth a chance during trial by allowing them to be paroled to their homes. 
Those youth who make it through trial without further incident have, in a sense, 
proven themselves to the court and are more likely to be sentenced to probation or 
some other community-based disposition. Those who “fail” this trial period, by 
getting re-arrested, absconding or not attending school, are more likely to get 
placed. Conversely, judges do not feel that it is necessary to give this chance to 
youth who, because of the characteristics of their cases, will inevitably be placed. 
Thus, youth who are already destined for incarceration are substantially more 
likely to be detained during trial, in order to guard against the possibility of 
absconding or further offending. 
A youth’s attitude towards the offense may also contribute to the 
recommendation outcome. Recall that in Chapter 2, I proposed that youth who are 
not compliant with institutional expectations, such as probation violators and those 
who show little remorse, are likely to be “stepped up” to harsher sanctions (see 
Asquith 1983; Reese, Curtis & Richard 1989). The descriptive statistics presented 
in Table 4.2 bear this out. Almost half of those recommended for probation 
(46.5%) take some responsibility for the offense, while only 27.4% of those 
recommended for placement take such responsibility. 
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than those recommended for probation, though some of these differences are not 
statistically significant. Those receiving placement recommendations are 
significantly more likely to have moved between family units (45.2% vs. 30.0%). 
They are significantly less likely to have clear boundaries set in the home (19.3% 
vs. 38.2%). They are significantly less likely to be obedient to their parents (33.2% 
vs. 71.9%) and significantly more likely to have conflict with parents (36.3% vs. 
8.8%). Their parents are significantly more likely to ask for placement as a 
disposition (25.1% vs. 1.8%). They live in households that are significantly more 
likely to have had an official finding of abuse or neglect (13.7% vs. 7.4%). They 
are more likely to live with family members with criminal records (9.9% vs. 8.8%, 
non-significant), drug or alcohol problems (10.2% vs. 0.9%), and mental health 
problems (8.1% vs. 4.1%, non-significant). Youth recommended for placement are 
also slightly less likely to have a legitimately-employed family member (52.3% vs. 
58.5%, non-significant). 
Youth recommended for placement do much worse in school than their 
probation-recommended counterparts. Their attendance is worse: 6.1% of those 
recommended for placement attend more than 90% of the time, while 24.4% of 
those recommended for probation have good attendance. Only 11.7% of youth 
recommended for placement are passing more than half of their classes. 
Conversely, almost one-third (32.3%) of youth recommended for probation are 
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special education (34.0% vs. 24.9%), and more have received some sort of 
intervention, such as detention or suspension, for behavioral problems in school 
(44.9% vs. 27.6%). 
Placement-recommended youth also exhibit other social and behavioral 
problems at higher rates. They are significantly more likely to have negative peers 
(84.5% vs. 66.4%), to associate with gang members (31.2% vs. 12.0%), and to 
have a history of assaultive behavior (78.2% vs. 65.9%). They more frequently 
admit to current or past drug use (63.5% vs. 20.3%). A higher proportion has a 
history of receiving counseling (52.3% vs. 32.7%). Fewer placement-
recommended youth regularly participate in organized activities such as church, 
sports teams or school clubs (39.1% vs. 45.6%, non-significant). 
Overall, there appear to be substantial differences between youth 
recommended for placement and youth recommended for probation, with 
placement-recommended youth having more extensive legal histories, more family 
and home problems, lower school engagement, and a higher incidence of 
behavioral issues. But which of these factors are most important in the minds of 
JPOs? And which of the two mandates of the juvenile justice system (public safety 
or child welfare) weighs more heavily on the recommendation? Or, as Asquith 
(1983) and others have suggested, is there an institutional logic to system decisions 
that transcends these mandates? 
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To predict JPO dispositional recommendations, I estimated a logistic 
regression model. The dependent variable in this model was coded dichotomously, 
with a zero value indicating a probation recommendation and a value of one 
indicating a placement recommendation. Independent variables, drawn from prior 
research and theory, represented factors that JPOs were likely to consider in 
making their recommendation, and were split into four categories:  
•	 Demographic: Age, sex, race, borough; 
•	 Risk: Variables signifying higher risk of future offending;    
•	 Needs: Variables describing problems or issues that need attention; 
•	 “Institutional non-compliance”: Variables indicating the degree to 
which youth meet the expectations of the justice system. 
It would be fiction to presume that the categories of “risk,” “need” and 
“non-compliance” are mutually exclusive and clearly bounded. While some 
measures fall clearly into a single category (e.g., history of assaultive behavior), 
others straddle multiple categories. Pre-trial detention, for example, suggests an 
increased risk of offending, but might also be interpreted by a JPO as a measure of 
non-compliance with system mandates, as youth who refuse to go to school or 
show up in court are often remanded to detention by judges. My categorizations, 
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compartments. 
Some independent measures were recoded in order to reduce degrees of 
freedom, and improve the distributions of the variables. Table 4.3 describes the 
included independent variables, and categorizes them. 
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JPO Recommendations, Spring 2000 
Variable name  Description  Variable type  Variable 
category 
AGE  Age at disposition  Continuous  Demographic 
SEX Sex  (male=1)  Dichotomous  Demographic 
RACE  Race: white, black, Hispanic, 
other/don’t know 
Categorical Demographic 
BOROUGH Borough  of  disposition  Categorical  Demographic 
TOPVIOL  Top adjudicated charge type is for a 
violent, against person, or weapons 
offense 
Dichotomous   Risk 
TOPSEV  Top adjudicated charge severity: 
misdemeanor, felony C/D/E, felony 
A/B, other/don’t know 
Categorical Risk 
VIOLHIST  Respondent has a history of 
assaultive behavior 
Dichotomous Risk 
PREVAR  Previous or other arrests on record  Dichotomous  Risk 
NEGPEERS Respondent  only associates with 
negative peers 
Dichotomous Risk 
FAMDRUG Family  member  has a drug or alcohol 
problem 
Dichotomous Need 
CONFLICT  Significant conflict between 
respondent and parent 
Dichotomous Need 
ATTEND  Respondent is not enrolled in school, 
or attending less than 10% of the 
time 
Dichotomous Need 
PASSING  Respondent is passing more than ½ 
of his/her classes in school 
Dichotomous Need 
CURRDRUG  Current drug or alcohol use by 
respondent 
Dichotomous Need 
COUNSEL  Respondent has previously attended 
counseling 
Dichotomous Need 
DETAINED  Respondent detained before 
disposition 
Dichotomous Non­
compliance 
VIOLATED  Current disposition is for violation of 
probation or other community 
sentence 
Dichotomous Non­
compliance 
PINS  Previous PINS complaints on record  Dichotomous  Non­
compliance 
ATTITUDE  Youth takes some responsibility for 
the current offense 
Dichotomous Non­
compliance 
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presented in Table 4.4 below. For categorical independent variables, the first listed 
category is the reference category. The logistic regression model correctly 
predicted 86.9% of dispositional recommendations. The logistic equation produced 
a significant model with a pseudo R
2 of .413;
xxxvi the pseudo R
2 was calculated as 
c/(c+N), where c was the model chi-square and N was the number of cases. The 
included independent variables thus improved the goodness of fit 41% over 
chance. 
Multicollinearity did not appear to be a problem among the selected 
independent variables. I estimated a linear regression, with all independent 
measures included, and examined the variance inflation factor (VIF) associated 
with each variable. No VIF had a value exceeding six. Black race had a VIF of 5.9; 
the Hispanic race VIF was 5.6; and the “other race” VIF was 2.1. VIFs for all other 
variables were below two, with most being closer to one.    
To test for model misspecification, I performed a linktest in STATA after 
running the logistic regression. The linktest was non-significant, suggesting an 
acceptable model specification. Additionally, I examined two two-by-two tables 
detailing the predictive accuracy of the model. The first table reported the 
percentage of cases correctly classified on the basis of the base rate – that is, the 
regression model with no independent predictors included. This classification rate 
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independent variables); the classification rate improved to 81.8%.  
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Variable name  Variable description  B  Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
AGE  Age at disposition  -0.12  0.89 
SEX Sex  (male=1)  0.68  1.97 
RACE (1)  Race – white 
RACE (2)  Race – black  1.24  3.45 
RACE (3)  Race – Hispanic  0.74  2.09 
RACE (4)  Race – other/DK  0.60  1.82 
BOROUGH (1)  Borough – Bronx 
BOROUGH (2)  Borough – Brooklyn  -1.83**  0.16 
BOROUGH (3)  Borough – Manhattan  -1.30**  0.27 
BOROUGH (4)  Borough – Queens  -1.10*  0.33 
BOROUGH (5)  Borough – Staten Island  -1.34  0.26 
TOPVIOL  Top charge – violent  -1.05**  0.35 
TOPSEV (1)  Top charge – misdemeanor 
TOPSEV (2)  Top charge – felony C/D/E  -0.27  0.76 
TOPSEV (3)  Top charge – felony A/B  2.09  8.06 
TOPSEV (4)  Top charge – other severity/DK  -0.46  0.63 
VIOLHIST  History of assaultive behavior  0.72*  2.06 
PREVAR Previous  or  other arrests on record  0.77*  2.15 
NEGPEERS  Only associates with neg. peers  0.66*  1.93 
FAMDRUG  Family with drug/alc. Problem  2.57**  13.10 
CONFLICT Significant  conflict with parent  0.66  1.94 
ATTEND  Not enrolled/attends less than 10%  0.24  1.27 
PASSING  Passing more than ½ of classes  -0.07  0.93 
CURRDRUG  Current drug or alcohol use  0.82*  2.27 
COUNSEL  Previously attended counseling  0.92**  2.50 
DETAINED  Detained before disposition  2.56**  12.92 
VIOLATED  Violation of probation  2.57**  13.08 
PINS  Previous PINS complaints  1.18**  3.27 
ATTITUDE Takes  some  responsibility for offense  -0.72*  0.49 
Constant Constant  -0.85  0.43 
Model Chi
2  430.38** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.413 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed). 
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a family member with a drug problem (odds ratio=13.10), being a probation 
violator (OR=13.08), and being detained prior to disposition (OR=12.92). Being 
adjudicated on a violent charge was also significantly related to JPO 
recommendation, but the direction of this relationship was counterintuitive. Youth 
adjudicated on violent charges were less likely to be recommended for placement 
than youth adjudicated on property, drug, or other types of charges (OR=0.44).  
The model also discerned a strong borough effect, with Bronx JPOs being 
significantly more likely than JPOs from other boroughs to recommend placement. 
This dissertation’s data are not well suited to systematically identifying the reasons 
behind this tendency, but it is believed anecdotally that Department of Probation 
staff members in the Bronx do take a more punitive view of young offenders than 
staff in other boroughs (differential borough placement rates are the main 
evidence). Senior staffers, in particular, seem to favor placement dispositions over 
community alternatives, and there is speculation that this organizational propensity 
“trickles down” to JPOs making dispositional recommendations. However, other 
dynamics could be at work. Distinctive social and economic conditions in the 
Bronx might indeed increase opportunities for juvenile recidivism, and probation 
staff may simply be recognizing this reality. Specifically, they might believe that 
recommending probation allows youth to remain in bad neighborhoods (with bad 
influences) and that therefore, placement is a good way to separate youth from 
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regression with neighborhood characteristics included as independent variables, in 
order to see whether these characteristics affected inter-borough recommendation 
differences (see chapter 3 for variable descriptions and derivations). They did not. 
Borough differences remained significant, and geographic variables did not 
significantly affect recommendation patterns. This test was imperfect in that most 
youth come from the same disadvantaged neighborhoods, and so the assessment of 
neighborhood effects may have been hindered by the skewed distributions of 
independent neighborhood variables.
xxxvii Nevertheless, the results of this test 
suggest that there are other, unmeasured, reasons behind the Bronx’s more 
punitive treatment of young offenders. At this point, my best guess is that this is 
principally an issue of organizational culture. 
Other factors that were positively and significantly related to the 
recommendation were: prior PINS complaints, having a history of counseling, 
current drug use, prior arrests, a history of assaultive behavior, and having 
negatively-influencing peers. Taking some responsibility for the offense was, as 
expected, negatively and significantly related to receiving a placement 
recommendation. 
Race did not appear related to recommendation as no coefficients were 
significant. However being black, Hispanic, or another nonwhite race did raise 
odds ratios appreciably. This may have been due to the small number of white 
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suggested that I create a dichotomous white/nonwhite race variable and test its 
power and significance. The new NONWHITE variable did exhibit a large 
coefficient (B=1.05; OR=2.85), but it was not statistically significant. So, while 
there is some evidence that JPOs give either conscious or subconscious 
consideration to race in their recommendation decisions, this evidence is far from 
definitive.   
Overall, JPOs seem to consider a number of factors related to recidivism 
risk and youths’ needs in making dispositional recommendations, but they appear 
most concerned with youths’ respect for and compliance with legal institutions. In 
other words, JPOs appear to be swayed heavily by indications that youth “have not 
learned their lesson.” In the logistic regression model, every variable in the 
institutional non-compliance category was significantly related to the dispositional 
recommendation. Two that had a particularly strong relationship with the PO 
dispositional recommendation were: whether youth were detained before 
disposition, and whether the current disposition is for a probation violation or 
violation of some other community disposition (e.g., conditional discharge). Pre­
trial detention was the most powerful predictor of a placement recommendation, 
with youth who were detained before disposition much more likely than non-
detained youth to be recommended for placement. Probation violators were 
substantially more likely to be recommended for placement than non-violators. 
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variables indicating prior PINS complaints and attitude towards the offense. Youth 
who took some responsibility for the act that led to the current disposition were 
significantly less likely to be recommended for placement as those who 
minimized, justified or simply denied their actions. 
These findings suggest that JPOs in New York City may be adopting 
measures of institutional non-compliance as critical markers in their “frames of 
relevance” (Asquith 1983). These markers trigger placement recommendations 
under the auspices of community safety and youth needs, with the twin forces of 
risk and need reconciled in an accepted logical sequence of sanctions. When a JPO 
is aware that a youth has been remanded to a city detention facility, the JPO may 
infer that that youth needs to be kept out of the community as a safety precaution. 
However, the decision to detain a youth is not based completely on the risk of 
offending; youth can be detained because of family instability, for fear that the he 
or she may not appear at the next court date, or a number of other administrative or 
legal reasons. For example, youth who are arrested after family court working 
hours are automatically delivered to a city detention facility; if the youth’s parents 
cannot be reached, or if they cannot come to the facility, the youth is remanded 
until the first court date. Probation violations can also occur for a number of 
reasons: truancy, failure to report to or cooperate with the JPO, failure to report to 
counseling or other mandated services, in addition to re-arrest. Note here that these 
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may not like going to school because he fears being bullied. She may not report to 
her JPO because she does not like the JPO, or because she cannot find 
transportation. A youth may not go to counseling because it conflicts with another 
obligation, such as a part-time job. Likewise, having a PINS complaint on file may 
not be a good marker of criminal propensity. Youth may be PINS because of drug 
problems, because they do not like to go to school, or because parents feel the 
youth is associating with negative peers. Moreover, the presence of a prior PINS 
complaint can actually represent two countervailing forces – one potentially 
criminogenic, one potentially protective. PINS complaints indicate that a youth has 
problems, but also that the youth’s family cares enough to seek formal help from 
the court. Presumably, there are many youth in the community with problems, but 
whose families are not engaged or motivated enough to seek help for those 
problems. Again, I will compare factors associated with court decisions with 
factors related to recidivism in the next two chapters. 
It is important to note here that the factors that best predict JPO 
recommendations may not necessarily be the ones given most narrative weight in 
the actual I&R reports. While JPOs may, either consciously or unconsciously, be 
giving these factors priority in their decisions, the language of the actual reports 
may not reflect this. As Curtis and Reese (1994) claim, JPO reports are accounts 
using “vocabularies of motive” or “organizationally acceptable languages” to 
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wording of these accounts may be disconnected from the real factors behind 
recommendation decisions. 
The above discussion should not imply that JPOs do not factor needs and 
risk at all in their dispositional recommendations. While markers of institutional 
non-compliance are highly predictive of the recommendation, other factors also 
play a role. Having a family member with a drug problem, one marker of need, is 
highly associated with receiving a placement recommendation. When JPOs 
become aware of drug problems in a youth’s family, they may assume that these 
problems detrimentally impact the youth’s welfare and behavior. However, JPOs 
may only become aware of these problems because the affected family member 
has enrolled in some sort of treatment program, or is openly attempting to address 
the problem. JPOs probably do not detect many cases in which family members 
have drug and alcohol problems, as youth and their families, when being 
interviewed by court officials, are not likely to volunteer such information. Thus, 
when JPOs do become aware of such problems, it is likely to be in cases where the 
family, either by will or by coercion, is taking steps to remedy the problem. Two 
other “needs” variables - having a history of counseling and current drug use - are 
also predictive of receiving a placement recommendation, though their coefficients 
are not large (OR=2.50 and 2.27, respectively).   
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associated with the dispositional recommendation, though none exhibit very large 
coefficients. Youth with previous arrests on record are more likely to receive a 
recommendation of placement. This is no surprise, and as mentioned above, the 
previous arrest variable might actually straddle the line between the categories of 
risk and non-compliance. While a longer criminal record is commonly viewed as a 
marker of increased offending risk, it also shows that previous sanctioning had not 
effectively deterred the youth in question. Being adjudicated on felony A or felony 
B offenses is not significantly associated with the JPO recommendation, though 
this may be a result of the relatively small number of youth who fall into this 
category. Only 2.8% of the sample was adjudicated on these most serious charges. 
However, it seems as if charge severity is, in reality, something that JPOs do 
consider in their recommendations, as this variable exhibits a fairly large 
regression coefficient (OR=8.06). Another variable that is significant in the 
recommendation model was having negatively-influencing peers. Youth who only 
associate with negative peers are more likely to receive a placement 
recommendation.  
One puzzling finding in my analysis is that when a youth’s top adjudicated 
charge is for a violent offense, he or she is less likely to receive a placement 
recommendation. Though this may seem surprising on the surface, it may be the 
case that JPOs view many violent offenses as singular, emotional outbursts, 
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consider property and drug offenses to be calculated crimes-for-profit, which are 
likely to be repeated in the absence of a restrictive intervention.  
My findings in this section seem to support the notion that non-compliance 
with legal norms and institutional orders is the driving force behind placement 
recommendations. For JPOs, markers of non-compliance, such as detention status, 
probation violation, and a youth’s attitude, might serve as a partial solution to the 
conundrum of juvenile justice. The range of dispositional options available to 
JPOs is limited, and it is unlikely for any disposition to simultaneously address the 
issues of public safety and child welfare with any adequacy. Individual-level 
factors that suggest increased offending risk or the needs of youth thus play second 
fiddle to proximate institutional factors that are easily knowable and directly 
indicative of youths’ respect for, and adherence to, the mandates of the system. 
4.3 Family Court Dispositions: Descriptive Statistics 
I have shown that JPOs, in their assessments of youth, give a great deal of 
weight to factors that signify compliance with institutional expectations. Next, I 
wish to investigate the dispositional decision itself. In this sub-section, I explore 
the types of dispositions that are given to delinquent youth, the degree to which 
dispositions agree with what JPOs have recommended, and the factors that are 
most significantly associated with placement. Table 4.5 below lists the frequencies 
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third receives straight probation. Nine percent end up in community-based 
alternative-to-placement programs, and another nine percent receive conditional 
discharges. 
Table 4.5: NYC Family Court Dispositions, Spring 2000 (N=698) 
Number Percent 
Placement 341  48.9 
Probation 230  33.0 
Alternative-to-placement program (JISP, CASES)  62  8.9 
Conditional discharge  65  9.3 
Next, I explore the degree to which recommendations and dispositions 
agree. In line with prior research, I find a high rate of agreement between 
recommendations offered by JPOs and ensuing dispositions (see Table 4.6 below).   
Table 4.6: Agreement of NYC JPOs and Judges by Disposition, Spring 2000 
(N=698) 
JPO  Recommendation 
Disposition  Probation Placement  Missing/Don’t  know 
Probation  94.0%  26.4%  56.3% 
Placement   6.0%  73.6%  43.7% 
When a JPO recommends probation, the youth is given probation 94% of 
the time. Similarly, when the JPO recommends placement, the juvenile is 
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important role of JPOs in determining juvenile dispositions. The reason that 
placement recommendations lead to placement dispositions less often than 
probation recommendations lead to probation dispositions has to do with the 
availability of alternative-to-placement programs in New York City. A certain 
proportion of court-involved youth who are recommended for placement are 
screened for eligibility for these community-based alternatives, and some of these 
youth are accepted and “stepped down” to community supervision. However, 
youth who are recommended for probation are rarely “stepped up” to placement 
dispositions. 
In cases where no recommendation could be found, subjects were fairly 
evenly split between probation and placement dispositions (56.3% versus 43.7%), 
suggesting an absence of bias in the reasons behind missing/deferred/unknown 
recommendations. 
Next, I explore the characteristics of youth receiving different dispositions: 
placement, community-based alternative-to-placement, probation, and conditional 
discharge (see Table 4.7 below). As expected, youth sentenced to placement have 
the most extensive legal histories, the highest incidence of home/family problems, 
and the worst school performance. There is also evidence of other problems among 
this group, such as drug use, behavioral issues, and peer influences. 
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2000 (N=698) 
Placement Alt-to-
placement 
Probation CD 
Female (%)  16.7*  24.2  22.2  33.8 
Age  (mean)  14.45 14.74 14.50  14.46 
Black (%)  64.8*  58.1  58.7  55.4 
Hispanic (%)  29.0*  32.3  23.9  27.7 
Bronx (%)  28.4*  19.4  12.6  29.2 
Brooklyn (%)  26.7*  32.3  31.7  29.2 
Manhattan (%)  26.7*  27.4  28.7  30.8 
Queens (%)  14.1*  17.7  18.3  3.1 
Staten Island (%)  4.1*  3.2  8.7  7.7 
Adjudicated on violent charge (%)  45.2  48.4  53.0  58.5 
Adjudicated on property charge (%)  30.8  33.9  32.2  27.7 
Adjudicated on drug charge (%)  17.6  8.1  9.6  6.2 
Adjudicated on felony charge (%)  46.9*  40.3  33.1  18.5 
Detained before disposition (%)   92.1*  50.0  26.1  15.4 
Takes some responsibility for offense (%)  24.0*  37.1  41.3  35.4 
Probation violators (%)  22.0*  12.9  9.1  3.1 
Has previous arrests (%)  56.6*  35.5  22.6  26.2 
Has previous violent arrests (%)  29.9*  11.3  10.9  16.9 
Has previous OCFS placements (%)  6.7*  0.0 0.4  6.2 
Has previous PINS complaints (%)  33.4*  16.1  13.0  16.9 
In 2 parent household (%)  24.3*  33.9  27.4  36.9 
History of moving b/w family units (%)  46.0*  46.8  33.5  24.6 
Parents set clear boundaries (%)  15.2*  25.8  36.1  41.5 
Usually obedient to parents (%)  30.2*  54.8  66.5  84.6 
Significant conflict with parent (%)  37.8*  22.6  10.4  12.3 
Parent wants youth placed (%)  27.0*  6.5 3.5  1.5 
Court finding of abuse/neglect (%)  13.8  14.5  7.0  6.2 
Family with criminal record (%)  11.7  8.1  7.0  6.2 
Family with drug/alcohol problem (%)  9.4*  4.8  3.9  0.0 
Family with mental health problem (%)  7.6*  12.9  3.5  1.5 
Family member is employed (%)  51.6  50.0  55.7  56.9 
Family member with pub. assistance (%)  44.0  46.8  44.8  38.5 
Attends school more than 90% (%)  5.3*  11.3  19.1  29.2 
Passing more than ½ classes (%) 10.3*  14.5  24.8  36.9 
In special education (%)  34.3*  25.8  29.1  13.8 
School intervention (%)  42.8*  41.9  30.9  20.0 
Has negative peers (%)  85.9*  83.9  71.7  72.3 
Associates with gang members (%)  31.7*  29.0  13.0  12.3 
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Current or past drug use (%)  62.5*  50.0  30.9  20.0 
Has attended counseling (%)  49.0*  53.2  36.1  38.5 
Participates in organized activities (%)  38.1*  37.1  49.6  64.6 
*Differences significant at p≤0.05. 
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.7 above mirror those shown in 
Table 4.2 (youth characteristics by JPO recommendation outcome), and not 
surprisingly, more severe dispositions appear to be associated with higher 
incidences of problems. Youth sentenced to placement have the most problems; 
youth sentenced to conditional discharge have the least, and youth given 
alternative-to-placement and probation fall in the middle.  
I am not going to go into detail about each item listed in Table 4.7, but I 
will point out some interesting findings. Girls are under-represented and ethnic 
minorities over-represented at the more severe end of the juvenile sanction 
spectrum. Age appears to play no role. As with JPO recommendations, the Bronx 
appears more punitive than other boroughs. Bronx youth comprise the highest 
proportion of cases going to placement, and a disproportionately low proportion of 
youth going to probation and alternative-to-placement programs.  
Violent charges tend to result in lesser sanctions, while drug charges are 
associated with more serious sanctions. Placement-bound youth are more likely to 
be felons than youth receiving community dispositions. Placement-bound youth 
have the longest legal histories. 
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households, to have clear boundaries set at home, and to be obedient to their 
parents. They are the most likely to have significant conflict with a parent, and for 
their parents to want them placed. They are also most likely to have a family 
member with a criminal record (not statistically significant) or a drug/alcohol 
problem. 
Youth getting placement dispositions also do the worst in school, and on 
other social and behavioral issues. They have the worst attendance, the worst 
grades, are most likely to be in special education, and the most likely to have been 
subject to school intervention for a behavioral problem. They are the most likely to 
have negative peers and associate with gang members. They are most likely to 
have admitted past or present drug use. 
4.4 Family Court Dispositions: Multivariate Analysis 
I use logistic regression to model the judges’ dispositional decisions. Two 
models are estimated. The first predicts judges’ disposition decisions. The second 
predicts cases in which judges override JPO recommendations for probation and 
decide to place youth. I have estimated this second model in order to get a sense of 
an important sub-part of the juvenile delinquent population: youth who, by 
recommendation, appear destined for probation but are placed instead. And in 
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understand a critical point of disagreement between JPOs and judges. Included 
independent variables are the same as those included in the JPO recommendation 
model. The dependent variable the first model is dichotomous, with a value of one 
indicating a placement disposition. The dependent variable in the second model is 
also dichotomous, with a value of one indicating a placement disposition in cases 
where the JPO recommendation was for probation. Table 4.8 below displays the 
results of the first model. 
The logistic regression model correctly predicted 83.1% of dispositional 
recommendations (compared to a base rate of 51.2%), and produced a significant 
model with a pseudo R
2 of .392.
xxxviii The included independent variables thus 
improved the goodness of fit 39% over chance. I performed a linktest in STATA to 
assess misspecification; the test was non-significant, suggesting no specification 
problems. And as with the recommendation model, examination of variance 
inflation factors did not reveal multicollinearity to be a serious problem. 
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Variable name  Variable description  B  Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
AGE  Age at disposition  -0.38**  0.69 
SEX Sex  (male=1)  0.34  1.41 
RACE (1)  Race – white 
RACE (2)  Race – black  1.38*  3.97 
RACE (3)  Race – Hispanic  1.04  2.82 
RACE (4)  Race – other/DK  0.57  1.77 
BOROUGH (1)  Borough – Bronx 
BOROUGH (2)  Borough – Brooklyn  -1.58**  0.21 
BOROUGH (3)  Borough – Manhattan  -1.02**  0.36 
BOROUGH (4)  Borough – Queens  -0.50  0.61 
BOROUGH (5)  Borough – Staten Island  -1.30*  0.27 
TOPVIOL  Top charge – violent  -0.59*  0.55 
TOPSEV (1)  Top charge – misdemeanor 
TOPSEV (2)  Top charge – felony C/D/E  0.36  1.44 
TOPSEV (3)  Top charge – felony A/B  0.16  1.18 
TOPSEV (4)  Top charge – other/DK  -0.26  0.77 
VIOLHIST  History of assaultive behavior  0.42  1.52 
PREVAR Previous  or  other arrests on record  0.86**  2.36 
NEGPEERS  Only associates with negative peers  0.64**  1.90 
FAMDRUG  Family member has a drug or alcohol 
problem 0.67  1.95 
CONFLICT Significant  conflict with parent  0.85**  2.34 
ATTEND  Not enrolled/attends less than 10%  0.52  1.68 
PASSING  Passing more than ½ of classes  -0.40  0.67 
CURRDRUG  Current drug or alcohol use  0.14  1.15 
COUNSEL  Previously attended counseling  0.07  1.07 
DETAINED  Detained before disposition  2.97**  19.43 
VIOLATED  Violation of probation  1.05**  2.87 
PINS  Previous PINS complaints on record  0.60*  1.82 
ATTITUDE Takes  some  responsibility for offense  -0.65*  0.52 
Constant Constant  1.59  4.90 
Model Chi
2  450.64** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.392 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
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Most of the factors that predict placement recommendations also predict 
placement dispositions. Variables indicating institutional non-compliance 
dominate the disposition model. By far, the strongest predictor of placement is 
whether a youth was detained prior to disposition (OR=19.43). Probation violation 
(OR=2.87), attitude towards the offense (OR=-0.52), and prior PINS complaints 
(OR=1.82) are all significant predictors of placement. The previous arrests 
variable, which can be considered both a risk measure and a non-compliance 
measure, is again significant (OR=2.36).  
Violent charges are again negatively associated with placement (OR=0.55). 
Association with negative peers is again positively associated with placement 
(OR=1.90). 
Needs-related factors appear to hold less sway in the dispositional decision, 
compared to the JPO recommendation. JPOs, in making recommendations, give 
significant consideration to whether family members have drug or alcohol 
problems, current drug or alcohol use by the youth, and the youth’s history of 
counseling. However, these factors do not weigh very heavily on the disposition. 
The only needs variable that significantly predicts placement is conflict between 
the youth and parent (OR=2.34). 
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recommendation. While age is not significantly related to the recommendation, 
judges appear more reluctant to place older offenders. Age is negatively and 
significantly related to the likelihood of placement (OR=0.69). That is, the older 
the youth, the less likely he/she is to be placed. This is surprising, but perhaps 
judges believe that younger offenders need to be removed from unhealthy 
environments while there is still a chance for rehabilitation. This finding might 
also be due to the fact that alternative-to-placement programs are reluctant to 
accept very young clients. (They may also be legally prohibited from taking on the 
youngest offenders.) 
There appear to be differential placement patterns by borough. Controlling 
for other factors in the model, I find that judges in the Bronx are substantially 
more likely to place youth than judges in other boroughs. This pattern is nearly 
identical to the pattern seen in the JPO recommendation model. It is not clear 
whether Bronx judges place a higher proportion of young offenders because there 
are a higher proportion of JPO placement recommendations, or whether there are 
more placement recommendations because JPOs are in tune with judges’ 
proclivities. Either way, it is unsettling that Bronx youth are more likely to be 
incarcerated at disposition, even controlling for other case-level factors.  
Race also exhibits a more powerful effect on the disposition as compared 
to the recommendation. While I did find that black youth are more likely than 
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significant, but just barely), I find this effect to be even more pronounced for the 
disposition. Black youth are significantly more likely to be placed by judges than 
white youth (OR=3.97). But what does this mean? 
We must be careful not to jump to the conclusion that judges are more 
racially biased than JPOs. While this is indeed a possibility, other forces could be 
at work. Race, for example, could be a proxy for class. Hypothetically, white 
youth may be more likely than black youth to retain private counsel (as opposed to 
a public defender). Presumably, the commitment and legal dexterity of a hired 
defense lawyer would be expected to outstrip the dedication and skill of an 
overburdened public defender, and thus, those youth with private counsel would be 
more likely to avoid placement. An alternative explanation might be that there is 
bias in the system, but the locus of that bias may not be the judge. If alternative-to­
placement programs are more likely to admit white youth than black youth, then 
non-incarceral opportunities will be more limited for black youth, and they will be 
more likely to be placed. Judges may simply be unable to avoid placing 
disproportionate numbers of black youth, as their hands would be tied by 
discriminatory program admission practices. Bridges and Steen (1998) propose a 
related explanation; they find that JPOs tend to explain the criminal behaviors of 
black youth through internal attributions (i.e., “bad character”), while the 
behaviors of white youth are explained by external attributions (i.e., “family 
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making racially biased decisions because of a systematic skew in the content of 
JPOs’ I&R narratives. Unfortunately, this is all speculation. My data are not well 
suited to test the accuracy of these propositions, but it is important to mention 
them in order to avoid the crude conclusion that judges are simply racist. 
So when do judges override JPO recommendations? Table 4.9 below 
shows the results of the logistic regression model predicting judges’ placement 
overrides. I exclude the eighty-seven cases in which there was no recommendation 
on file, resulting in a model N of 611. Overall, this is a poor model; it is not 
significant. Principally, this is due to the fact that there were only thirteen cases 
(out of 611) in which such an override occurred. The pseudo-R
2 is quite small: 
0.048. Therefore, conclusions drawn from this portion of the analysis must be 
considered with great caution. 
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Variable name  Variable description  B  Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
AGE  Age at disposition  0.24  1.27 
SEX Sex  (male=1)  0.11  1.12 
RACE (1)  Race – white 
RACE (2)  Race – black  -0.93  0.39 
RACE (3)  Race – Hispanic  -0.66  0.52 
RACE (4)  Race – other/DK  -0.01  0.99 
BOROUGH (1)  Borough – Bronx 
BOROUGH (2)  Borough – Brooklyn  0.28  1.32 
BOROUGH (3)  Borough – Manhattan  0.76  2.13 
BOROUGH (4)  Borough – Queens  1.78  5.92 
BOROUGH (5)  Borough – Staten Island  -5.09  0.01 
TOPVIOL  Top charge – violent  0.87  2.40 
TOPSEV (1)  Top charge severity – misdemeanor 
TOPSEV (2)  Top charge severity – felony C/D/E  2.02*  7.52 
TOPSEV (3)  Top charge severity – felony A/B  -5.00  0.01 
TOPSEV (4)  Top charge severity – other/DK  1.66  5.26 
VIOLHIST  History of assaultive behavior  -0.28  0.75 
PREVAR Previous  or  other arrests on record  -0.19  0.82 
NEGPEERS  Only associates with negative peers  -0.38  0.68 
FAMDRUG  Family member has a drug/alcohol 
problem 0.16  1.18 
CONFLICT Significant  conflict with parent  1.84*  6.28 
ATTEND  Not enrolled/attends less than 10%  0.28  1.32 
PASSING  Passing more than ½ of classes  0.22  1.25 
CURRDRUG  Current drug or alcohol use  -0.86  0.42 
COUNSEL  Previously attended counseling  -0.75  0.47 
DETAINED  Detained before disposition  1.33  3.77 
VIOLATED  Violation of probation  0.48  1.61 
PINS  Previous PINS complaints  -1.27  0.28 
ATTITUDE Takes  some  responsibility for offense  0.50  1.65 
Constant Constant  -9.86  0.00 
Model Chi
2  31.38 
Pseudo-R
2  0.048 
* p≤.05. 
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override. The first is a top adjudicated charge with a severity of felony C, D or E 
(OR=7.52). Since youth adjudicated on felony A or B charges are never 
recommended for probation, this effectively means that when JPOs recommend 
probation for youth convicted of felonies, judges are likely to give strong 
consideration to placement. The other variable that is significant in the model is 
conflict between youth and parent (OR=6.28). It is difficult to say why this is a 
factor. Perhaps the nature of such conflict is more evident in the courtroom than in 
interviews with JPOs. Over the course of a number of court dates, judges might get 
a clearer sense of this conflict, and in certain cases, decide that it would be better 
to place youth rather than let them remain in a tumultuous family environment.  
Since this is such a poor model, I must note here that interpretations of 
coefficients must be treated with caution. At the p≤.05 level, I might expect to find 
one coefficient in twenty to be significant by chance (if no variable was significant 
in the “true” model). Two variables are significant in this model, and so must be 
interpreted with care.  
Another variable deserves mention. Though the detained before disposition 
variable is not significant in the override model, it exhibits a relatively large 
coefficient (OR=3.77) and approaches statistical significance (p=0.160). I wish to 
discuss the issue of detention because it plays such a large role in the 
recommendation and the disposition, and because it is indicative of judges’ 
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of absconding, to risk of re-offending, to an unstable home environment. But there 
are few statutory guidelines to dictate the rationale behind detention. The analyses 
in this chapter suggest that judges detain youth whom they feel are likely to be 
placed at disposition. Anecdotal evidence also supports this point. Thus, when a 
detained youth receives a probation recommendation, judges may choose to look 
quite closely at the case, and formulate their own reasons for placement. That is, 
they may see something inherently and unmeasurably dangerous about the youth, 
and thus override the JPO’s recommendation. This decision to place may be 
foreshadowed by the initial decision to detain. 
Though not statistically significant, the coefficients and odds ratios for the 
race variables in this model were fairly large, and suggested that youth of color are 
less likely than white youth to have recommendations overridden for placement. 
(As in the JPO recommendation model, the non-significance may have been due to 
the small number of white respondents in the sample.) It was suggested that I 
group nonwhites together and rerun the model to see if the coefficient for a 
dichotomous race variable (white/non-white) might reach statistical significance. 
The dichotomous NONWHITE variable did not reach significance, though the 
coefficient remained large and negative (B=-0.773). So, while it seems that whites 
are more likely to have their recommendations overridden and to be sent to 
placement against the suggestions of JPOs, I cannot state this with any certainty. 
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The purpose and function of juvenile justice in America is distinct from the 
purpose and function of adult justice. The dual, often conflicting, mandates of 
public safety and child welfare produce decisions that may meet the requirements 
of one while ignoring the other. Placement, for example, in removing a youth from 
the community, is an effective means of (temporary) public protection, but might 
not be very good for the youth. Probation, on the other hand, can facilitate the 
provision of needed services, but in allowing the youth to remain at home, may not 
adequately protect the public from the youth’s offending. Given that juvenile 
justice decision-makers can consider a range of factors in their orders, and that 
available dispositional options cannot possibly meet the twin mandates of juvenile 
justice in any satisfactory way, these decisions have the potential to become very 
muddled. As prior research has shown, decision-makers often cite the same 
reasons for different dispositions; the need for “treatment” can be used to justify 
probation, placement, or an alternative-to-placement (Crittendon 1983; Curtis & 
Reese 1994; Reese, Curtis & Richard 1989). More critical research has suggested 
that the justificational language behind dispositions, in reality, masks an 
institutional logic that transcends and reconciles the ideas of risk and need 
(Asquith 1983; Cicourel 1968; Reese, Curtis and Richard 1989). As there is no 
easy solution to the dilemma of juvenile justice, the court has created its own ad 
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for ascension up the sanction scale.  
In this chapter, I have attempted to uncover the real forces behind 
dispositions in New York City. The richness of the data I have collected allows a 
fairly nuanced investigation of the reasons youth get placed or do not get placed. I 
am thus able to test the relative impacts of individual-level factors on the 
likelihood of placement, and have split these factors into broad categories 
representing risk, need, and what I term institutional non-compliance. As I have 
stated previously, these categories are not mutually exclusive, as measures may 
fall into more than one. But splitting them up as an intellectual exercise is 
revealing. 
I find evidence that JPOs and judges do appear to rely on standard markers 
of non-compliance in making placement decisions. Detention, probation violation, 
prior arrests, prior PINS complaints, and attitude toward the offense are all 
powerful and significant predictors of placement recommendations and 
dispositions. Detention status is the strongest predictor of a placement 
recommendation, as well as a placement disposition. It is also one of the most 
difficult factors to interpret, as there are a number of sub-factors that contribute to 
the decision to detain. Youth may be detained because of the severity of their 
offense, or because of extensive prior legal contact. They may also be detained 
because they are arrested at night or on the weekends and cannot be brought to 
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in court. They may also detain youth because of an unspecified “badness” that they 
perceive. In a way, detention status may, empirically, be soaking up a range of 
characteristics. I have labeled it “non-compliance” because it captures a number of 
factors that may indicate an inability to adhere to system mandates; judges 
typically detain youth who they feel will re-offend, flee, or fail to meet some other 
order (e.g., attend school). Similarly, probation violators, youth with arrest records, 
and youth with PINS complaints on file are seen to have been given a chance by 
the system, and to have failed. These measures can be interpreted as indicators of 
risk, but in reality, they indicate an inability to adhere to system guidelines. A 
youth’s attitude towards the offense reveals, to JPOs and judges, the degree to 
which the family court experience has deterred the youth from future actions that 
may result in repeat court contact. 
In the next chapter, I will present the results of my recidivism analyses, 
which identify factors that are most powerfully associated with the risk of various 
types of re-offending. I can thus compare the factors that predict placement against 
the factors that predict recidivism, and determine whether those that get youth 
placed are congruent with those that empirically indicate recidivism risk. These 
comparisons will allow me to draw broader conclusions about the purpose and 
function of juvenile justice. Is the system placing youth who are most likely to re­
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violent ways? 
This chapter has also allowed me to examine the relationship between JPO 
recommendations and judges’ dispositions. One question of interest in the field is 
whether judges follow JPO recommendations or whether JPOs write with the 
expectations of judges in mind. Unfortunately, my analysis has not produced a 
clear answer. It does seem that JPOs and judges give weight to the same factors in 
their decisions, but I cannot discern the direction of the relationship. My attempt to 
address this question, in modeling judge decisions to override the 
recommendation, did not produce very reliable results. In truth, the answer to this 
question may be complicated. Prior research has found differences in 
recommendation/disposition patterns by decision-maker characteristics (Anderson 
and Spanier 1980; Brennan and Khinduka 1970; Reese, Curtis and Whitworth 
1988; Rush 1992; Walsh 1985). And given the wide discretionary powers of 
juvenile justice officials, there may be profound differences across boroughs, 
across judges, and across JPOs. 
An alternative possibility is that there is no direction of influence at all. 
Some research has analyzed the courtroom as a sort of organizational “workgroup” 
structured around the negotiations of various court actors (Clynch & Neubauer 
1981; Eisenstein & Jacob 1977; Ulmer 1997). This characterization, in contrast to 
the common “adversarial” perspective, depicts many court actors as sharing 
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cohesion in the interest of bureaucratic efficiency. I certainly see evidence of this 
in the operation of the New York City Family Court, as judges and JPOs appear to 
adopt very similar rationales about the causes of and remedies for delinquent 
behavior. Perhaps the family court, over time, develops accepted standards of guilt 
and punishment, and it is this standard that pervades the work of every court actor. 
Thus, the direction of influence (judge to JPO, versus JPO to judge) may be less 
germane than the original sources of court punishment ideologies, and how these 
ideologies vary from court to court. The cross-borough differences I find in 
placement rates provide some tentative support for this idea. 
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Recidivism Analysis and the Effect of Placement 

5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of my recidivism analyses. I use logistic 
regression to identify the best predictors of recidivism, and survival analysis to 
identify predictors of time to recidivism. For all models, the follow-up period is 
eighteen months of time in the community. In order to better understand the 
dynamics of different types of re-offending, each series of models predicts four 
types of recidivism: any re-arrest, any re-arrest for a felony offense, any re-arrest 
for a violent offense, and any re-arrest for a violent felony offense.  
The first question that these analyses address is: What are the best 
predictors of recidivism? That is, what individual-level characteristics are 
associated with various types of re-offending? Answering this most basic question 
allows me to compare factors that predict recidivism against factors that predict 
placement, thus illustrating the degree to which the rationale behind placement 
decisions coincides empirically with threat to public safety. It is important to note 
here that placement decisions are ostensibly based on the dual goals of community 
safety and child welfare, and my analyses in this chapter do not address the latter 
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identifies the most dangerous young offenders is of critical importance. 
Next, the analyses in this chapter address my dissertation’s central research 
questions: Does placement, controlling for other relevant factors, have an impact 
on recidivism? Can I identify a deterrent or criminogenic effect? And more 
specifically, does this effect vary by the characteristics of youth – particularly their 
levels of social bonding and the characteristics of their neighborhoods? The 
answers to these questions are of academic interest, but they can also have 
implications for policy. 
5.2 Patterns of Recidivism and Time to Recidivism 
My initial step in the recidivism analyses is to gauge the extent of 
recidivism. What proportion, overall, of subjects experience different types of 
recidivism events? Table 5.1 below breaks these numbers down. Both juvenile and 
adult re-arrests are counted. 
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Type of recidivism  Percent recidivating within 18 months 
Any re-arrest  47.9 
Felony re-arrest  32.9 
Violent re-arrest  26.0 
Violent felony re-arrest  21.1 
Recidivism rates are relatively high. Almost half (47.9%) of study subjects, 
regardless of disposition received, are re-arrested within eighteen months in the 
community. About one third (32.9%) are re-arrested for felony-level offenses, and 
roughly one quarter (26.0%) are re-arrested for violent offenses. Slightly more 
than one fifth (21.1%) experience the most serious type of recidivism – violent 
felony re-arrest. 
Next, I am interested in examining the timing of recidivism. That is, how 
long does it take these youth to be re-arrested? Table 5.2 below displays the 
average number of days that it takes youth to get re-arrested, to get re-arrested for 
a felony, to get re-arrested for a violent offense, and to get re-arrested for a violent 
felony. Note that these are averages among those who are re-arrested only. Those 
who do not recidivate within eighteen months are excluded from the calculation. 
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Type of re-arrest  Mean days to re-arrest 
Any re-arrest  215 
Felony re-arrest  232 
Violent re-arrest  246 
Violent felony re-arrest  250 
Those who are re-arrested are re-arrested, on average, within a year of 
disposition or release from placement. More serious types of recidivism happen 
later. While re-arrests, among those who recidivate, occur on average in 215 days, 
felony re-arrests take about 232 days, violent re-arrests take 246 days, and violent 
felony re-arrests take 250 days. So more serious types of re-arrests are not only 
less common, but they also appear to take longer to occur. Table 5.2 is 
informative, but there is still more to be known about the timing of juvenile 
recidivism. 
To further address this issue, I have created cumulative survival curves that 
illustrate the proportion of subjects remaining arrest-free during their first eighteen 
months in the community. These curves paint a detailed picture of the patterns of 
recidivism over time. See figures 5.1-5.4 below. Note that across all curves, some 
cases are censored before the full eighteen-month risk period elapses. Censoring 
occurs when a subject runs out of time in the community, and it is therefore not 
known whether the subject is re-arrested within the allotted follow-up frame. 
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OCFS aftercare.
xxxix These violations may not be due to a re-arrest; rather, subjects 
may have failed to attend school, or failed to engage some other mandated service. 
Regardless, these subjects do not accumulate sufficient community time because 
of their incarceration for these infractions. Two: subjects may have been re­
arrested and re-incarcerated, but the re-arrests may not have met the recidivism 
criteria displayed in the survival curve. For example, if a subject was re-arrested 
on a misdemeanor and re-incarcerated for the balance of the follow-up period, that 
subject would be censored in figure 5.2 below (felony re-arrests) because of his or 
her removal from the community, yet would not have “failed” according to the 
criteria of figure 5.2 because he or she had not been re-arrested for a felony. 
Instead, that case would be censored. 
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As Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show, about half of study subjects are arrested 
within eighteen months of release to the community. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
temporal pattern of this form of recidivism. The initial leg of the curve (until about 
50 days in the community) is relatively “flat,” indicating a fairly slow re-arrest rate 
during this period. The curve then becomes steeper, signifying an increased rate of 
arrest for the next year or so. At about day four hundred, the curve flattens out 
again. Overall, this pattern suggests that family court contact may deter youth from 
offending (or at least getting caught) for a very brief period, after which subjects 
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highest risk is between thirty days and one year in the community.  
Figure 5.2: Proportion of Subjects Remaining Felony Arrest-Free Over Time 
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The line of the felony re-arrest survival curve is fairly straight, meaning 
that the rate of re-arrest is steady over time. However, the timing of felony re­
arrests follows a similar pattern to the pattern of all arrests, although it is not as 
pronounced. There is a brief period of fifty to seventy days when the felony re­
arrest rate is fairly low, after which the curve gets steeper – though only slightly. 
After about a year, the rate of felony arrests flattens out a bit. So overall, the rate 
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worth noting. The stability of this rate indicates that changes in the rate of all re­
arrests (figure 5.1) are likely due to changes in the pattern of re-arrests for less 
serious (non-felony) crimes. The pattern of felony-level offending is more 
consistent over time. 
Figure 5.3: Proportion of Subjects Remaining Violent Arrest-Free Over Time 
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The curve shown in figure 5.3 above, indicating re-arrests for violent 
offenses, is straighter than the previous two curves. The brief period of suppressed 
offending is still present, as is the slight flattening of the curve after the first year. 
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significantly affected by court contact, as these offenses occur at a very steady rate 
after disposition or release from placement. There is an intuitive logic to this 
finding, as violent offenses are more likely than property and drug crimes to be a 
product of charged emotional circumstances, and less a product of any sort of 
rational calculation. As such, these violent acts are less likely to be premeditated, 
and therefore, less likely to be influenced by prior legal contact. 
Figure 5.4: Proportion of Subjects Remaining Violent Felony Arrest-Free 
Over Time 
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arrests. This is the least common form of recidivism, with only about one fifth of 
study subjects getting re-arrested for violent felonies. The initial “grace period” is 
still present, with the rate of violent felony recidivism fairly low for the first one 
hundred days or so. After this period, the curve gets slightly steeper, indicating a 
higher risk of re-arrest, and again, the curve flattens out a little after the first year 
in the community. However, like figure 5.3 (survival for violent re-arrest), the line 
of this curve is flat and steady. Once again, I am inclined to conclude that the 
timing of violent recidivism, even serious violent recidivism, is not substantially 
affected by family court contact. The deterrent (or rehabilitative) impact of the 
court on violent felony offending, at least in the short term, does not seem to be 
felt very acutely. 
5.3 Predictors of Recidivism and Time to Recidivism 
Thus far, I have established overall rates and temporal patterns of 
recidivism, painting a general picture of youthful offending patterns in New York 
City. Now, I turn to the characteristics of youth that are most profoundly 
associated with the likelihood of re-offending. To begin, Table 5.3 below presents 
recidivism rates broken down by youths’ demographic, legal and social 
characteristics. 
138 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Table 5.3: Recidivism Rates by Characteristics of NYC Youth Receiving 
Dispositions in Spring 2000 (N=698) 
TYPE OF RECIDIVISM 
Any re-
arrest (%) 
Felony re-
arrest 
(%) 
Violent 
re-arrest 
(%) 
Violent 
felony re-
arrest (%) 
Male 55.1**  39.4**  31.0**  25.4** 
Female 19.6  8.0  7.3  5.1 
Age 14 or younger  40.4**  26.5**  24.5  19.2 
Age 15 or older  53.3  37.5  27.1  22.5 
White 33.3**  17.1*  4.9*  2.4* 
Black 52.0  36.3  28.1  22.7 
Hispanic 46.0  30.6  26.8  22.0 
Other 26.5  23.5  23.5  20.6 
Bronx (%)  49.0  35.2  25.0  20.3 
Brooklyn (%)  54.1  36.8  29.2  25.0 
Manhattan (%)  43.7  31.4  25.8  19.7 
Queens (%)  44.4  26.0  22.3  19.4 
Staten Island (%)  41.5  29.3  24.4  17.1 
Violent adjudicated charge  42.0**  27.5**  22.9  19.0 
Non-violent adjudicated charge  53.5  38.1  29.0  23.1 
Felony adjudicated charge  55.3**  38.8**  28.3  23.0 
Non-felony adjudicated charge  43.1  29.1  24.6  20.0 
Subject has history of assaultive behavior  50.1  35.1  28.4*  23.6* 
NO history of assaultive behavior  41.8  27.1  19.7  14.6 
Subject has previous arrests on record  61.5**  44.0**  34.1**  28.0** 
Subject has NO previous arrests on record  38.5  25.3  20.7  16.5 
Only associates with negative peers  55.5**  26.3**  31.3**  25.6** 
Does NOT only associate with neg. peers  40.6  39.9  21.1  17.0 
Family member has drug/alcohol problem  54.8  38.1  30.0  27.5 
NO family with drug/alcohol problems  47.4  32.5  25.7  20.7 
Significant conflict with parent  54.5*  41.5**  31.1  25.2 
NO significant conflict with parent  45.7  30.0  24.3  19.8 
Attends school less than 10%  44.0**  49.5**  36.2*  24.7 
Attends more than 10% of the time 70.0  30.0  24.3  20.5 
139 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Passing less than ½ classes  52.1**  36.2**  28.1*  23.0* 
Passing more than ½ classes 29.0  18.2  16.8  12.7 
Current drug/alcohol use  62.0**  45.9**  33.9**  29.0** 
NO current drug/alcohol use  40.4  26.0  21.9  17.0 
Previously attended counseling  50.2  34.7  27.9  23.9 
NO previous counseling  46.0  31.5  24.6  19.0 
Detained prior to disposition  56.1**  39.0**  31.2**  25.4** 
NOT detained prior to disposition  36.2  24.5  18.9  15.3 
Disposition is violation of probation  56.9*  39.2  28.7  23.8 
Disposition is NOT violation of probation  46.2  31.7  25.5  20.6 
Previous PINS complaints  52.2  37.9  26.8  25.0 
NO previous PINS complaints  46.5  31.4  25.7  20.0 
Takes some responsibility for the offense  38.1**  25.5**  20.0*  14.4** 
Minimizes, justifies or denies the offense  52.4  36.4  28.9  24.3 
*Differences significant at p≤0.05; **Differences significant at p≤0.01. 
Demographics matter. Boys are much more likely than girls to recidivate. 
They are arrested at significantly higher rates for any offense, for felonies, for 
violent offenses and for violent felonies. Older subjects (15 and above at 
disposition)
xl are significantly more likely than younger subjects to be re-arrested, 
and to be re-arrested for a felony. They are also more likely to be arrested for 
violent offenses and violent felonies, though these differences are not statistically 
significant. Youth of color recidivate at considerably higher rates than white youth. 
Across all recidivism measures, white youth exhibit extremely low re-arrest rates, 
while black youth exhibit the highest rates. Hispanic youth also recidivate at much 
higher rates than white youth, but at slightly lower rates than black youth. Here, it 
is important not to jump to the conclusion that black and Hispanic youth simply 
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may be masking other characteristics that are linked to the propensity to offend, or 
the likelihood of detection. Race might be a proxy for class. Or, the neighborhoods 
where black and Hispanic youth tend to live might be more heavily policed. 
Relatedly, police may be more willing to charge youth of color at the moment of 
arrest, instead of letting them go with a warning. 
There are not significant differences in re-arrest rates by borough. This is 
noteworthy, as I did find borough differences in JPOs’ placement 
recommendations and judges’ dispositions in chapter 4. JPOs and judges in the 
Bronx were significantly more likely than officials in other boroughs to 
recommend youth for placement, and to order placement at disposition. But 
despite the fact that youth in the Bronx are more likely to end up in placement, 
they show no greater propensity to recidivate than youth in any other borough. In 
fact, though the differences are not statistically significant, youth in Brooklyn 
exhibit the highest rates of re-arrest, re-arrest for felonies, re-arrest for violent 
offenses, and re-arrest for violent felonies. 
The risk of re-offense also varies by legal characteristics. Subjects 
adjudicated on violent charges are significantly less likely to be re-arrested, or to 
be re-arrested for a felony. They are also less likely to be re-arrested for violent 
offenses and violent felonies, though these differences are not statistically 
significant. Recall that in chapter 4, I showed that youth adjudicated on violent 
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judges are correctly identifying these youth as less likely to threaten public safety. 
Unsurprisingly, youth sentenced for felonies are more likely to experience all four 
types of recidivism (differences in violent re-arrests and violent felonies not 
significant). Subjects with a record of assaultive behavior are more likely to be 
arrested for violent offenses and violent felonies. Youth with prior arrests on 
record are significantly more likely than youth with no prior arrests to experience 
all types of recidivism.  
Social factors, including school performance, also appear to have some 
value in distinguishing youth who are likely to re-offend from youth who are not. 
Subjects who only associate with negative peers are significantly more likely to be 
re-arrested, to be re-arrested for a felony, to be re-arrested for a violent offense, 
and to be re-arrested for a violent felony. Youth who have conflict with their 
parents are significantly more likely to be re-arrested, or to be re-arrested for a 
felony. Youth who rarely or never attend school are more likely to be re-arrested, 
re-arrested for a felony, or re-arrested for a violent offense. Similarly, those who 
do better academically (are passing more than half of their classes) are less likely 
to experience any type of recidivism, compared to those who do worse in school. 
Finally, youth who are known to use drugs or alcohol recidivate (all four types) at 
significantly higher rates. 
142 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Chapter 4 revealed that a critical area of interest in the recidivism analyses 
should be around those factors that indicate institutional non-compliance, such as 
probation violation, detention status, prior PINS complaints, and attitude toward 
the offense. Since these factors contribute so heavily to the prediction of 
placement, I am extremely interested in assessing their relationship to recidivism. 
The evidence from my bivariate analysis is mixed. Those who are detained before 
disposition recidivate at much higher rates than those who are not. Similarly, youth 
who take some responsibility for the offense are much less likely to recidivate than 
those who do not take any responsibility. However, while probation violators are 
significantly more likely to be re-arrested than non-violators, differences in rates 
of felony, violent, and violent felony re-arrests are not statistically significant. The 
differences in recidivism rates between those with prior PINS complaints and 
those without are not significant at all. 
For the most part, the recidivism rates of my study subjects fall in line with 
what common sense and prior research would posit. Boys, older subjects, and 
youth of color recidivate at higher rates. Youth with more extensive legal histories 
appear more likely to recidivate. And social problems also seem associated with 
recidivism propensity in the expected directions. However, it is clear that a 
multivariate analysis is needed to disentangle the potential interactive effects of 
these factors, and to isolate factors that are empirically linked to the risk of 
recidivism, controlling for all other factors. 
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regression analyses predicting re-arrest, felony re-arrest, violent re-arrest, and 
violent felony re-arrest. Cases that are censored (i.e., subject is not re-arrested and 
does not complete eighteen months in the community) are excluded from the 
models. The number of censored cases in each model is: 
•  Any re-arrest: 23 

•  Felony re-arrest: 38 

•  Violent re-arrest: 48 

•  Violent felony re-arrest: 54 

Multicollinearity diagnostics revealed no serious problems. None of the recidivism 
models appeared to be misspecified, and all were significant. 
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Any arrest  Felony arrest  Violent arrest  Violent felony 
Variable name  B  Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
Age  0.17*  1.18 0.11 1.12  0.01 1.01 0.02 1.02 
Male  1.68** 5.35  2.08** 8.02  1.81** 6.12  1.89** 6.63 
W h i t e 
Black  0.93* 2.54  1.29**  3.63  2.35**  10.51 2.63* 13.84 
Hispanic  0.60 1.83 0.91 2.48  2.30**  9.92 2.64*  14.01 
Other race  -0.42  0.66 0.64 1.91  2.10* 8.16  2.54* 12.73 
B r o n x 
Brooklyn  0.17 1.18 -0.05  0.95  0.24 1.27 0.37 1.45 
Manhattan  -0.15  0.86 -0.18  0.83  0.05 1.05 0.02 1.02 
Queens  0.06 1.06 -0.34  0.71  -0.07  0.93 0.07 1.07 
Staten  Island  0.32 1.37 0.31 1.37  0.83 2.30 0.65 1.91 
Violent  charge -0.43* 0.65  -0.46* 0.63  -0.29  0.75  -0.23  0.80 
M i s d e m e a n o r 
Felony  C/D/E  0.17 1.19 0.20 1.22  -0.12  0.89 -0.02  0.98 
Felony  A/B  2.05**  7.77 1.47**  4.34  0.99 2.68 0.61 1.85 
Other  severity  0.31 1.37 0.61 1.84  0.00 1.00 -0.01  0.99 
Hist.  of  assault  0.51* 1.67  0.59* 1.81  0.52* 1.68  0.53  1.70 
Prior  arrests 0.32 1.38 0.26 1.30  0.20 1.23 0.17 1.19 
Neg.  peers  0.30 1.34 0.25 1.28  0.28 1.32 0.29 1.34 
Family  drug  -0.44 0.65  -0.38 0.69  -0.30 0.74  -0.07 0.93 
Parent  conflict  0.04 1.04 0.34 1.40  0.20 1.22 0.11 1.11 
School  attend.  0.95**  2.59 0.63*  1.88  0.47 1.60 -0.02  0.98 
Grades  -0.56*  0.57  -0.54 0.58  -0.38 0.68  -0.48 0.62 
Curr.  drug  use  0.34 1.41 0.36 1.44  0.17 1.18 0.32 1.38 
Counseling  0.27 1.31 0.23 1.26  0.21 1.23 0.33 1.38 
Detained  0.17 1.19 -0.01  0.99  0.18 1.20 0.06 1.06 
Prob.  violator 0.00  1.00  -0.07 0.94  -0.17 0.84  -0.17 0.84 
Prior  PINS  -0.13 0.88  -0.05 0.95  -0.29 0.75  0.01  1.01 
Attitude  -0.43*  0.65  -0.34 0.71  -0.33 0.72  -0.50*  0.61 
Constant  -5.40** 0.00  -5.97** 0.00  -5.65** 0.00  -6.55  0.00 
Model Chi
2  178.1**  146.0**  96.4**  84.2** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.209  0.181  0.129  0.116 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
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analysis. In predicting recidivism, demographics matter quite a bit. The most 
consistent predictor of recidivism is gender. Boys are much more likely than girls 
to be re-arrested (OR=5.35), re-arrested for a felony (OR=8.02), re-arrested for a 
violent offense (OR=6.12), or re-arrested for a violent felony (OR=6.63). Older 
age is associated with the risk of (any) re-arrest (OR=1.18). And race exerts a 
profound effect, particularly with regard to violent offending. Black youth are 
significantly more likely than white youth to experience any of the four forms of 
re-arrest. Hispanic youth are more likely than white youth to be arrested for a 
violent offense or a violent felony. There are no significant differences by 
borough. 
Legal variables also contribute to the prediction of recidivism. Violent top 
charge is negatively and significantly associated with the likelihood of any re­
arrest (OR=0.65) and felony re-arrest (OR=0.63). It is also negatively associated 
with violent re-arrests (OR=0.75) and violent felony re-arrests (OR=0.80), though 
the coefficients are not statistically significant. In this regard, JPOs and judges 
appear to be rightly flagging youth as lower risk, as youth adjudicated on violent 
charges are less likely to be recommended for placement or to be placed at 
disposition. Youth adjudicated on the most severe charges – felony A’s and B’s – 
are also much more likely to be re-arrested (OR=7.77) and to be re-arrested for a 
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arrest (OR=1.67), felony re-arrest (OR=1.81) and violent re-arrest (OR=1.68).  
With the exception of measures related to school, social variables are not 
highly predictive of recidivism. Negative peers, family member drug use, conflict 
with parents, current drug use, and counseling history are not significant in the 
models. However, those who attend school less than ten percent of the time are 
more likely to be re-arrested (OR=2.59) and to be re-arrested for a felony 
(OR=1.88). Youth who are passing more than half their classes are less likely to be 
re-arrested (OR=0.57). There are a couple of potential reasons why social 
variables are not highly predictive of recidivism. Most obviously, they may simply 
not be related to the risk of re-offending. Alternatively, JPOs and other court 
officials may not be getting very accurate information about these factors, thus 
diluting the accuracy and predictive power of the variables in my models. This 
hypothesis is given further support by the statistical significance of school 
attendance and grades, which are typically obtained directly from schools and are 
therefore fairly accurately recorded in court files.
 Critically,  variables  indicating  institutional non-compliance do not 
contribute much to the recidivism models. Only attitude towards the offense 
matters at all. Youth who take some responsibility for the offense are less likely to 
be re-arrested (OR=0.65) or to be re-arrested for a violent felony (OR=0.61). 
Neither pre-trial detention, nor probation violation, nor prior PINS complaints are 
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must take care here not to conclude that judges are detaining non-risky youth. The 
decision to detain can be driven by a number of factors that are also included in the 
regression models (e.g., charge severity, legal history, attitude). These factors are 
likely related to the risk of recidivism and the risk of placement, as well as the 
likelihood of pre-trial detention. As the multivariate models include these factors 
as well, they could be “soaking up” the predictive power of the detention variable. 
So, even though detention factors heavily into JPOs’ and judges’ placement 
decisions, the reality may be that detention actually acts as a proxy for a number of 
other relevant characteristics, and even though the detention variable itself does 
not contribute much to the prediction of recidivism, the characteristics that get 
youth detained make this contribution in its place. 
Next, I mimic these four logistic regression models using multivariate 
survival analysis. Results of the survival analysis highlight factors that are 
statistically associated with time to recidivism. I estimated four Cox Proportional 
Hazards models. To check for violation of the proportional hazards assumption, I 
used the STPHTEST command in Stata, version 8. None of the models violate this 
assumption, and so I report results directly in Table 5.5 below. 
To assess overall model fit, I examine pertinent residuals – specifically 
Cox-Snell residuals. If the Cox model adequately fits the data, these Cox-Snell 
residuals should have a standard censored exponential distribution with a hazard 
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Snell residuals for the time variable, with each relevant recidivism variable still 
indicating failure. A good model fit is supported when this plot is a straight line 
with a slope of one (some deviation is acceptable). The four recidivism survival 
models appear to be reasonably fitted. The Cox-Snell plots are shown in Appendix 
A. 
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Any arrest  Felony arrest  Violent arrest  Violent  felony 
Variable 
name 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Odds  B Odds  B Odds 
Age 0.16**  1.18  0.13*  1.14 0.03  1.03 0.03  1.03 
Male  1.26** 3.51  1.72** 5.57 1.62**  5.05 1.70**  5.49 
W h i t e 
Black  0.61* 1.84  0.93* 2.54 2.03**  7.59 2.32*  10.15 
Hispanic 0.50  1.65  0.80  2.23 2.12**  8.30 2.44*  11.52 
Other race  -0.26  0.77  0.52  1.68 2.00*  7.36 2.39*  10.95 
Bronx 
Brooklyn 0.16  1.17  0.06  1.07 0.26  1.30 0.33  1.40 
Manhattan 0.07 1.07  0.05 1.05 0.15  1.16 0.10  1.11 
Queens  0.12  1.12  -0.17  0.84 -0.03  0.97 0.01  1.01 
Staten Island  0.34  1.41  0.35  1.41 0.83*  2.29 0.60  1.82 
Violent 
charge -0.23  0.79  -0.25  0.78 -0.19  0.83 -0.16  0.85 
Misdemean. 
Felony 
C/D/E  0.07 1.07  0.11 1.11  -0.15 0.86  -0.10 0.90 
Felony A/B  0.89**  2.43  1.08**  2.93 0.57  1.76 0.42  1.52 
Other 
severity -0.03  0.97 0.21  1.24 -0.09  0.91 -0.02  0.98 
Hist. of 
assault  0.32* 1.38  0.38* 1.46  0.35 1.42  0.41 1.50 
Prior arrests  0.26*  1.29  0.30*  1.36 0.17  1.19 0.20  1.22 
Neg. peers  0.18  1.20  0.22 1.25  0.24 1.27  0.23 1.26 
Family drug  -0.35  0.70  -0.29 0.75  -0.12 0.89  0.06  1.06 
Parent 
conflict 0.09  1.10  0.27  1.31 0.23  1.26 0.14  1.16 
School 
attend.  0.42**  1.52 0.32  1.38 0.22 1.25  -0.10  0.90 
Grades -0.39*  0.68  -0.42  0.66 -0.39  0.68 -0.48  0.62 
Curr. drug 
use  0.17 1.18  0.25 1.28  0.07 1.07  0.23 1.26 
Counseling 0.12  1.13  0.13  1.14 0.15  1.16 0.20  1.23 
Detained 0.08  1.08  -0.11  0.89 0.14  1.15 0.02  1.02 
Prob. 
Violator  0.01 1.01  0.04 1.04  -0.18 0.84  -0.14 0.87 
Prior PINS  -0.15  0.86  -0.10 0.90  -0.34 0.71  -0.09 0.91 
Attitude -0.30*  0.74 -0.26  0.77 -0.28  0.76 -0.41  0.67 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
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regression results reported in table 5.4, suggesting that factors which predict the 
likelihood of re-arrest also predict the speed at which youth are re-arrested. Older 
age speeds time to re-arrest and time to felony re-arrest. Sex is again the most 
consistent and powerful predictor, with boys getting arrested faster than girls for 
all recidivism measures. Black and Hispanic youth generally get re-arrested faster 
than their white counterparts, particularly for violent offenses and violent felonies. 
Youth adjudicated on felony A and B charges are arrested faster and 
arrested faster for felonies, as are youth with histories of assault, and youth with 
prior arrests on record. 
School attendance and grades are also associated with time to recidivism, 
in the expected directions. Institutional non-compliance variables such as detention 
status, probation violation, and prior PINS complaints are not related to the timing 
of recidivism. However, youth who take some responsibility for the offense do get 
re-arrested a bit slower than youth who take no such responsibility. 
5.4 The Effect of Placement; the Problem of Heterogeneity 
I have so far established that the most reliable predictors of recidivism (and 
the speed of recidivism) are demographics and legal background. But what about 
placement? Does placement exert any effect on the likelihood or timing of 
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binary placement variable included, in an attempt to identify this effect.  
Recall that in chapter 4, I showed that youth who get placed look 
substantially different from youth who receive probation. In addition to certain 
demographic differences, youth who get placed have more serious legal records 
and more social problems. Therefore, it would not be fair to simply compare the 
recidivism of youth in placement with the recidivism of youth who are not, as 
youth in placement may have other characteristics that affect their propensity to 
recidivate. This is the problem of heterogeneity (Winship and Morgan 1999; see 
also chapter 3). Let me first show the differential recidivism patterns of placed and 
non-placed youth, to illustrate the raw differences in re-offending between these 
two sub-samples. Then I will discuss my remedy for this problem. 
Youth who go to placement are re-arrested more frequently, and more 
frequently re-arrested for serious and violent offenses, than youth who remain in 
the community at disposition. Table 5.6 below displays recidivism rates by 
disposition type. 
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Disposition 
Type of recidivism  Placement  Community 
% re-arrested  59.1  37.7 
% re-arrested for felony  43.3  23.8 
% re-arrested for violent  32.7  20.4 
% re-arrested for violent felony  28.0  15.4 
Figure 5.5 below is a survival curve that illustrates the timing of recidivism 
by disposition type. There appears to be a brief “grace period” of about fifty days 
when subjects sentenced to placement recidivate at a similar rate to those given 
probation and other community sentences. After this period, however, the 
placement sub-sample recidivates at a considerably faster rate, and by the time 
eighteen months elapse, roughly twenty percent more placement subjects are 
arrested than community subjects. Survival curves (by disposition) indicating the 
proportions of subjects remaining felony arrest-free, violent arrest-free and violent 
felony arrest-free show similar patterns. I choose not to display these curves here. 
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I have shown that subjects sentenced to placement are arrested faster and 
more frequently than those given community-based sentences. But is this 
difference the product of incarceration itself, or the characteristics of youth? Next, 
I estimate multivariate regression and survival models with a binary variable 
indicating a placement or community disposition included (PLACEMENT). The 
inclusion of demographic, legal, and social characteristics in the multivariate 
models controls for observed differences between the two subsamples, but recall 
from chapter three that unobserved differences may also befuddle quasi­
154 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.experimental designs. There is no easy fix for this problem. However, I have 
chosen to use a propensity scoring method to alleviate the relationship between 
unobserved group differences and recidivism outcomes, which will help isolate the 
“pure” effect of incarceration. Using the results of my placement prediction model, 
I calculate each subject’s predicted probability of placement as an independent 
variable (PREDPROB). PREDPROB is a continuous variable with values ranging 
from zero to one; a zero value means no chance of placement and a one value 
means that placement is inevitable. In doing so, I hope that differences in observed 
independent predictors, in combination, will also soak up unobserved cross-sample 
differences. Spohn and Holleran (2002) utilize this method in a similar analysis of 
adult offenders. Table 5.7 below displays the results of the logistic regression 
models with PLACEMENT and PREDPROB included as independent measures. 
Table 5.8 displays the results of the Cox survival models with PLACEMENT and 
PREDPROB included. No Cox model violates the proportional hazards 
assumption, and all appear to have a reasonable goodness of fit (Cox-Snell residual 
plots are displayed in Appendix A). 
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Any arrest  Felony arrest  Violent arrest  Violent felony 
Variable name  B  Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Odds  B Odds  B Odds 
Age  0.17*  1.19 0.13 1.13  0.02 1.02  0.05 1.05 
Male  1.67** 5.29  2.06** 7.85 1.82** 6.15 1.89** 6.60 
White 
Black  0.90* 2.47  1.21* 3.37  2.37** 10.69  2.60*  13.52 
Hispanic  0.58 1.78 0.84 2.33  2.31** 10.07  2.62*  13.79 
Other race  -0.44  0.65 0.60 1.82  2.12* 8.35  2.57* 13.05 
Bronx 
Brooklyn  0.21 1.24 0.06 1.06  0.17 1.19  0.35 1.42 
Manhattan  -0.12 0.89  -0.11 0.89 0.01  1.01 0.00  1.00 
Queens  0.08 1.08 -0.30  0.74  -0.09 0.91  0.05  1.05 
Staten Island  0.35 1.42 0.40 1.50  0.77 2.16  0.62 1.85 
Violent charge  -0.42* 0.65  -0.44* 0.64 -0.29 0.75  -0.21 0.81 
Misdemean. 
Felony C/D/E  0.16 1.18 0.18 1.20  -0.12 0.89  -0.03 0.97 
Felony A/B  2.05** 7.79  1.46** 4.32 1.00 2.73  0.64 1.89 
Other severity  0.33 1.39 0.64 1.89  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00 
Hist. Of assault  0.49* 1.64  0.56* 1.75  0.53* 1.71  0.53  1.70 
Prior arrests  0.29 1.34 0.20 1.22  0.25 1.28  0.20 1.22 
Neg. peers  0.28 1.32 0.21 1.23  0.29 1.34  0.29 1.33 
Family drug  -0.44 0.64  -0.40 0.67  -0.30 0.74  -0.07 0.93 
Parent conflict  0.01 1.01 0.29 1.34  0.23 1.26  0.12 1.12 
School attend.  0.94** 2.56  0.60*  1.82 0.48 1.62  -0.04  0.96 
Grades  -0.55* 0.57  -0.52  0.60 -0.38 0.68  -0.48 0.62 
Curr. drug use  0.34 1.41 0.36 1.43  0.18 1.20  0.34 1.40 
Counseling  0.27 1.31 0.23 1.26  0.22 1.25  0.35 1.42 
Detained  0.06 1.06 -0.27  0.76  0.35 1.42  0.18 1.20 
Prob. violator  -0.03 0.97  -0.13 0.88  -0.14 0.87  -0.17 0.85 
Prior PINS  -0.15 0.86  -0.09 0.91  -0.28 0.76  0.00  1.00 
Attitude  -0.41* 0.67  -0.30  0.74 -0.35 0.70  -0.52*  0.60 
PREDPROB  0.03 1.03 0.21 1.23  -0.43 0.65  -0.64 0.53 
PLACEMENT  0.19 1.21 0.32 1.38  0.10 1.11  0.44 1.55 
Constant  -5.50** 0.00  -6.11** 0.00  -5.79** 0.00  -6.96** 0.00 
Model Chi
2 
178.8**  148.2**  96.9**  86.2** 
Pseudo-R
2 
0.209  0.183  0.130  0.118 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
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placement) does not substantially change the regression results. Demographics 
continue to contribute the bulk of explanatory power. Legal and social variables 
make modest contributions.  
Placement itself does not appear to increase or decrease the risk of re-arrest 
(of any type). Across all four models, the PLACEMENT coefficient is small and 
non-significant. However, the coefficient is consistently positive, hinting at a slight 
criminogenic placement impact, or perhaps some degree of selection on 
unobserved variables. 
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Any arrest  Felony arrest  Violent arrest  Violent felony 
Variable name  B  Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B  Odds B  Odds B  Odds 
Age 0.17**  1.19  0.14*  1.15 0.04  1.04 0.05  1.05 
Male 1.25**  3.50  1.70**  5.48 1.63** 5.10 1.70** 5.48 
W h i t e 
Black 0.59*  1.81  0.89*  2.44 2.06** 7.85 2.33*  10.23 
Hispanic  0.49 1.63 0.77  2.15 2.14** 8.49 2.45*  11.62 
Other race  -0.27  0.76  0.49 1.64 2.02*  7.57 2.42*  11.28 
Bronx 
Brooklyn  0.16 1.18 0.13  1.14 0.18  1.20 0.28  1.33 
Manhattan 0.07 1.08 0.10  1.10 0.10  1.10 0.07  1.07 
Queens  0.12 1.13 -0.14  0.87 -0.06  0.94 0.00  1.00 
Staten  Island  0.35 1.41 0.44 1.55 0.73  2.07 0.55  1.74 
Violent charge  -0.23  0.79  -0.23  0.79 -0.20  0.82 -0.15  0.86 
Misdemeanor 
Felony  C/D/E  0.07 1.07 0.10  1.11 -0.14  0.87 -0.10  0.91 
Felony A/B  0.89**  2.45  1.08**  2.93 0.60  1.82 0.44  1.55 
Other severity  -0.03  0.97  0.21 1.24 -0.09  0.91 -0.03  0.97 
Hist. Of assault  0.32*  1.38  0.36*  1.44 0.38  1.46 0.41  1.51 
Prior arrests  0.26*  1.29  0.27 1.31 0.22  1.25 0.24  1.28 
Neg.  peers 0.18 1.20 0.19 1.21 0.27  1.31 0.24  1.27 
Family drug  -0.35  0.70  -0.30  0.74 -0.11  0.89 0.07  1.07 
Parent conflict  0.09  1.10  0.24 1.27 0.27  1.31 0.17  1.18 
School attend.  0.41**  1.51  0.30 1.35 0.25  1.28 -0.09  0.92 
Grades -0.38*  0.68  -0.40  0.67 -0.40  0.67 -0.48  0.62 
Curr. drug use  0.17  1.19  0.25 1.28 0.08  1.08 0.23  1.26 
Counseling  0.12 1.13 0.12  1.13 0.16  1.18 0.22  1.24 
Detained  0.09 1.09 -0.27  0.76 0.37  1.44 0.20  1.22 
Prob.  violator  0.02 1.02 0.01 1.01 -0.14  0.87 -0.12  0.89 
Prior PINS  -0.15  0.86  -0.12  0.89 -0.31  0.73 -0.08  0.92 
Attitude -0.30*  0.74  -0.24  0.79 -0.30  0.74 -0.42  0.65 
PREDPROB -0.11  0.89  0.11 1.11 -0.43  0.65 -0.57  0.57 
PLACEMENT  0.10 1.11 0.20  1.22  0.00 1.00  0.25 1.29 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
Placement does not appear to have a profound effect on time to recidivism 
either. The inclusion of the PLACEMENT and PREDPROB variables does not 
change the results of the survival models very much, and the coefficient associated 
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consistently positive, suggesting a minor acceleration in time to recidivism. 
5.5 Assessing the Impact of Punishment Severity: Length of Stay  
In order to assess whether the severity of punishment is related to the risk 
of recidivism, I estimate multivariate models with a variable indicating subjects’ 
length of stay in state placement facilities. For these models, I conduct analyses on 
a sub-sample of youth who were sentenced to placement, excluding those given 
probation, alternative-to-incarceration, and conditional discharge (n=394). Length 
of stay is operationalized as a continuous measure representing the number of days 
that youth spent incarcerated. Table 5.9 reports the logistic regression coefficients 
of the length of stay variable in the four recidivism models. All other independent 
predictors are included in these models, but for the sake of clarity, I do not report 
the associated coefficients. 
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B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
Any re-arrest  0.002*  1.002 
Felony re-arrest  0.001  1.001 
Violent re-arrest  0.001  1.001 
Violent felony re-arrest  0.001  1.001 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
The impact of length of stay is minimal. Among youth sentenced to 
placement, length of stay has a very small, but statistically significant, positive 
effect on the risk of any re-arrest. For every additional day that youth spend in 
placement, the risk of re-arrest is increased by about one-fifth of one percent 
(0.2%). There are no significant relationships between length of stay and felony, 
violent, or violent felony re-arrests. 
Table 5.10 displays length of stay coefficients from four Cox survival 
models predicting recidivism. 
Table 5.10: Length of Stay Coefficients in Four Recidivism Survival Models 
(N=698) 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
Any re-arrest  0.001  1.001 
Felony re-arrest  0.000  1.000 
Violent re-arrest  0.000  1.000 
Violent felony re-arrest  0.000  1.000 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
160 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Length of stay in placement has no impact whatsoever on the timing of 
recidivism. No coefficient in any of the Cox models is significant, and the 
coefficient values suggest no change in timing related to the length of placement. 
5.6 Differential Impacts: Testing the Control Hypotheses 
I have shown that placement, above and beyond other relevant predictors 
of recidivism, does not exert much effect on the timing or likelihood of juvenile re­
arrest patterns. But as I proposed in chapter two, there may be differential effects 
by youth characteristics. Specifically, I wish to determine whether there are 
differences by degree of conventional social bonding. I have identified four 
variables in my multivariate models that represent such bonding. They are: having 
negative peers (only), having significant conflict with a parent, school attendance, 
and grades. 
To operationalize this research agenda, I have created interaction terms that 
are included in multivariate models. When an interaction term coefficient is 
statistically significant, this indicates that the effect of one independent variable 
(i.e., placement) on the dependent variable (recidivism) differs by the value of the 
other independent variable (peers, parental conflict, attendance, grades). 
I re-estimate the four logistic regression models predicting various types of 
re-arrest with interaction terms included. Coefficients for placement*negative 
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placement*attendance coefficient was significant in the “any re-arrest” model, and 
the placement*grades coefficient was significant in both the any re-arrest model 
and the felony re-arrest model. The placement*grades coefficient was also nearly 
significant in the violent felony re-arrest model (p=0.06). 
I will first explore the interaction between placement and school 
attendance. Table 5.11 below reports the coefficients, in the “any re-arrest” model, 
for the placement variable, the attendance variable, and the placement*attendance 
interaction variable. For clarity, I will not report coefficients of other independent 
predictors in this section. 
Table 5.11: Placement*School Attendance Interaction Coefficients in the 
“Any Re-arrest” Logistic Regression Model (N=698) 
Variable Coefficient  (B) 
Placement 0.386 
Attendance 1.896** 
Placement*Attendance -1.581** 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
How are these coefficients to be interpreted? Assume the following 
regression equation where a is the intercept, BB1 is the PLACEMENT coefficient, 
B2
B  is the ATTENDANCE coefficient, and BB3 is the 
PLACEMENT*ATTENDANCE interaction coefficient: 
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Recall that the ATTENDANCE variable equals one when a subject is not enrolled 
in school, or attends less than ten percent of the time (“bad attender”); 
ATTENDANCE equals zero when a subject attends more than ten percent of the 
time (“good attender”). 
For good attenders (ATTENDANCE=0), the effect of placement 
(PLACEMENT=1) can be calculated as: 
Y = a + 0.386(1) + 1.896(0) – 1.581(1*0) 
OR 
Y = a + 0.386 
Placement thus has a modest criminogenic effect on good attenders. 
For bad attenders (ATTENDANCE=1), the effect of placement is 
calculated as: 
Y = a + 0.386(1) + 1.896(1) – 1.581(1*1) 
OR 
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Placement therefore also has a criminogenic effect on bad attenders, and this effect 
is larger than it is for good attenders. 
Next, I explore the differential impact of grades. Table 5.12 below displays 
coefficients for placement, grades and the placement*grades interaction in the any 
re-arrest, felony re-arrest and violent felony re-arrest regression models. 
Table 5.12: Placement*Grades Interaction Coefficients in Three Recidivism 
Regression Models (N=698) 
Coefficient  (B) 
Variable Any  re-arrest 
Felony re-
arrest 
Violent fel. re-
arrest 
Placement 0.003 0.147  0.292 
Grades -1.102**  -1.134**  -1.038* 
Placement*Grades 1.375**  1.400*  1.207 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
Using the same calculations as I made for good and bad attenders, I estimate that 
for subjects passing less than half their classes (GRADES=0), the effect of 
placement on the risk of (any) re-arrest is: 
Y = a + 0.003(1) – 1.102(0) + 1.375(1*0) 
OR 
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Placement has no apparent impact on youth with “bad” grades. For subjects 
passing more than half their classes (GRADES=1), I calculate the effect of 
placement as: 
Y = a + 0.003(1) -1.102(1) + 1.375(1*1) 
OR 
Y = a + 0.276 
Placement and grades interact in the opposite manner from placement and 
attendance. While placement has a larger criminogenic effect on youth with bad 
attendance, youth with good grades recidivate more when placed.  
Placement has a stronger criminogenic impact in terms of the risk of re­
arrest for youth with good grades than for youth with bad grades. This effect is 
similar when considering felony re-arrests and violent felony re-arrests. Among 
youth with bad grades, placement modestly increases the risk of re-arrest for a 
felony (Y=a+0.147) and the risk of re-arrest for a violent felony (Y=a+0.292; not 
statistically significant). Among youth with good grades though, placement 
increases the risk of re-arrest for a felony (Y=a+0.413) and the risk of re-arrest for 
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does for youth with bad grades. 
I re-ran the four multivariate Cox survival models with the control 
interactions included, and results were nearly identical to the logistic regression 
results. Among good attenders, placement slightly accelerated time to (any) arrest. 
Among bad attenders, placement substantially accelerated time to arrest. Among 
youth with bad grades, placement slightly accelerated time to re-arrest for felonies 
and violent felonies. Among youth with good grades, placement considerably 
shortened time to re-arrest, time to re-arrest for a felony, and time to re-arrest for a 
violent felony. In the interest of avoiding redundancy, I will spare further details of 
the survival models. 
School engagement then, has a profound interactive relationship with 
placement. While placement overall does not seem to have much of an impact on 
short-term recidivism, I am able to identify important differential effects by school 
attendance and academic performance. Let me reiterate the control theory 
hypotheses I proposed in chapter two: 
Hypothesis 3a: Among delinquent youth, the deterrent effect of incarceration will 
vary by level of social bonding. Those with higher levels of social bonding will 
recidivate later, and less frequently, than those with lower bonding levels. 
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associate positively with level of social bonding. Those with higher levels of social 
bonding will recidivate sooner, more frequently, and more severely, than those 
with lower bonding levels. 
Overall, I find placement to have a very small, non-significant, criminogenic 
effect. The school-related differential effects of placement, while significant, are 
confusing. Youth with bad attendance experience increased recidivism as a result 
of placement, but so do youth with good grades. Depending on the chosen measure 
of school engagement then, placement is either worse, or better, for academically-
engaged youth. 
5.7 Differential Impacts: Testing the Geographic Hypotheses 
Next, I attempt to determine whether geographic or neighborhood factors 
have any effect on recidivism risk, and subsequently, whether there are interactive 
relationships between placement and neighborhood characteristics. I re-estimate 
multivariate regression and survival models with geographic variables included. 
The first set of geographic variables I test in these models are derived from social 
disorganization theory, which posits that socially disorganized environments 
increase the probability of criminal activity. Using subjects’ zip codes, I have 
attached year 2000 U.S. Census data to my dataset that indicate: 
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persons (p) within each ethnic group from one (1-Σpi
2); 
•	 Percent of households with public assistance income;  
•	 Percent of residents living below poverty level;  
•	 Median family income;  
•	 Percent of owner occupied housing units; 
•  Percent of residents living in same house in 1995;   
Table 5.13 displays the logistic regression coefficients of the social disorganization 
variables. I do not report the coefficients for other included independent variables. 
Table 5.13: Social Disorganization Variable Coefficients in Logistic 
Regression Models Predicting Recidivism (N=698) 
Any re-arrest  Felony  Violent  Violent 
felony 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
Ethnic 
heterogeneity  0.81 2.24  0.86 2.36  0.10 1.11  0.26 1.29 
% public 
assistance  0.00 1.00  0.01 1.01  0.01 1.01  0.01 1.01 
% below 
poverty 0.01  1.01  0.01  1.01 
-
0.02 0.98 
-
0.02 0.98 
Median family 
inc.  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00 
% owner 
occupied  0.00 1.00  0.01 1.01 
-
0.01  0.99 
-
0.01  0.99 
% in same 
house  0.02 1.02  0.00 1.00  0.03 1.03  0.04 1.04 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
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effect sizes are not large. I also re-estimated the survival models with these 
geographic measures included, and results were similar. No variable was 
statistically significant. I tried using exploratory factor analysis to condense 
measures, and was able to create a “poverty” factor that combined median family 
income, percent of households with public assistance, and percent of residents 
living below the poverty line (alpha=0.909). However, this factor had no 
relationship to recidivism. I also created interaction terms between each variable 
and placement, and included these interaction variables in regression and survival 
models. None of the interaction terms was significant. 
Criminal opportunity theory contends that crime rates will be higher in 
geographic areas with more suitable targets and less capable guardianship. I have 
derived representative measures from the 2000 U.S. Census. They include:  
•	 Housing units per square mile (target);  
•	 Median rent asked (target); 
•	 Vehicles per square mile (target);  
•	 Percent of vacant housing units (guardianship); 
•	 Population density (guardianship); 
•	 Percent of population that works outside county of residence 

(guardianship); 

•	 Average travel time to work (guardianship);  
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variables across the four recidivism models. 
Table 5.14: Criminal Opportunity Variable Coefficients in Logistic 
Regression Models Predicting Recidivism (N=698) 
Any re-arrest  Felony  Violent  Violent felony 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
B Exp(B) 
[Odds] 
Housing units 
per  sq  mile  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00 
Median rent 
asked  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00 
Vehicles per 
sq  mile  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00 
% vacant 
housing  units 0.03 1.03  0.04 1.04  0.02 1.02  0.02 1.02 
Population 
density  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00 
% working 
outside  -
county 0.00  1.00  0.01 0.99  0.01 1.01  0.00 1.00 
Average 
travel time to  -
work  0.01 0.99  0.02 1.02  0.01 1.01  0.00 1.00 
* p≤.05; ** p≤.01 (one-tailed) 
Like the social disorganization measures, none of the criminal opportunity 
measures was significant in any model. Results were similar in the multivariate 
survival models, and I found no interactive effects between any of these variables 
and placement. 
There are a number of reasons why geographic factors do not impact 
recidivism in my analysis. The most straightforward explanation would be that 
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draw this conclusion, as my analysis is riddled with methodological problems. 
First, my measures of social disorganization and criminal opportunity appear too 
crude to be meaningful. Second, using zip code as a neighborhood proxy may 
produce analytical “neighborhoods” that are too large to be able to isolate 
geographic effects. Similarly, zip codes may cross the boundaries of 
neighborhoods, further muddling the findings. These are limitations of the U.S. 
Census. Third, most of this study’s subjects are clustered in New York City’s most 
disadvantaged areas. This was obvious during the data collection process; court-
involved youth live almost exclusively in the same neighborhoods, such as 
Harlem, East New York, and the south Bronx. Because of this limited variation in 
neighborhoods’ character, my statistical analyses are unlikely to detect 
neighborhood effects. 
Thus, I do not believe that I can affirm or refute the predictions of social 
disorganization theory or criminal opportunity theory, as my tests are simply 
inadequate. My data are well suited to testing individual-level theories, but poorly 
suited to testing community-level theories. 
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In this chapter, I have explored patterns of recidivism among delinquent 
youth in New York City, identified individual-level characteristics associated with 
an increased risk of recidivism, estimated the impact of placement on recidivism 
likelihood, and discerned interactive effects between placement and other factors.  
Overall, I find recidivism rates to be high, with almost half of my study 
subjects getting re-arrested within eighteen months of disposition or release from 
placement. The average time to re-arrest is 215 days, though slightly longer for 
more serious types of recidivism. If family court contact has any deterrent effect, it 
is short-lived. There is a brief period (about fifty days post-disposition) of 
suppressed offending, followed by a more rapid increase in the risk of re-arrest 
that lasts for about a year, after which the re-arrest rate slows again. While this 
pattern holds across all four recidivism measures, it is less pronounced for violent 
recidivism and violent felony recidivism. 
The best predictors of recidivism are demographics. Boys are much more 
likely than girls to recidivate, and there are substantial differences by race, 
particularly with regard to violent recidivism and violent felony recidivism. Once 
again, however, one must be careful not to jump to the conclusion that youth of 
color are simply more violent than white youth. Communities of color are likely to 
be more heavily policed, and youth of color may penetrate more deeply into the 
system because of systemic biases. Race, also, could be a proxy for class or other 
172 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.differential characteristics that are related to the risk of re-offense. Along with 
demographic factors, some legal and social characteristics contribute to the 
prediction of recidivism. School engagement, for one, appears to relate 
significantly to risk. Youth who are out of school a lot may simply have more 
ample time to offend, or the reasons that they choose not to engage school may 
also be related to their criminal propensities.  
Placement itself has no apparent relationship to recidivism, neither 
increasing nor decreasing risk. While regression and survival models show 
consistent positive (criminogenic) effects, none of these effects was statistically 
significant. Length of stay in incarceration also appears to have minimal impact.  
The most interesting finding from this chapter’s analysis has to do with 
interactive effects between placement and school engagement. While placement, 
on its own, does not affect recidivism, I find significant differential effects by 
school attendance and grades. The findings related to differential placement effects 
by school engagement are, however, contradictory. Placement increases the 
likelihood of recidivism (and decreases time to recidivism) for: 
1.  Youth who do not attend school very often (poorly engaged youth). 
2.  Youth who pass more than half of their classes (better engaged youth). 
While these findings are hard to explain and reconcile, when they are taken in 
conjunction with other findings in this chapter, they highlight the profound 
dilemma of the juvenile justice system. Initial regression results show that poor 
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findings alone, we might suggest to policymakers that youth who are poorly-
engaged in school should be flagged for placement, as they are most likely to 
recidivate. When asked to consider the best interests of youth though, such a 
policy does not seem as sensible, as placement will have a larger negative effect 
for some poorly-engaged youth than for others. Specifically, placement increases 
the recidivism of youth who do not attend school very often. In light of this, how 
should juvenile justice decisionmakers view the function of incarceration? The 
inability of juvenile sanctions to simultaneously address the issues of public safety 
and youths’ best interests is brought into profound relief, as placement, in many 
cases, cannot address one without compromising the other. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 

This dissertation has explored the function and effect of juvenile 
incarceration in New York City. I have attempted to address two distinct, but 
analytically and politically intertwined questions: 
•  Why are youth incarcerated? 
•  What effect does incarceration have on juvenile re-offending patterns? 
Using data collected from Department of Probation case files found in the New 
York City Family Court, I have developed measures that capture a wide range of 
characteristics of delinquent youth, and used these data to predict the likelihood of 
incarceration, as well as the likelihood of recidivism for a sample of youth given 
dispositions between April and June of 2000. Multivariate statistical techniques 
have identified the institutional reasons behind juvenile incarceration, as well as 
the effects of incarceration on four types of recidivism in a controlled eighteen 
month follow-up period: any re-arrest, re-arrest for a felony, re-arrest for a violent 
offense, and re-arrest for a violent felony. 
175 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.In the adult justice system, incarceration is meant to achieve a range of 
goals, though debates rage about their underlying rationales and utilities. These 
goals include: incapacitation, retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 
Incarceration certainly incapacitates offenders for some period of time; there is no 
doubt that this goal is effectively accomplished (not considering escapes from 
incarceration). And retribution, debatably, is also accomplished. The evidence on 
deterrence is mixed at best, as is evidence about rehabilitative effects. Regardless 
of which goal is considered the most important, the principal rationale behind 
incarcerating adults is to reduce the threat to public safety through the reduction of 
present and future criminal activity. 
In the juvenile justice system, however, the purpose of incarceration is 
more confused, as young people in America are perceived differently from adults. 
Regardless of the nature of their crimes, young offenders are not viewed as fully 
culpable, and are always legally considered as candidates for effective 
rehabilitation. Judges and JPOs, who are the most important decision-makers in 
the family court, are thus subject to a confusing mandate in making dispositional 
decisions about youth. The historical development of juvenile justice, as well as 
the conceived role of the young offender within the system, has resulted in a 
mandate that orders the simultaneous consideration of both public safety and child 
welfare in making dispositional decisions. But these purposes are often at odds, 
and court actors must find a way to resolve them. This is not always easy, 
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needing services or treatment, or that youth who may be best served in the 
community may also present a substantial risk to public safety. But given that the 
youth who are most likely to offend are generally the youth with most problems, 
what are the real reasons behind the decision to incarcerate? That is, how do court 
actors resolve this dilemma of juvenile justice? Adult dispositions are driven by a 
discrete number of legal factors – most notably the character of the offense and the 
defendant’s legal history. However, since family court dispositions may be based 
on a whole host of factors pertaining to youths’ perceived risk and their putative 
needs, the task of identifying reasons behind juvenile placement is more 
challenging, and requires more information than administrative data alone can 
provide. 
I find that JPOs and judges in New York City, in making their dispositional 
decisions, are very concerned with factors that are organizationally and personally 
proximate. It is nearly impossible, given the limited resources and abilities of the 
state placement system, to consistently order dispositions that optimally preserve 
public safety and serve the needs of court-involved youth. Instead, actors appear to 
solve this problem by adopting markers of institutional compliance and non­
compliance as the driving forces behind dispositional recommendations and 
orders. Youth who demonstrate to the court that they cannot or will not obey its 
orders are identified as prime candidates for incarceration. In multivariate models 
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such markers, including probation violation, pre-trial detention, prior arrests, and 
prior status offenses are among the most powerful predictors of placement. When 
court officials see that youth have not learned their lesson as a result of prior court 
contact, youth are “stepped up” to more severe sanctions. Similarly, when youth 
are not viewed as adequately contrite or remorseful, officials are inclined to punish 
them more severely. I find that youth who minimize, justify or deny their crimes 
are significantly more likely to be recommended and ordered for state placement 
than youth who are willing to take some responsibility for their offenses. 
JPOs and judges may perceive markers of institutional non-compliance as 
indicators of increased offense risk, but empirically, they contribute little to the 
prediction of recidivism. The best predictors of recidivism are factors that court 
actors cannot control, and furthermore, are unable to cite as reasons for 
incarceration. Gender and race are the most consistent predictors of re-offending. 
School engagement is another promising area for investigation. My recidivism 
analyses show that attendance and grades both contribute to the prediction of re-
offending, and that engagement in school may be a good proxy indicator for 
youths’ propensity to offend. 
I have shown that placement decisions are based on the degree to which 
youth demonstrate that they have “learned their lesson” from prior sanctioning. 
The question that logically follows is: Does placement teach this lesson? That is, 
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subsequent offending? I find that, at least in the short term, it does not. Placement 
does not suppress the frequency or speed of recidivism. If anything, it may have a 
very small criminogenic effect. Across multivariate regression and survival models 
predicting four types of re-arrest, the placement coefficient is small, positive and 
non-significant. 
Some interesting findings of this dissertation emerge from the analysis of 
differential placement effects. I find that school engagement is a critical area of 
distinction. Placement has different impacts depending on whether youth are well-
engaged or poorly-engaged in school, though these findings are confusing and 
difficult to interpret. Among youth who attend school infrequently (or never), 
placement has a positive and statistically significant association with the risk of 
recidivism. This effect is substantially greater than the comparable effect 
placement on “good attenders,” and suggests that these “bad attenders” may have 
their remaining, tenuous, social bonds destroyed by the experience of 
incarceration. Strangely, youth who have better achievement in school (passing 
more than half their classes) experience greater recidivism as a result of placement 
than youth who pass less than half their classes. So I find some evidence that 
placement is more suitable for better-bonded youth, and other evidence that 
placement is more suitable for poorly-bonded youth. These findings are confusing, 
but perhaps it is more useful to step away from examining specific incarceration 
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meant to simultaneously address the best interests of public safety and child 
welfare, these findings indicate that this goal is elusive. Bad attenders and bad 
achievers, overall, are more likely to recidivate. Thus, if public safety were the 
principal concern of juvenile dispositional decisions, such youth should be flagged 
for placement. However, I also find evidence that bad attenders will experience 
relatively higher recidivism rates as a result of placement. This suggests that 
placement, in terms of youths’ welfare, is not the correct disposition for bad 
attenders. So which goal – public safety or youth interests – is to take precedence 
here? This dissertation shows that one cannot be prioritized without, at least in 
some cases, compromising the other. 
6.1 Implications for Research 
In terms of family court processing, this research supports other work that 
highlights organizational mechanisms by which court actors resolve the “risk and 
need” dilemma of juvenile justice. In the case of New York City juvenile justice, 
actors tend to conform to established institutional decision processes that step 
youth up to harsher penalties when they prove themselves to be non-compliant 
with prior sanctions (Asquith 1983; Cicourel 1968; Reese, Curtis and Richard 
1989). This is likely due to the limited range of options available to JPOs, judges 
and others in the system, and the fact that the juvenile justice system is often the 
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children’s services, foster care, mental health). Placement will certainly not 
optimally meet the needs of every youth who is placed, and court actors may not 
believe in the notion that incarceration will deter youth from further criminal 
activity, but when youth cannot abide by the orders of prior court contact without 
incident, the court’s limited range of options (and the limited time of actors) tends 
to push these youth further up the scale of sanctions. As Asquith (1983) posits, 
court officials seem to have adopted a “frame of relevance” to justify young 
offenders’ movement up the sanction scale; this frame of relevance is shaped by 
court ideologies about the purpose and function of various sanctions. The juvenile 
justice system is supposed to mete out individualized justice based on the unique 
needs and risk of each youth, but resource constraints and the broad diversity of 
problems that youth present inherently challenge this mandate. In the end, 
decision-makers must choose among a limited set of dispositional options – none 
of which may be appropriate for a particular youth. When options run out, or when 
re-offending appears likely in the absence of a restrictive intervention, placement 
is likely. 
My findings illustrate the complex relationship between the official goals 
of juvenile justice and the ways that court actors attempt to meet those goals in 
their day-to-day work. The New York City Family Court system does not conduct 
routine recidivism analyses.
xli JPOs and judges are aware, however, of when youth 
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orders, they are typically handled by the same JPO and often the same judge. But 
youth who get re-arrested may be adjudicated in another borough, or even another 
state, or they may age into the adult system. The point being that the court does not 
have a systematic understanding of recidivism risk, but is well aware of instances 
when youth fail to comply with its orders. In addition, it is intuitive and logical to 
move non-compliant youth up a standard sanction scale, as opposed to carefully 
(and systematically) considering a multitude of interrelated factors, as I have done 
in this dissertation. JPOs and judges simply do not have the time or energy to do 
this. 
Future research should further investigate the precise means by which court 
actors assess delinquent youth, as well as the short- and long-term effects of these 
decisions. More qualitative work in this area is needed. Seminal studies by 
Cicourel (1968), Emerson (1969), and Asquith (1983) were informative in this 
regard, and effectively highlighted court operation and inter- relationships between 
critical actors. However, given the changes that have occurred in the perception 
and administration of justice in recent years, it would be useful to understand, in 
an empirically rich way, the reasons that officials believe young people should be 
incarcerated, and the impact that they believe incarceration will have on individual 
and collective welfare. 
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dispositions, as well as some work on identifying biases in dispositions and 
assessments (Bridges & Steen 1998; Carter 1979; Dannefer & Schutt 1982; 
Frazier, Bishop & Henretta 1992; Gross 1967; Horowitz & Pottieger 1991; 
Horwitz & Wasserman 1980; Kowalski & Rickicki 1982; McCarthy & Smith 
1986; Phillips & Dinitz 1982; Sanborn 1996; Thomas & Cage 1977; Teilman & 
Landry 1981; Thornberry 1973; Tittle & Curran 1988). It is rare, however, for 
research on discretionary court actions to intersect with research on juvenile 
recidivism (but see Minor, Hartmann and Terry 1997). This intersection is in 
critical need of development, as it has profound implications for policy. This 
dissertation begins to fill this gap. Again, I identify distinct inconsistencies 
between the factors that drive placement and the factors that predict recidivism. 
Placement, it seems, is driven by factors representing youths’ relationships with 
the court, while recidivism is driven by demographic and social factors. 
(Recidivism is also harder to predict.) 
This dissertation also contributes to an understudied area of criminological 
scholarship – the impact of incarceration on juvenile populations. I move beyond 
the simple assessment of aggregate impact, and have attempted to discern 
differential effects by social and geographic characteristics of youth. In terms of 
the effect of placement, I find that, at least in the short term, placement has no 
apparent impact on re-offending. This is an important point, as it calls into 
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what juvenile incarceration is for, we must first understand what juvenile 
incarceration does. Placement does not seem to reduce recidivism for everyone. 
Though my findings in this regard are difficult to interpret, I believe that the 
degree to which youth are bonded to legitimate institutions is a promising area for 
future research. Subsequent studies should further develop measures of this bond 
and explore its role in conditioning recidivism and the effects of sanctioning. One 
limitation of this dissertation is that most of the data was collected from JPO-
written reports. Not only are these reports colored by the unique personal and 
occupational perspectives of court officials, they are also subject to biases in 
interviews between JPOs, youth and parents. Self-censorship is certainly a 
concern. More reliable baseline information, which can be obtained through direct 
interviews with delinquent youth and their families or the cross-referencing of 
other types of official records (i.e., school records, family services records), would 
facilitate the rigorous exploration of the complex relationship between youth 
characteristics, sanctions, and criminal behavior. I would encourage research 
investigating the role of such characteristics as: 
•  Family engagement and conflict; 
•  Peer influences; 
•  Participation in organized activities; 
•  Participation in school and work; 
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6.2 Implications for Policy 
This research can also help to inform policy and practice in the juvenile 
justice system. I believe that there are three broad areas that can benefit: 
•  Highlighting the utility of standardized risk assessment; 
•  Clarifying the function of juvenile placement; 
•  Helping policymakers understand the role and function of social bonds. 
The data used in this dissertation were originally intended to facilitate the 
design and implementation of a standardized risk assessment instrument in New 
York City. I helped to develop this instrument while employed at the Vera Institute 
of Justice. Because of some of the issues I have highlighted in this dissertation – 
namely, inconsistency in ad hoc assessment and lack of institutional knowledge 
about predictors of recidivism risk – the Department of Probation asked Vera to 
create an instrument that would classify youth according to their risk of re-
offending. This instrument has been created and is now in use. JPOs use this 
instrument to make dispositional recommendations to judges based on a scored 
scale of factors that are empirically associated with recidivism. 
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recidivism, it has also highlighted inconsistency between the factors that JPOs had 
previously considered important, and factors that are important. Adopting a 
locally-validated standard assessment instrument helps JPOs make 
recommendations based on research and data, and it also tempers inconsistency 
across JPOs and across boroughs. Recall that in chapter four I found statistically 
significant differences in recommendations and dispositions by borough. This 
raises serious ethical concerns, as youth adjudicated in the Bronx, controlling for 
other factors, are more likely than youth in other boroughs to be placed. The 
adoption of a risk assessment instrument addresses these concerns directly. Not 
only are borough-by-borough inconsistencies remedied, but differences by JPO 
and judge are also reduced.
xlii,xliii 
Relatedly, the findings of this research can also help to clarify the function 
of juvenile incarceration in the minds of court actors. Knowing the characteristics 
that are associated with lesser and greater risk, and letting this knowledge inform 
practice, JPOs and judges can better identify those youth who are best served by 
placement, and those who should not be incarcerated. The use of this knowledge 
should be driven by the official goals of placement. If placement is meant to deter 
or rehabilitate, then those youth whose recidivism is most effectively reduced by 
placement (i.e., poorly-bonded youth) should be flagged, and efforts should be 
made to divert those who would benefit least (i.e., well-bonded youth) to 
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only the most dangerous youth – those at highest risk of re-offending – should be 
placed. Finally, if placement is meant only as retribution, then this research is of 
little use, and only the most heinous offenders should be locked up. I would 
encourage the routine collection and analysis of data by family court officials, in 
order to ensure that placement is being used appropriately, and that negative 
effects (higher recidivism) are minimized.
xliv 
My findings also illustrate that for young offenders, the role of social 
bonding needs to be given consideration in making decisions that will profoundly 
affect their lives. And this finding need not only be considered at disposition. Early 
interventions, such as pre-trial diversion and the assignment of adjournments in 
contemplation of dismissal (ACDs), can take degree of bonding into account – 
both in assessments of suitability and the assignment of appropriate services. 
Youth who do well in school can be favored with low-intensity supervision, and 
allowed to prove that their delinquency was not part of a repeating pattern of 
misbehavior. Youth who are not invested in school, conversely, might be given 
high-intensity educational programming as a precursor to placement. Failure to 
engage such a program can cement the identification of placement as a last resort 
measure to effectively serve the youth and protect public safety. Though not 
definitive, my findings suggest that youth who show themselves to be invested in 
traditional beliefs, practices and institutions should be “stepped up” the sanction 
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engagement appears to be negatively related to the propensity to recidivate. 
Among those who demonstrate low engagement, every effort should be made to 
reestablish their ties to conventional practices and institutions. 
6.3 Final Note 
This dissertation has used rich data to analyze patterns of family court 
action, as well as recidivism. The connection of these two areas of analysis is vital 
to the reform and improvement of juvenile justice in America. We must strive to 
understand the reasons why youth offend, the reasons behind harsh punishment, 
and the interrelationships between criminality, sanctioning, and court organization. 
Moreover, researchers must continue to pursue streams of inquiry into system 
biases and inequalities such as disproportionate minority confinement. Youth of 
color, for example, comprise roughly 94% of my study sample, while the 2000 
U.S. Census reports that only 22% of New York City residents are people of color.  
A holistic approach to the study of juvenile justice processing will allow 
the creation of a transparent, effective, and humane system for the most vulnerable 
members of our society. Given its potential consequences and the profound effects 
on those involved, the decision to incarcerate young people should not be taken 
lightly. As a society, we need to clearly establish the rationales for incarceration, 
and ensure that we abide by them. 
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Survival Diagnostics 

Below, I display eight plots of Cox-Snell residuals, which correspond to 
the eight multivariate survival models reported in Chapter 5. 
Dependent variable: Any re-arrest (PLACEMENT is not included as an 
independent variable) 
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i By “benefit,” I refer to reduction in subsequent recidivism. 
ii In the New York State juvenile justice system, “placement” refers to the 
incarceration of youth in state-run facilities. Placement is the most severe sentence 
a young person can receive from the New York family court.  
iii This figure (annual cost of placement) is not readily available, but is generally 
cited as being between sixty thousand and eighty thousand dollars. 
iv “Involved” is the semantic equivalent of “guilty” in the New York State juvenile 
justice system. 
v This has changed. The data used in this dissertation was originally used to design 
a structured risk assessment instrument for use by JPOs (I was part of the original 
research team). This instrument was introduced in New York City juvenile 
probation offices in 2004, with the goal of reducing disparities in discretionary 
recommendation patterns, and more ambitiously, to reduce the overall level of 
placement in the city. The impacts of this instrument’s adoption are not yet clear, 
as there has not been sufficient time for a follow-up study. 
vi If the family court is closed (i.e., in the evening or on the weekend), arrested 
youth may be detained in New York City Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) 
facilities until their first court appearance. Or, if the arresting officer deems it 
appropriate, youth may be released to their families and told when to show up for 
their first court appointment. 
vii Serious youthful offenders who commit one or more of fifteen specified felonies 
(e.g., murder) are termed “juvenile offenders” and processed in adult criminal 
court. 
viii In the adult system, adjustment is commonly called “diversion.” 
ix Personal communication with Casey Eiseman, Intake Coordinator for the 
Esperanza/Hope program, New York, NY. 
x Secure detention is reserved for youth who are considered most dangerous or 
likely to abscond. Limited secure detention is given to less-risky youth. The court 
can also order “open” detention, allowing DJJ to make the decision based on 
available bed space and their assessment of risk. Between court dates, detention 
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foster care, or a group home). The judge may order a previously paroled youth to 
be detained; this often happens when a youth is re-arrested while on parole. The 
judge may also change the restriction level of detention. Changes in detention 
status usually occur as a result of DJJ reports about a youth’s behavior.  
xi When involvement is established but the charges are not very serious (e.g., 
turnstile-jumping, petit larceny, disorderly conduct), the judge may order an 
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD). This decision effectively 
delays the dispositional decision for six months, with attached conditions. The 
youth will be told to remain arrest-free, attend school, refrain from substance use, 
and avoid negative peers. If six months pass without incident, the case is dismissed 
and sealed. If the youth gets into trouble, the case is reopened and a harsher 
disposition is assigned. 
xii This is generally done by contacting the Administration for Children’s Services 
(ACS) and inquiring about existing or pre-existing complaints. 
xiii For minor cases that make it through the adjudication stage, judges can order an 
“adjournment in contemplation of dismissal” (ACD). This is not unlike JPO 
adjustment. The youth is ordered to stay out of trouble for six months, at which 
point the case is retroactively dismissed. If the youth does get into trouble, by 
getting re-arrested or failing to attend school or some other means, the original 
case is re-opened and a disposition is issued. 
xiv Today, a program called Esperanza/Hope has been added to this roster of 
alternative-to-placement options. Esperanza provides family-based therapy in the 
community for youth who would have otherwise been placed. 
xv Literally: “parent of the country.” 
xvi Interestingly, Fader et al. also find that while decisions to place first-time 
offenders are driven heavily by family functioning factors, decisions to place 
youths with prior offense histories are based principally on legal factors,  
suggesting that the parens patriae doctrine may apply more strongly to those with 
shorter records. 
xvii To date, most literature that has looked exclusively at the actions of POs has 
focused on the background characteristics of POs that influence recommendation 
outcomes.  In terms of educational attainment, it is not surprising that PO’s with a 
background in social work tend to lean towards rehabilitative recommendations, 
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sanctions (Anderson & Spanier 1980; Brennan & Khinduka 1970). Similarly, 
younger POs and those who reported being delinquent themselves were less likely 
to recommend rehabilitative strategies (Reese, Curtis & Whitworth 1988). Burnout 
and cynicism were also found to contribute to the attitudes, behaviors, and 
ultimately, the decisions of POs (Rush 1992). 
xviii Some research on the juvenile court suggests that “demeanor” actually cloaks 
differential attributions of criminal character that are rooted in the race of the 
accused. Bridges and Steen (1998) find that JPOs are more likely to explain black 
youths’ criminality through internal attributions such as a “bad character,” while 
the acts of white youth are more often linked to external factors such as peer group 
or family conflict. The effect of race is mediated by the type of assigned 
attribution. Black youth are more likely to receive harsher sanctions because their 
behavior is more likely to be explained by internal factors (see also Cicourel 1968; 
Emerson 1969).   
xix Here, it is important to note the limitations of sample matching as a quasi-
experimental method. Because the most serious prisoners have no comparable 
cases in the probation sample, and the least serious probationers have no 
comparable prison cases, this type of sample matching essentially simulates an 
experimental comparison between “softer” prisoners and “harder” probationers. 
Consequently, it is impossible to draw conclusions about sentencing effects on the 
most serious prisoners and the least serious probationers. However, this type of 
design is useful in determining the effects of competing dispositions on offenders 
who might realistically end up in either sample due to discretionary court 
dynamics. 
xx Nationally, the number of adjudicated juvenile cases that resulted in out-of­
home placement rose from 119,700 in 1989 to 163,800 in 1998 - an increase of 
37% (Puzzanchera 2002). 
xxi Levitt’s (1998) aggregate state-level analysis of the relationship between state 
sanctioning and juvenile criminal involvement serves as a test of the general 
deterrent effects of juvenile sanctions. Levitt finds that crime rates decrease with 
associated increases in sentencing severity, providing some support for the idea of 
general deterrence. 
xxii More generally, in a study of English youth, De Li (1999) finds that (all) legal 
sanctions are associated with increases in subsequent delinquent activity, and 
indirectly associated with decreased status achievement. 
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youth delinquency in general (Elliott & Menard 1996; Farrington 1995; Keenan et 
al. 1995; Simons et al. 1994; Wasserman et al. 2003). 
xxiv This sample of juvenile delinquents does not include the most serious offenders 
(termed “juvenile offenders” in New York), who commit one or more of fifteen 
specified felonies (e.g. murder), and whose cases are waived to adult criminal 
court. 
xxv One data coder, who had extensive justice system experience and displayed an 
excellent understanding of family court processing, was eventually promoted, and 
stood in as a senior staff member for some of the data collection. 
xxvi Presumably, some (unknown) number of these youth are being truthful. They 
may indeed have had minimal involvement, but have erroneously been judged 
“involved” by the family court. 
xxvii Stepparents, adopted parents, and other adult family members such as 
grandparents and aunts were counted as parental figures. During data collection, 
we examined case files for evidence of adult caretakers in the household, and 
counted all relevant figures as “parents.” Thus, if a youth lives with his mother and 
his grandmother, and both have some degree of authority over and responsibility 
for the youth, both are counted as parents. 
xxviii “Moving between family units” means that the figures in the household 
actually changed, not just that the youth had moved residences. A typical scenario 
would involve a youth moving from his mother’s house to his grandmother’s 
house. 
xxix School characteristics reflect behavior in the three months preceding arrest. If 
this three-month period included summer vacation, we collected data on the three 
months that the youth had last been in school. 
xxx STATA Version 8. 
xxxi In recidivism analyses, follow-up time is sometimes also termed “time at risk.” 
xxxiihttp://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTGeoSearchByListServlet?ds_name=DE 
C_2000_SF3_U&_lang=en&_ts=74694218710 
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chosen persons do not belong to the same (ethnic) group” (Blau 1977, p.78). To 
create this measure, I subtract the sum of the squared proportions of persons (p) 
within each ethnic group from one (1-Σpi
2), which accounts for the total number of 
groups represented in the population, and the distributions of persons among the 
groups (Blau 1977; Warner & Rountree 1997).  
xxxiv In true “experimental” designs, such as random treatment/control group 
assignment, these problems do not exist, as treatment and control groups are 
presumably identical on measured and unmeasured characteristics. 
xxxv Patricia Brennan, Deputy Commissioner of Family Court Services; Pamela 
Hardy, Assistant Commissioner of Family Court Services. 
xxxvi The Cox and Snell R
2 for this model was 0.506. The Nagelkerke R
2 was 
0.695. 
xxxvii The crude proxy of zip code for “neighborhood” may also dilute the accuracy 
of this measurement. See chapter 5 for further discussion. 
xxxviii The Cox and Snell R
2 for this model was 0.476. The Nagelkerke R
2 was 
0.634. 
xxxix When youth are discharged from OCFS placement, they are placed on OCFS 
aftercare for some period of time (typically a few months). Aftercare is the 
juvenile equivalent of adult parole. 
xl For the sake of clarity in table 5.3, I recoded age at disposition from a 
continuous measure to a dichotomous one. 
xli  But see Frederick (1999), who conducted a sophisticated one-time recidivism 
analysis of youth leaving New York State placement facilities. 
xlii The instrument is not totally binding. JPOs and their supervisors can override 
the recommendation in cases where they deem it warranted. Therefore, differences 
in patterns of override can still cause some bias. 
xliii Unfortunately, I could not analyze recommendation and disposition differences 
across individual JPOs and judges. While this information was collected, I was 
forced to strip the data away for my dissertation analyses. 
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